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Abstract 
The motivation of this study was to explore how the design choices created when 
developing Performance Management (hereafter PM), produces proposals of how to 
coordinate and motivate operational employees in performing their tasks, and to 
which extent they are successful in doing so. PM is often postulated as a management 
resource in organizing employee contribution to value creation. Here, it is often 
suggested that carefully designed PM promotes organizational value creation, by 
facilitating the motivation and coordination of employees’ contribution. However, the 
way in which design choices function to suggest how to define the boundaries of what 
it means to coordinate and motivate employees in practice is less clear.  
I therefore set out to study the different design choices made on three central elements 
in a new operational Performance Management System (PMS hereafter), to explore 
how these design choices propose ideas of how to coordinate and motivate 
employees’ value creation in daily operations. My study follow the design choices 
made with regard to leading indicators (e.g. performance measures), performance 
targets and feedback over a period of three years (2012-2014). I do so, to investigate 
how design choices made on these three elements play a significant role in assigning 
specific property to what motivation and coordination of operational employees 
entails in practice.  For example, the study illustrate how the choice to design leading 
indicators as key behavioral indicators (KBIs hereafter) propose that coordination of 
employees contribution means to point out what they should do when performing key 
activities. Detailed accounts such as this, provides rich insight into how design 
choices suggest distinctive, meaning to how to coordinate and/or motivate employees 
in their daily operations, which produce the boundaries of desired action.  
In chapter 2, I provide a selected overview of the current understanding of the issue of 
designing PM within selected management accounting literature. Chapter 2 outlines 
current knowledge regarding the design of the selected PM elements e.g. leading 
indicators (performance measures), performance targets and feedback. This overlook 
of current knowledge is interesting as this identify how my study contributes with 
additional insight to current understanding of the design of PM. I find that most 
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studies concerned with the design of PM are quite vague with regards to provide 
detailed accounts of how the actual design choices made when developing PMS shape 
how organizational members understand what it means to coordinate and motivate 
value creation in practice. This in turn, imply the need of more insight as of how 
design choices shapes this, by proposing ideas of what it entails to coordinate and 
motivate employees value contribution. For example, while rich discussion of the 
value of leading indicators exists, few of the papers provide detailed descriptions of 
how organizations actually design leading indicators to lets say, point out what tasks 
to focus on, as well as how the selected design choice then shapes the perception of 
how PMS facilitates value creation. Thus, current appreciation of how design choices 
propose to define the boundaries of what it means to coordinate and motivate 
employees in practice is scarce. Additionally, my study also adds insight into the 
interesting design choices, which has received scant attention in prior literature, such 
as setting threshold targets, denoting setting targets for minimum level of 
performance, or designing feedback, which is provided by the individual himself 
(herself).  
In chapter 3, I clarify how and why I have used Callon's (1998) notions of framing 
and overflowing in order to study the design of PM from a performative perspective. I 
draw upon Callon's (1998) idea of framing, which implies to study how the ideas 
motivation and coordination proposed by the design choices produces boundaries that 
constructs the meaning of coordination and motivation in practice. Hence, design 
choices are here studied as actors that frame, denoting that design choices produce 
boundaries of action by suggesting what it is that employees should do, in order act 
within the boundaries of motivation and coordination of value creation. For example, 
the design of KBIs (e.g. leading indicators) pointed out the key activities (e.g. having 
customer meetings and making customer phone calls) or design of threshold 
performance targets pointed out how much to do (e.g., making 5 meetings a week or 
making 10 phone calls a week). More precisely, I understand framing as the making 
of boundaries that seek to regulate and shape action, and here it is argued that part of 
what frames action, is the ideas of what motivated and coordinated action is, which is 
proposed by the design choices. The focus here is to study how these ideas produce 
boundaries of action, but just as much how these boundaries make the design choices 
performative when they are contested, which lead to reframing ideas of what 
6 
coordination and motivation of employees means in practice (e.g. performativity). 
Consequently, this implies that I study how the meaning of coordination and 
motivation is constructed from making and contesting design choices. This is 
consistent with the performative ontology, which suggest that the meaning motivation 
and coordination cannot exist a priori, but must be constructed. Here, the argument is 
that the design choices play a significant role in doing so. Of course, it requires more 
than making design choices alone to construct (e.g. frame) the boundaries that shape 
the meaning of what to coordinate and motivate employee contribution entails. Still, 
my analysis shows how design choices partake significantly in this boundary making, 
by proposing detailed ideas of what coordination and motivation entails in practice. 
However, the ideas proposed in the design choices are only pro-position (anticipated 
effect), which is contested and modified when enacted. Because the proposed ideas 
are contested, design choices are performative, as this leads to new ways to suggest 
how to motivate and coordinate employee contribution. Callon (1998) carefully 
underline that framing is inescapably linked to overflowing, wherefore, studying 
framing involves to studying how the propositions of coordination and motivation 
proposed by the design choices are challenged and modified (i.e. overflows produced 
via the interaction with the branches).  
The study is motivated to contribute to current literature on design of PM, by stating 
the following research question: How does the design choices related to performance 
measures (i.e. leading indicators), performance targets and feedback contribute to the 
performance management systems framing of the coordination and motivation of 
operational staff (i.e. financial advisors) and how does the operational level response 
to the design choice potentially modify the way in which the design choices do so?  
Chapter 6 informs my research question by providing a rich account of how the 
choice to design leading indicators (e.g. performance measures on the key dimension 
of work processes) produces specific ideas of how to coordinate the financial advisors 
in their daily activities in division PerMark. Chapter 6 shows how the design of 
leading indicators (hereafter Key Behavioral Indicators (KBIs)) promotes ideas of 
performing key activities (customer meetings, outgoing phone-calls and producing 
customer satisfaction), as these activities supposedly predict achievement of sales 
6    Abstract 
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growth (e.g., value creation). The KBIs propose that coordinating employees means to 
promote the strong belief in the operational causality between activity and sales 
results. Thus, to coordinate is to point out how to perform key activities in a correct 
way (e.g. best practices on customer meetings, making phone-calls and customer 
satisfaction). Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that the KBI cannot frame meaning 
to coordination of operational activities alone, as the chapter show how the KBIs 
function together with additional elements in order to frame what it means to 
coordinate financial advisors in accordance to value creation. However, the framing 
of coordination proposed by the KBIs is contested, as it proves impossible to 
coordinate financial advisors as suggested by the KBIs (e.g. specifying what activities 
to perform and how to perform them). Thus, the KBIs are performative via the 
interaction with the operational context; a new meaning of coordination is produced 
which is framed by the KBIs together with lagging indicators. 
Chapter 7 further adds to my research inquiry, by portraying how the design of 
performance targets (respectively, threshold targets and benchmarking) additionally 
specify how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors in their work performance. 
Chapter 7 illustrates how the design of threshold targets (TT), proposes to coordinate 
financial advisors in their daily activities, by defining how much, as a minimum, the 
financial advisors need to perform on each of the measured activities, in order for the 
activity to be casually related to sales outcome. Thus, the TT defines new conditions 
of when coordination of key activities actually leads to value creation. Furthermore, 
the choice to design TT propose ideas to coordinate by pointing out how to allocate 
time and effort between tasks, as the design of TT implies less performance pressure 
on the key activities in order to allow time for other important performance 
dimensions. Another interesting issue regarding design choices on performance 
targets was multiple performance targets on each individual performance measure. 
The complexity of specify how to coordinate financial advisors in their daily 
operations, lead to the setting of multiple targets which together propose ideas of how 
to coordinate and motivate desired level of activity on key activities. Similarly, the 
design choices made on performance targets are performative as the branches contest 
how these design choices define desired level of activity due to uncertainties in 
operational day-to-day.  
8 
Chapter 8 further informs my research interest in the design of PM, by showing how 
the design made with regards to feedback provides additional proposals of what it 
means to coordinate and motivate the financial advisors in their work processes. 
Feedback propose that to coordinate value creation is to specify whom it is that 
provides the information (manager or system) and who it is that do the interpretation 
of the numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that find out how to take 
action (employee/peers/manager). Chapter 8 shows how the design of feedback was 
initially designed as “self-management”, denoting that it is the financial advisors who 
have the responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided information. 
Furthermore, design of feedback constructs coordination and motivation of financial 
advisors by shaping the social rules and routines that manifest acting upon 
information. However, the design choice of self-management feedback is contested in 
the branches. The idea to coordinate and motivate the financial advisors proposed by 
self-management is difficult as the financial advisors are not motivated or sufficiently 
competent to perform the responsibility to interpret and act upon the performance 
information. Thus, new ideas of how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors are 
proposed from re-design of feedback. Here, the branch managers provide feedback 
(i.e. coaching feedback mode). Coaching feedback specifies coordination as involving 
how managers should interpret and communicate feedback in lined with coaching 
feedback.  
All in all, the three empirical chapters answers my research question by portraying 
how the design choices made on each of the three PM elements contributes in their 
own way in the framing of specific ideas to what coordination and motivation entails. 
The analysis also illustrated how the branches contest the way that the design choices 
propose to construct coordination and motivation. This analysis of the contesting of 
the design choices illustrates the performativity of design choices, as this show how 
the design choices unfold into new proposals of what coordination and motivation is. 
Consequently, by studying design choices as actors that frame and thus, overflows, 
we also learn more about the limited ability to make design choices that can specify 
how to coordinate and motivate employees’ value contribution. Thus, we learn even 
more about how design choices are conditional in nature. Their conditionality is not 
just linked to the ex-ante initial choice, but rather the conditionality is an on-going 
process of emerging conditions. In other words, design of PM in the attempt to 
8    Abstract 
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include conditions simultaneously creates new conditions, and this processes is never 
ending. This is showed by the analysis of the overflows, which show how new 
conditions constantly will emerge to shape motivation and coordination in new ways. 
Thus, my detailed study of the role of design choices informs us with rich details of 
how operational practices impacts how design choices shapes the functionality of PM.  
All things considered, my project contributes to research concerned with the design of 
PM in practice as well as the design of PM at operational level. Returning to my 
starting point, my ambition was to take a closer look on how design choices are 
central tools that produce and shape the craftsmanship of designing PM.  I find that 
design choices are key tools, as they craft specific ideas of how to the intervention of 
organizational employees actually coordinate and motivate value creation. I believe I 
illustrate the importance of not “black boxing” the role of design choices in shaping 
PM, as they are key contributors to how PM unfolds in practice. Thus, the 
craftsmanship of PM involves the understanding the conditional nature of designing 
PM, to which my thesis has contributes with some new insight 
10 Sammendrag av Oppgaven 
Sammendrag av oppgaven 
Dette studiet følger design av ikke-finansielle prestasjonsmålinger (IFPM) e.g. 
leading indicators, fastsettelse av prestasjonsmål samt kommunikasjon av feedback i 
et nytt Performance Management (PM) system for finansielle rådgivere på 
operasjonelt nivå. Studie følger hvordan design valg på disse elementene av PM 
forsøker å koordinere og motivere operasjonell beslutningstaking og adferd av 
finansielle rådgivere i henhold til å utføre verdiskapende kundesalg og service-
tjenester. Mitt studie forgår i en nordisk bank, hvor jeg studerer designet av PM 
systemet PERFORM. Jeg ønsker å besvare følgende forskningsspørsmål: How does 
the design choices related to choice of performance measures (i.e. leading 
indicators), performance targets and feedback contribute to the performance 
management systems framing of the coordination and motivation of operational staff 
(i.e. financial advisors) and how does the operational context response to the design 
choices (i.e. overflows) in ways that potentially modify how the design choices do so? 
Dette spørsmålet søker jeg å besvare ved å utføre et performativt studie, hvor jeg 
benytter Callon (1998) teoretiske konsepter framing og overflow når jeg studerer 
hvordan PM utfolder seg i praksis. 
Mitt studie er strukturert i tre hoveddeler. Del 1 gir en oversikt over hvordan 
fenomenet PM er beskrevet i faglitteraturen, med et særlig fokus på IFPM, mål 
fastleggelse og feedback samt hvordan disse samvirker i utformingen av den måten 
PM koordinerer og motiverer verdiskapende adferd på operasjonelt nivå. PM er ofte 
definert som et  konsept, som innfanger atskillige deler såsom prestasjons måling, mål 
fastleggelse, belønning og feedback for at nevne noen eksempler. Påfølgende  
kommer Del 2, som etterstreber å adressere den første del av forskningsspørsmålet 
ved å beskrive hvordan: valg av IFPM , målfastsettelse og kommunikasjon av 
feedback er med til å skape en utformingen av en særlig måte å foreta PM i divisjon 
PerMark  Del 2 er delt i 4 kapitler som starter med en introduksjon av mitt casestudie 
Bank Nordic, samt til divisjon PerMark. De påfølgende tre kapitlene beskriver 
henholdsvis: hvordan IFPM, målfastleggelse samt feedback påvirker utviklingen samt 
utformingen av en den måten PM motiverer og koordinerer finansielle rådgivere i 
deres utførelse av verdiskapende kunde salg og tjenester. 
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Etterfølgende kommer Del 3, som er fokuserer på å besvare den andre del av mitt 
forskningsspørsmål, ved å utdype hvordan det enkelte element, så vel som hvordan 
disse elementene samvirker med de andre i å skape en særskilt måte å utøve PM på. 
Fokuset er å tydeliggjøre hvordan spesifikke design valg på de studerte elementene av 
PM skaper en særlig forståelse av hvordan PM kan koordinerer og motiverer 
verdiskapende adferd.  Dermed fremstiller også Del 3 hovedfunnene fra del 2, ved å  
utdype det enkelte design valgs rolle i å påvirke PM forsøker å gjøre dette i praksis. 
Men del 3 kaster også lys over hvordan de beskrevne design valg på 
prestasjonsmåling, målfastleggelse, feedback blir endret da de utfolder seg i praksis. 
Dette kommer av at f.eks. avdelingsledere, finansielle rådgivere ønsker å påvirke 
hvordan PM skal koordinere og motivere verdiskapelse. Dette utdypes og illustreres 
igjennom å presentere re-design av de studerte elementer av  PM.  Re-designet er en 
illustrasjon av hvordan PM opptrer i en ny form, som et resultat av en serie med 
forhandlinger.  
Det overordnede bidraget fra mitt studie av PM er å eksemplifisere verdien av 
Callon's (1998) framing og overflowing i studier PM i praksis, da disse analytiske 
konseptene muliggjør å reflektere PM dynamiske natur. Derutover linker mitt studie 
seg til det generelle ønske om for å utvikle vår forståelse av PM i praksis, og især 
innenfor design av PM på operasjonelt nivå.  Først, mitt studie bidrar til forståelsen av 
design av kausalitet  på operasjonelt nivå. Mitt studie informerer også om de 
begrensningene  som ligger til stede for å designe ”operasjonelle kart”, som illustrere 
nøkkel relasjoner mellom handling og ønsket effekt. Her bidrar mitt studie også med å 
demonstrere rollen til fastsettelse av mål, og kommunikasjon av feedback i å forme en 
forståelse av hvordan man kan koordinere og motivere i henhold til operasjonell 
kausalitet.  Derutover, bidrar mitt studie med innsikt til noen utradisjonelle design 
valg, især i forbindelse med mål fastsettelse og kommunikasjon av feedback. Alt i alt, 
bidrar mitt studie med detaljert innsikt til design av PM i praksis. 
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“We should assume that measuring performance is difficult. If performance 
measurement wasn’t difficult, then it wouldn’t be the chronic problem that it is… we 
should assume that performance measurement is difficult for good reasons. The good 
reasons, I suspect, lie in both the nature of organizations and the people in them” 
(Meyer, 2002; p: 5).  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Defining performance management  
Performance Management (PM) is an emerging topic within management control 
research (Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, & Stringer, 2009; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 
1999; Otley, 2003; Otley, 2012). Here, PM is often studied and understood as a 
discourse within management control research
1
, defined as “evolving formal and 
informal mechanisms, processes, systems, and networks used by organizations for 
conveying the key objectives and goals elicited by management, for assisting for 
strategic process and ongoing management through analysis, planning, measurement 
control, rewarding and broadly managing performance and for supporting and 
facilitating organizational learning and change”  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, p: 264). 
Accordingly, developing PM involves making multiple design choices related to a 
range of different elements
2
, to mention a few well-researched examples: performance 
measures, performance targets, bonus schemes, or feedback. However, the numerous 
examples of how PM might be designed
3
 also bear witness of the complexity of 
making design choices when developing PM (Franco-Santos, Lucianetti, & Bourne, 
2012; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Jordan & Messner, 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
 
Certainly, PM is often studied as the expertise of measuring and rewarding 
performance, with the purpose to influence organizational members’ decision-making 
                                                        
1
 Otley (1999, 2012), Ferreira, Otley 2009 and Stringer (2007) conceptualize PM as a discourse within 
management accounting, emerged in the attempt to address the call for a broader conceptualization of 
management control. (See more in Otley, 1999).  
2
 Other examples are Merchant,Van der Stedes’ framework (2007), focused on control elements such 
as result, action, personnel and cultural controls, Simons (1995) levers of control emphasize four key 
concepts: diagnostic, interactive, boundary and belief systems. Malmi & Browns’ (2008) 
conceptualization includes five control elements planning, cybernetic, reward and compensation, 
administrative and cultural controls See also Ferreira & Otley(2009) or Stringer (2007) for elaboration.  
3
 Consistent with the previous, performance measurement systems are understood as consisting of 
performance measures denoting the performance dimension and targets communicating the 
performance level (Ferreira, Otley 2009; Otley, 1999). 
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and behavior towards value creation (Lazear & Gibbs, 2009; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992; Roberts, 2004). Here, many view PM as a management resource  (Lillis, 2002; 
Malmi & Brown, 2008), where it is postulated that carefully designed PM systems 
(hereafter PMS) enables organizations to more effectively coordinate and motivate its 
members in accordance to value creation (Lambert, 2001; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; 
Roberts, 2004). PM is suggested to aid organizations in managing organizational 
complexity, such as aligning multiple decision-makers by motivating interest 
alignment and coordinating optimal resource allocation (Roberts, 2004). Thus, 
corresponding to prior research, PM is here studied as a question of how 
organizations seek to design PMS in ways that best fulfill the purposes of 
coordinating
4
 and motivating
5
 employees towards organizational value creation 
(Lambert, 2001; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, Roberts, 2004).  
 
Of course, the idea that design choices in PMS are made in order to influence how 
employees’ are motivated and coordinated to contribute to value creation is well 
recognized. Yet, as Meyer (2009) points out, making design choices, such as how to 
measure performance, is considered a chronicle problem in most organizations. Many 
point out that the complexity of designing PM supposedly lies in the difficulties of 
providing a complete reflection of all relevant dimensions of performance  (Hansen, 
2010; Jordan & Messner, 2011; Lillis, 2002). Furthermore, the conflicting findings of 
how design choices, such as leading indicators
6
 (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) or 
benchmarking
7
  (Matsumura & Shin, 2006), unfold in practice begs for more detailed 
exploration of how these designs choices both shapes and are shaped in practice 
(Ittner & Larcker, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Otley, 2012; Stringer, 2007).  In 
order to learn more to which extent, and if so, how design choices produce ideas of 
how PM facilitate value creation, this study trace in detail how the design choices 
                                                        
4
 Milgrom & Roberts suggest that PM coordinate by pointing out: ‘what things should be done, how 
they should be accomplished, and who should do what. At the organizational level, the problem is also 
to determine who makes decisions and with what information, and how to arrange communications 
systems to ensure that the needed information is available’ (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p: 126). 
5
Milgrom & Roberts suggest that PM motivate by ’ensure that the various individuals involved in these 
processes willingly do their parts in the whole undertaking, both reporting information accurately to 
allow the right plan to be devised and acting as they are supposed to act to carry out the plan’ 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p: 126).  
6
 Leading indicators denote performance measures of a process that predict the achievement of desired 
output (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
7
 Benchmarking denote to set a performance standard by comparing measured performance  
(Matsumura & Shin, 2006), 
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made on selected elements of an operational PMS unfold into particular logics of how 
to coordinate and motivate the operational employees.  
 
The role of designing the performance measures, performance targets and feedback 
Building on this line of reasoning, my study aim to explore how the design choices 
made when developing a new PMS produces specific ideas of how to coordinate and 
motivate operational employees in practice. I do so by studying the design choices 
made on selected elements of a new PMS in a Scandinavian bank (which I will refer 
to as Nordic bank). In this study, I follow the choice of designing leading indicators to 
facilitate performance on operational activity (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), which proved 
to depend heavily on related design choices on the other elements of setting 
performance targets and providing feedback. By following the design choices on 
these three elements of the PMS over a period of 3 years, I explore in detail how 
design choices play a significant role in specifying the characteristics of motivation 
and coordination at operational level.  
 
First, this research inquiry is interesting for research concerned with contemporary 
design of PMS  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Franco-Santos et al., 2012; Ittner & Larcker, 
2008; Lillis, 2002; Melnyk, Bititci, Platts, Tobias, & Andersen, 2014). The study 
addresses the general call for more research on the design of leading indicators. 
Despite the widely advocated value of leading indicators in improving coordination of 
employees’ decisions and behavior8 (Abernethy et al. 2005, Hoque 2014, Kaplan & 
Norton 1996, Lipe & Salterio 2000, Malina & Selto 2001, Malina, Nørreklit & Selto 
2007, Malina & Selto 2004, Norreklit 2000), findings are conflicting regarding the 
value of introducing leading indicators (Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Luft, 2009). Thus, 
researchers beg for more knowledge of how organizations design leading indicators 
that convey casual relations of organizations value creation  (Ittner & Larcker, 2003; 
Ittner & Larcker, 2008; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Luft, 2009; Malina & Selto, 2001; 
Malina & Selto, 2004; Norreklit, 2000). In particular, detailed knowledge of how 
leading indicators might be designed to convey causal relations at the more dis-
aggregated level of the organizations (e.g. operational level) is scarce (Lillis, 2002). 
 
                                                        
8 See (Norreklit, 2000) or (Hoque, 2014) for further discussion.  
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Furthermore, my detailed study of the design choices made regarding central elements 
in Nordic banks operational PMS also address other topics of interest within PM 
research. Current literature highlights the lack of detailed knowledge of possible 
design choices when setting performance target and providing feedback at operational 
level. Designing performance targets is often viewed as part of PMS together with 
choice of performance measures  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Ittner & Larcker, 2008; 
Otley, 1999). Yet, targets are found to both coordinate resource planning, direct 
attention and motivate higher effort intensity in their own way, at least at more 
aggregated levels in organizations (Dekker et al, 2012; Ferreria & Otley, 2009; Webb 
et al, 2014, Webb, 2004). Thus, this begs for more research on how organizations 
design performance targets to shape the coordination and motivation of employee 
behavior at operational level (Webb, 2004). Also, recent research stresses the 
overlooked role of feedback as part of PM  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton, Lillis, & 
Widener, 2010; Otley, 1999; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). Feedback is often understood 
as an implicit part of PM, but findings suggest that feedback involves multiple design 
choices that shape the value of PM  (Grafton et al., 2010; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). 
Hence, more research on specific design choices of feedback and how they shape the 
coordination and motivation of individual performance is yet to be explored.   
Designing performance management at operational level  
Additionally, on a more general note, my study of the design of a PMS designated to 
operational level employees addresses the call for more insight of how design choices 
are made and unfold at operational level. To the contrary to the significant research on 
design of PM at the more aggregated levels in organizations, little detailed knowledge 
exists on how design choices specify how to motivate and coordinate employees at 
operational level  (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Lillis, 2002; Potter & Banker, 1993). For 
example, looking into the significant body of literature concerned with the design of 
strategic means-ends relations, most studies focus on the design of strategy maps  
(Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 2013; Malina, Nørreklit, & Selto, 2007; 
Norreklit, 2000) or business models  (Abernethy, Horne, Lillis, Malina, & Selto, 
2005; Huelsbeck, Merchant, & Sandino, 2011) at management level. Nonetheless, 
few studies are concerned with how organizations make design choices to represent 
means-ends relations at operational level (e.g. operational maps) (Lillis, 2002). More 
precisely, it’s advocated that leading indicators improve coordination of operational 
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employees, by predicting how current decisions leads to desired ends. Yet, detailed 
knowledge is scare of how such operational maps are designed to point out how 
operational activities are linked to organizational value creation (Lillis, 2002). I am 
motivated to explore this gap in knowledge by providing a detailed study of how 
Nordic bank make design choices in the development of the operational PMS, and 
how these choices shapes the idea of a operational map that seek to coordinate and 
motivate operational employees in performing their daily tasks.  
Studying Performance Management from a performative perspective  
In order to study how design choices play a role in shaping how PM coordinates and 
motivates employees in Nordic bank, I study how design choices might frame 
coordination and motivation by designate specific ideas to what coordination and 
motivation is. I therefore draw upon Callon’s (1998) concepts of framing and 
overflowing, where framing is understood as producing the boundaries within which 
desired action occurs  (Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010). For example, the choice to 
design Key Behavioral Indicators (e.g. leading indicators) that point out which key 
activities to focus on (e.g. to have customer meetings and make customer phone calls) 
or the choice to design threshold targets, that pointed out how much to perform of the 
activity (e.g., making 5 meetings a week or making 10 phone calls a week). More 
precisely, I understand and study framing as how design choices are making 
boundaries that seek to define and shape how to regulate action. This corresponds to 
the proposition stated by my research inquiry, namely that part of what frames action, 
is the ideas of what motivated and coordinated action is, which is proposed by the 
design choices. Thus, my focus is to study how these ideas produce boundaries of 
action that shape how PM function in practice.  
 
All in all, studying how design choices frame, involves studying how design choices 
proposes ideas of how to understand coordination and motivation of value creation. 
This implies that I study design choices with the perspective that design choices 
produce boundaries by specifying what coordination and motivation of employees in 
accordance to value creation means in practice. However, Callon (1998) stresses how 
all framing is unavoidably incomplete, meaning that in the interaction between the 
design choice and the operational behavior to be framed, some relevant dimension of 
how to coordinate and motivate value creation are excluded. If this leads to the 
22 Introduction 
 
 22 
contesting of the way that the design choices frame motivation and coordination it can 
be studied as overflows (Callon’s; 1998). Therefore, I also study how the boundaries 
produced by design choices at the same time makes the design choices performative, 
as the proposed ideas are contested (e.g. overflows). Part of studying how design 
choices frame imply to study how the contesting of their framing leads to reframing 
and thus, new ideas of what coordination and motivation of employees means in 
practice (e.g. performativity). Thus, one might say that framing denote the production 
of order, while overflows is the production of disorder, and these movement are 
unavoidably interlinked  (Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010).  
 
My key interest is to add to outlined gaps in knowledge within research of PM design, 
by explore in detail how design choices seek to point out how operational employees 
should be motivated and coordinated in performing their tasks. I do so, by exploring 
how design choices on each of the three studied elements e.g. choice of performance 
measures, sating of targets and feedback, contribute in framing how to coordinate and 
motivate employees in their daily operations. I take a close look on the role of design 
choices, by studying them as key “actors”, in order to learn more about the role of 
design choices in shaping PM in practice (Roberts, 2004, Otley, 2012). My interest in 
how the details of design choices shape PM resulted in a case-based study where I 
traced the design of a PM system for operational staff, from its introduction in 2012 to 
my exit in 2014. The case company, Nordic bank, finds itself in the need to renew 
how to coordinate and motivate the financial advisors daily activities towards 
increased sales growth. This lead to designing a new PMS, referred to as PERFORM, 
which provided me with an interesting setting to study design choices of PM in 
practices in detail. I traced the design choices made on three central elements of 
PERFORM over a period of 3 years, which allows me to provide a detailed account of 
how design of PM specify how to coordinate and motivate financial advisor behavior 
in the branches.   
Research question and structure of thesis  
The overarching research question that guided my study of PM in Nordic bank is:  
 
How does the design choices related to choice of performance measures (i.e. leading 
indicators), performance targets and feedback contribute to the performance 
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management systems framing of the coordination and motivation of operational staff 
(i.e. financial advisors) and how does the operational level response to the design 
choices (i.e. overflows) in ways that potentially modify how the design choices do so? 
 
I address my research question by following how the design choices specify 
performance dimensions with performance measures, point out level of activity with 
performance targets, as well as how outline how to provide, interpret and act upon 
feedback of their daily performance. I have structured my thesis in the following way. 
First, I provide a selected review compromising research on design of PM from 
relevant management accounting journals, focused on how the design choices of 
leading indicators (e.g. performance measures), setting of performance targets and 
providing feedback coordinates and motivates organizations and its members towards 
value creation. Then, I explain how I inform my research question by applying a 
performative perspective, implying that I study the design choices as actors that 
partake in framing the world in particular ways. Also, this includes how design 
choices overflow (Callon, 1998). In the empirical part of my thesis, I analyze how 
design choices on each of the studied elements of PM seek to shape coordination and 
motivation of financial advisors. The empirical chapters are followed by a discussion, 
which elaborates upon my key findings. I also underline how my detailed study of 
design choices in division PERFORM contributes with insight to PM literature. 
Finally, I provide some concluding remarks that sum up my study.  
1.1 Contribution  
All in all, my study contributes with its detailed account how specific design choices 
made on performance measures; performance targets and feedback impact how 
substance is produced and assigned to what to coordinate and motivate operational 
employees in performing their activities in practice means. Certainly, it’s not an eye-
opener that design choices reflect ideas of coordination and motivation, but the 
conflicting findings of how they do so, requests for more detailed consideration of 
how design choices perform in practice  (Ittner & Larcker, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Otley, 2012; Stringer, 2007). My study contributes to this call by shedding 
some more light on how design choices act to designate specific substance to what 
coordination and motivation is in practice. Thus, I show that design choices specify 
how to coordinate and motivate employees at operational level, by pointing out the 
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particular ways that employees should perform their tasks. Thus, my study adds 
insight that informs the general concern with how PM design unfolds in practice 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jordan & Messner, 2011; Otley, 2012; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008). 
 
Correspondingly, my study also informs the literature concerned with design of PMS 
for employees at operational level (Banker et al, 1993; Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; 
Lillis, 2002). The level of detail in my study adds an interesting perspective of how 
design choices produce and shapes the ideas of how to coordinate and motivate 
employees’ when performing their daily tasks at operational level. An interesting 
contribution from my study is that I exemplify how design of causal maps at 
operational level denotes to point out to the employees what they should do and how 
they should do it, in order to contribute to value creation (e.g. achieving Nordic banks 
strategic KPIs). This also clarifies how design of PM seeks to coordinate how 
employees should handle the multiple goals at operational level (Lillis, 2002), by 
pointing out how to prioritize among activities. Thirdly, my study demonstrates the 
limitations of designing causal maps at operational level. This again adds insight on 
the relation between design choices and complexity from incompleteness. I clarify 
how leading indicators, who are designed to aid operational employees, 
simultaneously produces tension, as the framing from the leading indicators construct 
trade-offs between multiple operational goals. Thus, my study provides insight into 
the practical complexity of designing PM that is a resource that aid employees at 
operational level in performing their tasks.  
 
Furthermore, we are familiar with the incomplete reflection the design of PM might 
provide regarding how operational employees contribute to value creation  (Jordan & 
Messner, 2011; Lillis, 2002; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). I show how the incomplete 
design of PM unfolds in practice by tracing how the design choices of leading 
indicators with corresponding performance targets and feedback are modified over a 
period of 3 years. Here, I believe my study adds insight into how design choices 
unavoidably produces incompleteness, but also detailed accounts of how the 
incompleteness in turn leads to the re-design of PM. This indicates some more of how 
practices modifies the characteristics of PM. This illustrates why designing PM 
remains conditional in practice, as all design choices are shaped by practice they seek 
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to form, leading to new constructions that shape how to coordinate and motivate 
employees. In consequence, we learn more of the multiple ways that a design of PM, 
such as leading indicators, might designate substance to what it means to coordinate 
and motivate operational employees.  
 
Chapter 6 informs my research question with its account of how the choice to include 
leading indicators frame specific meaning to the coordination of financial advisors 
daily activities. Chapter 6 shows how the design of what is called key behavioral 
indictors (KBIs) (e.g. operational leading indicators on activity) seeks to pinpoint 
operational causality between a set of key activities (customer meeting, phone-calls 
and customer satisfaction) and the objective of sales growth. The design of KBIs 
shapes coordination of financial advisors by specifying what the advisors should do to 
increase sales performance. The KBIs produces ideas of coordination based on a 
strong confidence in operational causality. The design of the KBIs implies that by 
concentrating on correct performance of the measured activities, the financial advisors 
will automatically achieve the desired sales growth. The operational causality imply 
that performing the activities are all the financial advisors need to know and focus on 
in order to contribute to value creation. We also learn that operational performance 
measures, such as the KBIs, are highly dependent on other elements, such as IT 
systems, descriptions of the best practice and customer lists, in order to coordinate 
operational activities. However, coordinating employees towards achieving growth in 
sales, only by specifying, “leading” activities, overflows, as it’s too complex to 
specify a few key activities that supposedly lead to sales performance. Thus, the 
design choice of KBIs is incomplete in specifying all relevant dimensions of sales 
growth. Thus, from the interaction with the branches a new meaning of coordination 
is produced, framed together with lagging indicators. 
 
Chapter 7 clarifies my research interest from describing how design of performance 
targets produces additional substance to the coordination and motivation of financial 
advisors. Chapter 7 exemplifies how the design of threshold targets (TT) specifies 
how to coordinate the financial advisors in their job, which adds to specification 
provided by the KBIs. The TT inform of the minimum level of required activity on 
the identified key activities (defined by the KBIs). Thus, the TT specifies new 
conditions of how to coordinate financial advisors to perform activities in ways that 
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leads to sales growth, as the TT specify how much, as a minimum, one need perform 
of a given activity in order to achieve growth in sales. This is interesting, as the 
design of operational targets that point out how to perform activities has received 
scant attention. The choice of TT rather than, for example a stretch level target is 
believed to reduce distortion in financial advisors the prioritization between multiple 
tasks. The TT provides possibility for the individual employees to focus on their 
performance on the specified dimension (how many customer meetings etc.), and still 
ensure enough room to plan future activities. Another interesting design choice was to 
design multiple targets on each of the KBIs. The complexity in the operational 
context lead to multiple targets, as multiple targets improves coordination and 
motivation of financial advisors performance on selected activity. This causes 
employee to navigate among two or more targets on the same performance dimension, 
which frame coordination and motivation in interesting ways. Similarly, the branches 
challenges how these design choices, as setting targets on activity level is 
unreasonable due to uncertainties in operational day-to-day. 
 
Chapter 8 contributes with novel ways to understand design of feedback, by adding 
knowledge of how to design feedback that shape employee performance at 
operational level. The chapter portrays how feedback is designed to happen in a “self-
management mode”, denoting that it is the financial advisors who have the 
responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided information. This illustrates 
further how design choices produce a distinct meaning to coordination and motivation 
of financial advisors. Feedback does so, by pointing out the rules and routines of how 
to manifest information into actions. Thus, chapter 8 show how the design of how to 
produce and provide feedback frame additional substance to the meaning of 
coordinating financial advisors. Design of feedback does so, by specifying whom it is 
that provides the information (manager or system) and who it is that do the 
interpretation of the numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that finds out 
how to take action (employee/peers/manager). Furthermore, the choice of self-
management design involved additional design choices on the provision and 
interpretation of feedback i.e. self-manager and feedback meetings (e.g. Monday 
morning meeting and pep-talk). This show how the design of feedback constructs the 
socially produced routines and rules in ways that coordinate and motivate desired 
behavior. The design of self-management feedback is challenged, as financial 
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advisors are not motivated to interpret and act upon the information themselves. The 
re-designing of feedback represents new ideas of how to coordinate and motivate 
financial advisors with feedback, which is to coordinate the branch managers’ 
feedback style (i.e. coaching design of feedback). Designing coaching feedback 
involves specifying new meaning to coordination, by detailing how managers 
interpret and communicate feedback in lined with coaching feedback.  
Obviously, is not startling that design choices are incomplete in shaping the 
performance they seek to influence  (Jordan & Messner, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008). However, my study adds a detailed account of why this is the case. I do so, by 
illustrating the co-dependent relationship between design of PM and its 
incompleteness, as incompleteness in turn shapes the re-framing of the design of PM 
(e.g. new design choices). Thus, my study adds insight of how design of PM produces 
incompleteness, because by specifying what to do also means to specify what not to 
do. But the incompleteness only becomes a challenge in so forth that it leads to 
tensions, wherefore incompleteness is co-produced from the interaction between the 
design choice and the context it seeks to frame. Furthermore, the incompleteness also 
leads to modified specifications of how to motivate and coordinate financial advisors. 
As I trace the design choices over a period of 3 years, I account for the practical 
consequences of the design choices, and how these consequences shapes PM in new 
ways. The analytical concepts of framing and overflowing allowed me to provide an 
detailed account of how the framing of coordination and motivation is modified by 
interactions with practice, wherefore part of understanding how design choices frame 
PM involves to learn more of how their interaction with the context limit them in 
doing so. This illustration adds insight into the limitations of crafting how to 
coordinate and motivate individual behavior with design choices in PM. 
Consequently; making design choices are highly conditional, as the specifications of 
the boundaries of value creation are shaped when they unfold in practice.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of how previous literature has 
conceptualized the subject of my study, namely performance management (PM) and 
the design of the elements of PM.  More specifically, what is the key concern in this 
project is to study how specific design choices partake in shaping how PM seeks to 
shape the coordination and motivation of value creation in an operational context. 
This mirrors similar focus from prior literature, which therefore also identifies some 
of the ways in which design choices of PM shapes the motivating and coordinating 
roles of PM. I draw upon prior literature to identify some of the elements of PM, as 
this enables me to link how PM emerges in Nordic Bank with recorded knowledge of 
how design choices shape motivation and coordination, in the literature. This insight 
from the literature is important when studying the three design choices that emerged 
as central in PM in Nordic Bank: choice of non-financial performance measures, 
setting of performance targets and feedback.  The chapter starts out by providing a 
definition of PM, in order to provide a general idea of the notion of PM as well as the 
nature of the elements that is suggested to compromise PM.  
As elaborated upon in Chapter 4 (section 4.2.2.), I have designed my literature review 
with a management-problem-based approach (Merchant et al, 2003), which means 
that this review is organized on based on my research topic: The design of 
Performance Management
9
 (PM). This allows me to include insight from relevant
research that shed light on the design choices of PM. Thus, when relevant, my review 
includes insight from psychology (e.g. motivational theory). However, I have done so 
with a selective focus towards the research disciplines and topics presented in 
management accounting journals. Therefore I may exclude valuable insight on design 
of PM from other relevant research fields, such as operational management, human 
resource management or organizational studies. Despite this selective approach to the 
management-problem-based literature review, I am assured that I provide an adequate 
review for the purpose of my thesis 
9 Similar with Otley (1999), PM is here understood as a broader conceptualization of 
management control, compromising ideas of management control systems (MCS), control 
packages and other similar concepts of management control.  
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Following, I will briefly outline selected research on PM design choices in an 
operational setting, with particular focus on the design choices involving non-
financial performance measures, setting of targets and providing feedback for 
employees’ performance at the operational level. The first part of chapter 2 seeks to 
define PM, and briefly discuss PM in an operational setting. The second to the forth 
part of chapter 2 each discusses the three amplified design choices in more detail.  As 
the aim is to provide an overview of current knowledge of these design choices from 
prior literature, and also to identify potential ways to develop current understanding of 
these areas of PM, each part is structured by an overview of current knowledge 
followed by a part that identified areas with potential for more development.  
2.1 Towards a definition of Performance management 
Defining PM might seem somewhat in inconsistent with my performative perspective, 
as the performative ontology dismisses the idea of knowing the particulars of how a 
phenomenon materializes ex-ante. However, in order to be able to identify the 
phenomena I am studying; the notion of PM described in prior literature is applied. 
This way, it is also possible to identify how my study of the design choices 
contributes to current knowledge of PM. The somewhat general conceptualizations of 
PM provided in the literature are critiqued for their universality, and thus, lack of 
specifying the complexity of PM  (Stringer, 2007). However, for the purpose of 
identifying some of the key elements at stake when PM performs, a definition is 
useful. Furthermore, by applying a broad definition, few restrictions are made with 
respect to studying how PM comes to unfold in practice.  
For the purpose of this project, the definition of PM provided by Ferreira & Otley 
(2009) is applied, as this framework proves useful to describe the multifaceted 
structure of PM. Thus, PM is defined as “evolving formal and informal mechanisms, 
processes, systems, and networks used by organizations for conveying the key 
objectives and goals elicited by management, for assisting for strategic process and 
ongoing management through analysis, planning, measurement control, rewarding 
and broadly managing performance and for supporting and facilitating 
organizational learning and change”  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, p: 264).  
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The way in which Ferreira and Otley (2009) outline the purposes of PM, echoes the 
concern with how PM design might facilitate value creation by, motivating and/or 
coordinating employees contribution (Lambert, 2001; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, 
Roberts, 2004). For example, Roberts (2004) identify two key roles of PM: 1) 
motivating interest alignment and 2) coordinating allocation of resources’. PM might 
perform these roles in various ways, making it interesting to study the link between 
design choices and how the coordinating and motivating role of PM unfold in 
practice. PM compromises multiple design choices that shape the character of the 
elements that partake in performing the two roles in the name of PM, sometimes 
simultaneously (Ferreira & Otley 2009, Otley 1999, Stringer 2007). Accordingly, PM 
involves both formal and informal rules, processes, systems, and networks in order to 
facilitate the role of motivating or coordinating value creation. Elements
10
 are here
understood as both formal and informal actors such as objectives, action plans, 
performance measures, performance targets, rewards (penalties). An element is 
defined as a particular part of something (e.g. a situation, activity, system or process), 
making an element one of the components (e.g. actors) of the complex whole.  In 
general, the elements of PM are suggested to function simultaneously, and in a non-
sequential manner (Ferreira & Otley 2009, Otley 1999, Stringer 2007).   
More specifically, this project is concerned with the design choices made in 
developing an operational PM in a Scandinavian bank (e.g. Nordic bank), respectively 
on the central elements: the choice of non-financial performance measures, setting of 
performance targets and providing feedback. The design choices on non-financial 
performance measures and the setting of performance targets are well-acknowledged 
elements of PM, often studied as performance measurement system 
11
(PMS). 
However, a recent recognition is the importance of in-time information flows, 
especially in an operational context. Thus, current literature also emphasizes design 
choice regarding feedback as part of PM  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999; 
Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). Feedback is defined as socially produced routines and rules 
10
 This is similar to other generic frameworks that seek to define management control. See for example 
Malmi and Brown’s (2008) conceptualization includes five control elements, viz. planning, cybernetic, 
reward and compensation, administrative and cultural controls (Malmi &Brown, 2008). See also 
Ferreira & Otley (2009) or Stringer (2007) for further elaboration. 
11
 PMS is here defined as “strategic expert systems through which organizations observe and measure 
their intangible elements of performance, both in form of qualitative and quantitative assessments” 
(Fried, 2010, p: 118). 
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that seek to shape the scheme that interpret, analyze and communicate information. 
Thus, feedback involves the interpretation and communication of evaluated 
performance (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et al., 2010; Otley, 1999; Pitkänen & 
Lukka, 2011). Here, feedback compromise both feed-forward processes such as 
communicating expectations and goals, planning and developing business models 
(Huelsbeck et al., 2011) and feedback processes such as variance analysis, problem 
identification, and learning (Otley, 1999; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). 
The definition applied here outlines a general notion of PM, and it is therefore 
noteworthy that this definition provides an incomplete representation of the unique 
and complex nature of PM in practice. A shortcoming of the PM frameworks, such as 
the one by Ferreira and Otley (2009), is the low reflection of the multiplicity of how 
PM performs in practice (Stringer, 2007). For example, PM is often portrayed as a 
linear and sequential design process  (Hoque, 2014; Norreklit, 2000), which is far 
from the practical reality, as much research record how PM performs in a complex 
and non-sequential manner (Otley, 2012; Stringer, 2007). Thus, design is more an on-
going process of development (Andon et al, 2007; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). The 
non-sequential character of how PM performs in practice is a current topic, both 
within the PM discourse (Ferreira & Otley 2009, Otley 1999, Stringer 2007) and 
within management-control research. Here, researchers are concerned with generating 
more knowledge of the co-existence of multiple elements, compromising the 
interdependencies in-between these elements (Grabner & Moers, 2013; Malmi & 
Brown, 2008). The next describes the two studied roles that PM seeks to perform in 
some more detail.  
2.2. The studied roles of performance management 
Looking into the literature on PM, it is in general implicitly or explicitly assumed that 
PM design choices target PM as a management resource that facilitates managers in 
achieving organizational goals (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Lillis, 2002). Thus, a key 
concern is the effectiveness of the design choices made in making PM living up to its 
promise, such as facilitating strategic goal achievement (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) or 
financial profit (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). The outlined definition of PM identified that 
PM facilitates goal achievement by coordinating and motivating the organizations and 
its members towards value creation (Milgrom & Robert, 1992; Roberts, 2004).  Thus, 
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one way to study how the design choices of PM seek to influence organizational 
behavior, is to study how the design choices shapes how PM seek to motivate and 
coordinate organizational processes, routines and individuals towards value 
creation
12
. Thus, the coordinating role of PM is described, followed by a description
of the motivating role of PM. 
2.2.1 The coordinating role of PM 
According to Roberts (2004) coordination compromises how PM “seeks to ensure 
that the tasks are done efficiently, by the right people, in the right way, and at the 
right time and place. Ultimately, full coordination also requires that the tasks actually 
undertaken are the right ones’ (Roberts 2004, P: 75). This outlines that coordination 
involves orchestrating the right people do tasks efficiently in the right way, and at the 
right time and place.  More precisely, PM coordinates value creation by pointing out: 
’what things should be done, how they should be accomplished, and who should do 
what. At the organizational level, the problem is also to determine who makes 
decisions and with what information, and how to arrange communications systems to 
ensure that the needed information is available’ (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p: 126). 
This specifying how coordination involves a communicative role of PM, in guiding 
what to do, how to do it and whom should do it. This involves coordinating the 
resources where they are best utilized in the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1995). 
Thus, coordination often involves the allocation of decision-rights
13
, based on
employees’ specific knowledge to exploiting the resource (Jensen & Meckling, 1995; 
Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p: 126; Roberts, 2004). Specific knowledge is knowledge 
that is costly to transfer across organizational members, such as idiosyncratic 
knowledge of particular circumstances
14
 (Jensen & Meckling; 1995).
PM is suggested to coordinate by communicate how to prioritize between tasks and 
goals. Yet, a much-studied caveat of the coordinating role of PM is its incompleteness 
12
 The identification of these two overarching roles of PM echoes much of prior research, which 
directly or indirectly studies how PM motivates or coordinate desired behavior  (Berry, Coad, Harris, 
Otley, & Stringer, 2009, Chenhall, 2003, Chenhall & Euske, 2007, Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2007, 
Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
13
 Decision-rights are defined as the individual who is accountable for the result of a particular 
processes or project, and is empowered to make decision, concerning, changes or priorities involving 
that processes or project. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/decision-rights-owner.html 
14
 For example, a scientist is likely to know more about the potential of a new research project than 
people higher up in the firm. Thus, a decision-making process that requires the communication of such 
information to from individual to central level for approval is likely to be cumbersome, making the 
knowledge specific as it is “costly “to transfer.
Chapter 2 33 
33 
of reflecting all relevant dimensions of performance, leading to miscommunication 
such as exclusion of relevant tasks or set wrong prioritization between tasks (Hansen, 
2015; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Accordingly, a key concern is how to make design 
choices that secure lowest possible incompleteness
15
 in coordinating organizational
value creation. A recent focus has been the relation in-between PM and organizational 
learning  (Argyris, 1976; Chenhall, 2005; Fried, 2010; Hall, 2011; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008; Wu, 2012). Novel design choices, such as leading indicators, have 
introduced new ways to coordinate organizational members towards value creation: 
by creating and communicating task knowledge
16
 (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kaplan &
Norton, 1996). Here, specific design choice of PM has been studied as catalyst of 
individual and organizational learning
17
, by coordinating processes that leads to new
ideas, routines and ways of interpreting information (Fried, 2010; Kaplan & Norton, 
1996; Malina & Selto, 2004). For example, Hall (2011) describes how design of 
comprehensive PM (e.g. multiple performance measures) facilitates both single-loop 
and double-loop leaning
18
. PM might also facilitate learning from processes of
strategic learning, involving re-design of PM, such as correction, adjustment or 
alteration of current measures or means-ends relations  (Fried, 2010; Kaplan & 
Norton, 2001).  
2.2.2 The motivating role of PM 
The motivating role of PM has been studied with much inspiration from assumptions 
conflict of interest in organizations
19
: “Motivation becomes a problem too, because it
may not automatically be in the self-interest of individuals or groups to act in ways 
that promote realizing an efficient solution to the coordination of a problem” 
(Roberts, 2004, p: 75). Accordingly, the motivating role of PM often involve design 
choices regarding elements, processes, and rules that seek to align the interest of 
15
 PM does not capture all dimensions of performance considered relevant for the purpose of 
measurement, and in such cases, PM can be defined as incomplete representations of the performance 
(i.e. organizational, department, team or individual) (Hansen, 2015; Jordan & Messner, 2011). 
16
 According to Dekker et al (2012), Task knowledge involves specific knowledge of how input is 
transformed into output.  
17
 A key debate is to which extent PM constraints or facilitates learning, in particular double-loop 
learning  (Argyris, 1976, Fried, 2010, Hall, 2011).  
18
 Learning might occur as single-loop learning  (Argyris, 1976) where learned insights add to current 
practices without fundamentally changing these.  Double loop learning (Argyris 1976) denotes another 
learning process, where current practices, strategies, norms and assumptions are questioned and 
modified.  
19
 Much of management accounting literature, implicitly or explicitly draw on the assumptions from 
principal-agent theory, involving to avoid opportunism from self-interested individuals  (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008) 
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individuals’ with the interest of the organization. Thus, from a design perspective, the 
focus has often been to design PM that secure alignment of interest in terms of what 
goals to work towards across all organizational members. This is exemplified by 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992), who specify what the motivating role compromise as ’to 
ensure that the various individuals involved in these processes willingly do their parts 
in the whole undertaking, both reporting information accurately to allow the right 
plan to be devised and acting as they are supposed to act to carry out the plan’ 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p: 126).  
Yet, a critique of this view on the motivating role of PM is that it excludes 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation to provide high effort in their performance  (Adler & 
Borys, 1996; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Based on insight from 
motivation theory, individual’s work motivation can be understood as “a set of 
energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual being, to 
initiate work-related behavior and to determine its form, direction, intensity and 
duration” (Latham & Pinder, 2005, p.406).  To this end, a key focus has been the 
success of various PM design choices in stimulating the energetic forces within 
individuals to provide higher effort in contributing to value creation  (Birnberg, Luft, 
& Shields, 2007; Hall, 2008; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). The alternative ways, in which 
design choices might PM shape the motivating role of PM, is by design PM that 
stimulates intrinsic motivation
20
 (Hall, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Osterloh & Frey
2000). Here, design choices are studied as catalyst of intrinsic motivation which 
stimulate psychological needs, such as autonomy, role clarity and self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Hall, 2011) 
2.3. Performance management in an operational setting 
Prior literature is rich on examples of how to design the role of PM at strategic 
management level, but less rich on knowledge of the design choices of the two roles 
at the operational level. Ahrens & Chapman (2004) suggest that operational PM can 
be understood as PM that structure day-to-day operational management, such as face-
to-face discussions between line manager and line employee. This echoes prior work 
on the design choices such as leading indicators and enabling PMS, which often is 
20
 Extrinsic motivation denotes actions performed for a separate outcome, where intrinsic motivation 
denotes actions performed for the intrinsic pleasure of performing (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989, Deci 
& Ryan, 2000, Kunz & Pfaff, 2002, Osterloh & Frey, 2000, Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
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studied as how PM seek to coordinate and motivate operational staff. I study how 
three elements of an operational PM compromise design choices that seek to 
coordinate and motivate individual performance of financial advisors in the branches 
in Nordic Bank.  The next seeks to provide a selected overview of the current 
knowledge of the design and development of PM in an operational setting, focusing 
on two streams of research: 1) design of casual maps (e.g. leading indicators) and 2) 
design of enabling PMS. 
2.3.1 Designing operational Performance management 
A few decades ago, a key concern was the design and use of PM in manufacturing 
context (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Potter & Banker, 1993), which has inspired design 
choices such as action controls (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003), behavior control 
(Ouchi & Maguire, 1975) or interactive controls  (Simons, 1995)
21
. To novel notions
is design of strategic integrated PMS i.e. leading indicators (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
and enabling PMS (Adler & Borys, 1996). A common argument is that the changes in 
competition has enforced novel ways to organize companies operations, and thus 
produced needs of new ways to design operational PM  (Lillis, 2002). 
A much studied design choice aiming to facilitate business operations compromise 
PM designs including non-financial dimensions of performance (NFPM)
22
. Here, PM
is suggested to coordinate and motivate operational behavior with strategic integrated 
PMS that involves leading indicators. The design choice of leading indicators is 
viewed as more relevant to coordinate and motivate at operational level than financial 
performance dimensions (FPM), as these lagging indicators are too aggregated and 
remote from operational activities to provide useful guidance and feedback for 
operational staff (Malina & Selto, 2001). Design of leading indicators is advocated to 
make PM more useful at operational level by more directly and accurately coordinate 
the allocation of resources in daily operations. Leading indicators involves design 
choices that predict future outcome of current action, by communicating the key 
cause-and-effect relations (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Malina & Selto, 2001; Malina & 
21
Other distinctions made in terms of reflecting more interactive operational setting are: organic vs. 
mechanistic (Chenhall, 2003), formal vs. informal  (Chenhall & Euske, 2007), mechanistic vs. organic 
organizations (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  
22
 Flexibility has been a key concern  (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995, Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2007, 
Mouritsen, 1999, Potter & Banker, 1993) as management control designs emphasis formal rules, 
standardization of routines and procedures, which is argued to hamper flexibility and innovation in 
operational routines and procedures  (Adler & Borys, 1996, Ahrens & Chapman, 2004, Simons, 1995)
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Selto, 2004; Malina et al., 2007) by representing the drives of value creation, such as 
customer satisfaction, cycle time or hours of labor.  
In parallel, key focus to make PM “closer to operations” is the design of enabling 
PMS, seeking to coordinate and motivate operational staff by facilitating task-related 
decision-making (Adler & Borys, 1996). This line of research is inspired by Adler & 
Borys (1996) conceptualization of enabling and coercive formalization. Adler & 
Borys (1996) defines enabling control as formalizations, which are designed to enable 
employees to master their tasks, and coercive controls as formalizations that are 
designed to coerce effort and compliance from employees (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
According to Adler & Borys (1996), the system design is perceived positively if 
employees feel that the system enables them to become better in their work 
performance, or the system design might be perceived negatively, if employees 
experience that the system coerce effort and compliance (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Jordan & Messner, 2011). Encouraged by research from equipment design, Adler and 
Borys (1996) identify four design choices of enabling PM, denoting designing PM as 
a resource (enabling) for operational staff in performing their tasks. Here, the design 
of operational PM is not informed by assumptions of control, but rather how PM can 
be designed to facilitate operational staff in their mental model work processes and 
task performance (Adler and Borys, 1996). Within this stream of literature, the ways 
in which PMS perform the coordinating and motivating role in an enabling way has 
been studied (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  
A handful of studies have investigated the four design choices promoted as improving 
the usefulness of PMS for operational decision-making (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Fried, 2010; Jordan & Messner, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). The design 
choices compromise: repair, internal and global transparency and flexibility. 
Transparency echoes similar ideas as casual-maps within strategic integrated non-
financial performance measure design; which promotes the visualization of means-
ends relations (e.g. business models). A key criterion in enabling PM is the overall 
visibility of operations for the entire organization, where key targets are to be 
communicated widely in order to improve both vertical and horizontal coordination 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). However, the enabling literature supplement ways in 
which transparency in design perform, by adding internal transparency, which 
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compromises visibility of internal processes (e.g. design of PM, task knowledge etc.), 
enabling operational employees to interact creatively with the logic of the PM 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). The design choices of transparency perform the 
coordinating and motivating role by facilitates innovation and learning, as well as 
insight of the process as a whole. Another key deign choice in an enabling PM, is 
flexible design, denoting employee discretion of the use of the PM (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004). An operational PM is linked to enabling employees with advice and 
suggestions in how to improve task performance.  
On the contrary, with regards to the design of leading indicators, few studies have 
explored how the details of design choices of leading indicators specify how 
employees should perform their job at operational level. How design choices are 
made in developing operational maps that provide transparency is unclear, in 
particular with regards to how design choices are made in the attempt to coordinate 
and motivate value creation at operational level (Lillis, 2002). Thus, how 
organizations make detailed design choices that reflect means-end relations at 
operational level begs for more exploration. Furthermore, providing transparency with 
PM is not without its problems, as it is noted that the design of disaggregated 
performance measures might produce conflict from mismatches (Ferreira & Otley, 
2009) incomplete representations of performance (Lillis, 2002) or even non-integrated 
performance measures (Lillis, 2002). It is still unclear how leading indicators are 
designed to outline transparency in what employees should focus on and how to 
perform their tasks, in order to guide them in the complexity of operations. 
In consequence, a gap in current knowledge regarding the design choices of 
operational PM is to the detailed accounts of how design choices are made to perform 
ideas that mirror the ideals of strategic integration, transparency and flexibility. Most 
prior studies have focused on the design of the PMS as a whole, with the shortcoming 
of low level of details of how design choices regarding performance measures, set 
targets and provide feedback are made in order to coordinate and motivate operational 
employees with transparency, integration and flexibility in operational processes. 
Thus, the focus on the PMS as a whole leaves few studies on leading indicators or 
enabling PM that have studied the design choices in terms of designing specific 
performance measures, setting of targets and designing feedback in detail. The next 
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part of this chapter will describe the three design choices of PM in focus here in more 
detail.  
2.4. The choice of designing performance measures  (leading indicators) 
The choice of non-financial performance measures
23
 (hereafter NFPM) is advocated
to address the shortcomings of financial performance measures (hereafter FPM)
24
, by
allowing a more complete reflection of value creation. Prior literature has primary 
focus on two design choices of including NFPM (Van der Stede, Chow, & Lin, 2006): 
1) NFPM that complement the FPM, by representing performance dimensions
previous neglected in FPM
25
 and the focus in this review, 2) strategically integrated
NFPM, which guide decision-making by visualize the future financial consequences 
of the current action and decisions (e.g. leading indicators) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
Nevertheless, looking into the literature on the choice of leading indicators, it is filled 
with conflicting findings, ambiguity and contradictions of how this design choice 
improves the value of PM. Furthermore, another concern is to which extent leading 
indicators substitutes lagging in performing the motivating and coordinating role of 
PM in the operational context.  
First, the focus in prior literature is how PM enables articulation, communication and 
control of the business model (Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 2001; 
Malina & Selto, 2004; Merchant, Sandino, & Huelsbeck, 2011), advocating that 
strategy maps both coordinate and motivate goal achievement (Kaplan & Norton, 
2001; Norreklit, 2000). However, while strategy maps might be helpful to 
communicate, visualize and align interest at more aggregated management levels in 
organizations (Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 2001), little is said of the 
tools, elements and processes of PM employed to articulate, develop and 
communicate key means-ends relations in an operational context (Lillis, 2002; 
Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). However, conflicting findings suggest that designing 
leading indicators is a complex processes (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Lillis, 2002; 
23
 The definition of what separates NFPM from FPM varies across the fields of research (Luft, 2009). 
Most consider all quantitative performance measures stated in a currency as FPM, while NFPM are 
seen as quantitative performance measures such as number of defect products or customer satisfaction 
ratings (Luft, 2009; Nagar and Rajan, 2001). FPM are all objective measures expressed in a currency 
24
 The general critique of the one-sided use of financial performance is that this focus produce short-
term optimization, poor allocation of resources due to incomplete planning and forecasting future 
performance, as well as insufficient facilitation of problem solving  (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
25
 The design choices of combined use of FPM and NFPM (e.g. multi-tasking) (Hansen, 2015) 
denoting that NFPM are independent and non-correlated measures in a portfolio of measures. 
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Malina et al., 2007)also beyond the articulation of strategy maps (Lillis, 2002). A 
somewhat overlooked density in current literature is the complexity of designing 
leading indicators in an operational context (Lillis, 2002), as this further specification 
of the strategic means-ends relations. In consequence, designing leading indicators for 
operational level compromise the articulation of an “operational map”, denoting the 
articulation of assumed means-ends relations at operational level.   
Second, it is often assumed that introducing leading indicators improves the 
completeness of PM. However, if, and if so, how leading indicators improve the 
completeness of operational PM is in need of further exploration. Findings also 
suggest that specifying dimension of operational performance reduce flexibility and 
exclude relevant dimension, which might distort rather than improve operational 
decision-making (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Lillis, 2002). This is exemplified by 
studies of incomplete performance measures (Jordan & Messner 2011; Lillis, 2002; 
Wouters & Wilderom 2008). Performance measures design for operational employees 
might not capture all dimensions of performance considered relevant for the purpose 
of measurement, and in such cases, performance measures are understood as 
incomplete representations of the measured performance (i.e. organizational, 
department, team or individual) (Hansen, 2015; Jordan & Messner, 2011). Incomplete 
performance measures might arise either due to multiple goals (Lillis, 2002), the 
dynamic context (Jordan & Messner 2011; Wouters & Wilderom 2008) or due to 
incomplete translation of aggregated means-ends relations (Lillis, 2002). Certainly, 
the detailed articulation means-ends relations at operational level produces conflict 
and potentially, incomplete reflection of the complex nature from multiple objectives, 
decisions and stakeholders at play in the operational context. However, literature is 
quite mute on the details of how design choices are made to represented operational 
causality. While prior literature has reported on strategies to manage incompleteness 
in the operational context
26
, little is known of how organizations articulate and
develop operational maps, and how these means-ends relations are performed by 
design choices. 
26 For example, by complementing incomplete measures with flexible use and employee discretion 
(Jordan & Messner, 2011, Wouters & Wilderom, 2008) 
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2.4.1 The design of leading indicators 
In an operational context, leading indicators can be understood as strategic integrated 
measures on task process which aim to represent task performance, with examples of 
performance measures such as number of hours, cycle time, processes or quality in 
operations (Kaplan & Norton 1996; Lillis 2002). The key attribute of leading 
indicators is their integration with measures reflecting the outcome of the process, 
which empowers leading indicators to predict the future outcomes of current actions 
and decision  (Abernethy et al., 2005; Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; 
Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Lillis, 2002; Malina & Selto, 2001; Malina et al., 2007). 
Leading indicators are often linked to operational performance either in terms of 
aligning day-to-day operations with strategy or by providing comprehensive feedback 
from multiple points in the value chain (Abernethy et al, 2005; Franco-Santos et al, 
2012; Melnyk et al, 2014; Kaplan & Norton, 1996, 2001; Malina, Selto, 2004, 2001). 
Malina & Selto (2004) argue that leading indicators motivate and coordinate by 
“align actions and strategy by reducing managers’ financial myopia and effectively 
communicate strategy (Malina & Selto, 2004, p 446).   
The design of leading indicators supposedly coordinates operational decisions from 
mapping cause-and-effect relations of performance (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 
2007; Hansen, 2010; Lillis, 2002). Leading indicators are integrated with lagging 
indicators, which are performance measures (financial and non-financial) that 
measures the consequence of the performed processes (Hoque, 2014; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). The integrated design is advocated to enable communication of 
strategy and align operational decisions and actions with value creation. Yet, leading 
indicators are also studied as local measures (Noerreklit, 2000; Lipe & Seltario, 
2000). Here, the coordination from leading indicators is questioned, due to the 
potential confusion across hierarchical levels  (Lipe & Salterio, 2000). Different 
levels in organization might view leading indicators differently. For example, 
customer satisfaction measure might be a leading indicator for the head of the sales 
department, but a lagging indicator for the sales representative in the same 
department. Thus, how this multiplicity shapes the coordination and motivation 
produced by leading indicators is relatively unexplored. 
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2.4.2 Designing operational map 
Causality can be understood as assumptions or hypothesis of how means are related to 
ends (Abernethy et al., 2005; Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Kaplan 
& Norton, 2001). The design of means-end relations is advocated to coordinate 
knowledge of how value is created in operational processes (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
The design of leading indicators is argued to coordinate knowledge of key means-
ends relations, which again improve operational effectiveness from the knowledge of 
core business operations (Kaplan & Norton, 2001a, and b). A recent focus is how 
design of leading indicators provides value as a catalyst in the development and 
communication of a firms business models
27
. As argued “A business model should
explain how the important nonfinancial and financial variables in the performance 
measurement system are related to each other”  (Huelsbeck et al., 2011, P: 1632) 
Here, it is implicitly assumed that visualization and communication of the business 
model improves the congruency and completeness of operational decision-making
28
.
Yet, the maneuver of developing a business model that guide operational decisions is 
not without its problems  (Lillis, 2002; Luft, 2009; Melnyk et al., 2014)Little 
knowledge exists of the processes and strategies organizations employ in order to 
develop leading indicators (Abernethy et al, 2005). Research is inconclusive if, and if 
so, how leading indicators improve the guidance of operational decision-making. A 
current concern is the validity of the means-ends relations in the business model 
(Huelsbeck et al. 2011). For example  (Ittner & Larcker, 2003, p: 9) promote that ‘‘if 
companies don’t investigate whether there is a plausible causal relationship between 
actions and outcomes, they condemn themselves to measuring aspects of performance 
that don’t matter very much.’’ (Ittner, Larcker, & Randall, 2003, p: 9). However, 
surprisingly silent within this line of research is to learn how companies not only 
develop causality, but also transform and translate casual relations across 
organizational levels.  
27 Causality is defined as “the action of causing; the production of an effect”. This underlines that 
strategic integration of NFPM means to design and manage interdependence between 
heterogonous elements in a value chain (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
28 Malina & Selto (2001) state that if the links are valid reflections of a company's administrative 
and productive processes and economic opportunities, then the BSC embodies and can 
communicate the company's operational value creation 
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Given the wide focus on how leading indicators guide operational decision making it 
is rather puzzling how little of focus that is directed towards the way in which 
organizations develop operational means-ends relations or translate business models 
into operational maps
29
. According to Ochi and Maguire (1975), the premise of
developing means-ends relations in an operational setting is that the nature of core 
operations are known and that processes can be appropriately described. Such task 
knowledge would involve insight of the relation between input and output (e.g. 
organizational transformation processes) (Dekker, Groot, & Schoute, 2012). Yet, 
given the dynamic and contingent nature of most operational settings, literature is 
mute on how organizations seek to achieve this premise. How organization acquires 
task knowledge and is able to exploit this knowledge in developing operational maps 
is unclear. It is here suggested that more research should be conducted on the 
development of operational maps, as prior findings suggest that means-ends relations 
are combined and exist differently across organizational levels. Thus, the complex 
maneuver to translate the business model into operational model, which involves 
guiding actions and decision, needs more attention (Lillis, 2002). This echoes the 
scarce knowledge of the details of design choices regarding leading indicators at 
operational levels in organizations (Lillis, 2002).  
2.4.3 Future research possibilities on designing leading indicators in operational 
PM   
Prior literature is rich on arguments that emphasize the importance of explicitly 
incorporating critical dimension of organizational performance in the design choices 
of performance measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Lipe & Seltario, 2000; Malina & 
Selto, 2001, 2004; Malina et al, 2007). This is linked to the postulated role of leading 
indicators as a facilitator for communicating strategic direction throughout the 
organization (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Nørreklit, 2000). Yet, most literature is 
focused on the difficulties of mapping strategic performance measures at divisional 
level or above in organizations, overlooking the complexity of designing leading 
indicators that detail key mean-ends relations in the operational context.  Indeed, there 
is scarce literature on the development of detailed cause-and-effect relations in 
operational context (e.g. operational maps). Also, to which extent the design of 
operational maps differs from more aggregated strategy maps.  
29 Kaplan & Norton (2001) introduced the idea of the strategy map, inspired by this notion, 
operational map merely visualize the key means-end relations of the operational context  
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More precisely, the details of how specific design choices are made in designing 
leading indicators to motivate and coordinate individual performance at operational 
level is fairly unexplored. Lillis (2002) amplify that the level of detail of causality is 
different at operational level. Thus, reflecting strategic causality with design of 
operational causality is highly complex (Lillis, 2002). Hence, more detailed 
knowledge of how design choices specify operational casual-relations is lacking. 
Furthermore, as literature is inconclusive of the meaning of causality (Malina et al, 
2007: Noerreklit, 2000), general studies that document the design of causality in 
practice are important to shed some light on causality in shaping PM designs. For 
example, it is argued that causality is more the production of common assumptions of 
the key means-ends relations, rather than statistical linked relations (Malina et al, 
2007). All in all, exploring this speaks to debates regarding the concept of causality, 
by adding some clarity to the current vagueness of how causality influence design of 
performance measures (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Malina et al, 2007; Noerreklit, 2000). 
Consequently, it seems organizations design causality in different ways, wherefore it 
is interesting to explore in more detail how specific design choices perform 
integration in an operational context. 
Likewise, another interesting topic to explore further is how leading indicators 
coordinate individual performance at operational level by pointing out, in detail, how 
to perform in their job. The leading indicators might be designed to do so, by pointing 
out what tasks to perform in order to guide operational employees. Yet, findings also 
suggest that leading indicators limited in doing so, but we know less about why this 
is. Also, to which extent design of leading indicators improve coordination of 
individual contribution to value at operational level or not, beg for more exploration, 
as there is conflicting finding to which extent such design choices increase or 
decrease the incompleteness of PM at operational level. For example, Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) argue that leading indicators improve completeness of PM, but are 
relative vague on how to specifically design leading indicators that do so. On 
contrary, Lillis (2002) show how disaggregated performance measures increase 
incompleteness of PM, due to the complexity of multiple goals at operational level. 
Indeed, there is a general concern with the conflicting findings regarding the choice to 
design leading indicators  (Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 2008; Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998; Lillis, 2002; Luft, 2009). Yet, few studies have explored in detail if, 
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and if so, how specific design of performance measures align the operational map 
with the strategy map. This, however, is interesting to explore further. 
2.5 The setting performance targets at operational level 
The other PM element under investigation in this project is the design of performance 
targets. Performance targets are broadly defined as the manifestations of “expected 
performance level” on a given performance dimension  (Dekker et al., 2012). The 
critical role of performance targets in PM is generally acknowledged in the literature 
(Dekker et al, 2012; Ferreira & Otley, 2009, Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Otley, 1999; 
Stringer, 2007). For example, it is suggested that targets coordinate how to allocate 
attention among multiple tasks (Hansen, 2010) or motivate higher effort intensity in 
task performance  (Dekker et al., 2012; Indjejikian, Matejka, Merchant, & Van, 2014; 
Webb, Williamson, & Yue (May) Zhang, 2013). Yet, a current concerned is how 
various target design choices are linked to the coordinating and motivating role of 
performance targets (Dekker et al, 2012; Ittner & Larcker, 2001, 2008; Otley, 1999; 
Springer, 2007). Thus, as performance targets are part of PM, this also requests for 
more detailed studies on how the design choices of performance targets influence the 
coordination and motivation of operational employees. 
 
Target setting is often defined as identifying the required level of performance on 
selected performance measures 
30
(Dekker et al, 2012; Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Yet, 
this seems somewhat limiting, given the multiple ways in which performance targets 
might coordinate and motivate employees performance, such as facilitating problem 
identification (e.g. learning), guide allocation of time in work processes (Dekker et al, 
2012) or produce commitment to performance level (Webb, 2004). Furthermore, the 
recorded complexity from multiple objectives, tasks and interest at operational level 
suggest the co-existence of multiple performance targets. Yet, there is scarce 
knowledge to which extent and if so how, organizations design multiple performance 
targets at operational level. Consequently, the complexity of designing performance 
targets for employee performance level at operational level is in need of further 
exploration. The next outlines a selected overview of current knowledge of the 
processes and design of target setting, as well as the fruitful areas to explore further.  
                                                        
30
  The setting of target levels on chosen performance dimensions determines the aspiration level of 
performance targets (or ‘ target difficulty’)  (Dekker, Groot, & Schoute, 2012)  
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2.5.1 Current knowledge on the setting of performance targets  
The existing body of literature on design choices of target setting often concentrates 
on various design choices linked to the target design processes or the target outcome 
(Dekker et al, 2012; Ferreira & Otley, 2009). For example, a large body of literature 
studying budgeting processes, has explored various design choices related to the 
target setting processes (e.g. degree of employee participation) as well as target 
outcome (e.g. target achievability and target specificity) (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). 
Based on insights from psychological theory, adequately designed performance 
targets are powerful facilitators of motivation: “…goals are the most immediate 
regulators of human action and are more easily modified than values of sub-
conscious premise” (Locke, 1978, p: 599)31. A key concern has been the conflicting
evidence regarding the design of target level (Dekker et al, 2012; Merchant & 
Manzoni, 1989; Webb, 2004), where several point to the lack of studies concerned 
with the practices of designing performance targets (Dekker et al, 2012; Stringer, 
2007). 
Performance targets are often suggested to facilitate coordination of activities and 
decisions across individuals, groups and divisions (Hansen, 2010). For example, 
target design is suggested to coordinate decision-makers across the organizations, by 
internalize externalities. Accurately designed targets are also linked to planning of 
future activity and capacity levels
32
. Others have investigated how performance
targets improve the overall motivation in task performance, by producing 
commitment, involvement and feelings of ownership (Dekker et al 2012; Merchant & 
Van der Stede 2007; Otley, 1999; Webb, 2004). This stream of literature often uses 
insight from motivational theory
33
 (Latham & Locke, 1991). Here, challenging or
“stretch targets” design is generally postulated to motivate higher performance 
(Latham & Kinne III., 1974; Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988; Merchant & Manzoni, 
1989; Webb et al., 2013) 
31
 Targets are suggested to motivate higher performance by 1. Stimulate efforts to achieve the target; 2. 
Directing attention and efforts towards the target; 3. Increasing effort persistence; and 4. Indirectly 
influencing actions by leading to the enticement, discovery, and use of task-relevant knowledge and 
strategies (Locke, Latham, 2002; Pinder, 1998).   
32
 An advocated virtue of performance targets in a multi-task setting
32
, is how performance targets 
might communicate desired effort allocation in-between tasks (Dekker et al, 2012) 
33
 Within behavioural accounting research, insights from motivational theory (Latham &Locke 1991, 
Latham &Pinder 2004), such as goal setting theory, attribution theory or expectancy theory has 
informed researchers of the motivating role of performance targets (Birnberg et al, 2007).  
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However, the design of performance targets is not without its problems. For example, 
a much-explored dilemma is how designing performance targets involve trade-offs 
between motivating individual contribution and coordinating planning, learning and 
decision-making  (Hansen, 2010; Jensen, 2003). Jensen (2003) even describes how 
stretch target design might motivate manipulation  (Jensen, 2001; Jensen, 2003). 
However, how organizations deal with the trade-offs between the coordinating and 
motivating role when designing performance target at the detailed level of operations 
is unclear  (Lillis, 2002). 
2.5.2 Designing performance targets 
There exists a body of literature on target design, which is concerned with: 1) design 
of target outcome (e.g. specificity and achievability) (Dekker et al, 2012) and 2) 
design of the processes of setting targets (e.g. subjective or objective). Here, a key 
focus has been how various contingencies influence target design choices. For 
example Dekker et al (2012) study how contingencies such as environmental 
dynamism, task uncertainty, and incentive intensity influence the use of information 
sources and target setting methods in firms’. However, it is unclear if the different 
contingencies are different for respectively subjective or objective targets. Also, it is 
unclear in which situations firms are more inclined to use certain design choices over 
others, or even if and how, design choices might be used simultaneously. The next 
will briefly discuss how following an objective or subjective processes might set 
adequate performance targets.  
2.5.2.1 Defining adequate target level 
A key concern with regards to the design of performance targets is how to define an 
adequate target level. Dekker et al (2012) define the adequate target level as 
“providing the best (unbiased) estimate of a unit’s future performance on 
performance dimension, which accurately reflects the unit’s performance potential 
(Dekker et al, 2012, p: 22). This concern is often expressed in terms of the 
achievability of performance target level. With inspiration from motivational theory, 
it is argued that stretch target design facilitate motivation to perform. In contrast, 
others find that stretch targets introduce manipulation (Jensen, 2003). Furthermore, 
achievable target levels are emphasized as more adequate in terms of enable planning 
of activity and resource capacity (Jensen, 2003). Evidence suggests that firm make 
use of achievable target levels when designing targets in rewarding schemes (Dekker 
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et al, 2012; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). Yet, what “best unbiased estimate of a 
unit’s future performance” means in a practical setting is quite ambiguous. There is a 
broad call for investigating how organizations go about to define adequate target level 
for operational employees, and how organizational deals with potential trade-offs in 
target design.  
2.5.2.2 Designing target specificity 
Dekker et al (2012) explore how design choices produce target specificity, denoting 
“clarity and detail of targets to be achieved by subordinate managers during a 
particular time period
34” (Dekker et al, 2012). Targets can be defined with high
levels of detail (e.g. 80% or 2.5 million). To which extent a high degree of target 
specificity facilitates coordination and motivation of operational performance is in 
need of clarification. It is interesting to study if more detailed target designs provide 
more clarity with regards to activity planning, resource allocation or guiding the 
operational map. In an operational context, one could argue that a high level of 
specificity might distort decision-making, by producing sub-optimization in dynamic 
and complex contexts. It seems that there is a need of further development of what 
designing target specificity means in an operational setting. Arguably, it seems 
reasonable to question if target specificity coordinate common understanding of 
expected performance level on key dimensions defined by the operational map.  
2.5.3 Objective target setting 
A key concern has been how organizations design the processes that lead to adequate 
target outcome. Milgrom & Roberts (1992) identify three design choices of a relative 
objective processes of designing target level (1) information of past performance
35
,
(2) theoretical determination of the processes and task difficulty, (3) peers 
performance level (e.g. here discussed as benchmarking). In addition, Dekker et al 
(2012) separate target-setting processes based on past information and target designs 
based on future planning
36
. Future planning involves target designs based on the
organizations forecasted budgets and plans, adjusting past performance with 
expectations of future changes.   
34
 For example, Dekker et al (2012) provide the example that a target that specifies to ‘‘increase 
ROI’’ is less specific than a target that specifies to ‘‘achieve an ROI of 12 percent. 
35
 However, there is a rich literature on the potential dysfunctional effects of using past performance to 
set future targets, such as the ratchet effect (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) 
36
 The use of past performance information may induce negative behaviors such as ‘‘sandbagging’’ to 
avoid target ratcheting by meeting, but not beating, targets (Anderson et al. 2010; Bouwens and Kroos 
2011; Indjejikian and Nanda 2002; Leone and Rock2002). 
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2.5.3.1. Absolute performance targets 
Objective targets involve performance targets that are verifiable by a third party, often 
manifested by absolute targets ex-ante of the measurement period  (Hansen, 2010). 
Various designs of absolute targets have been investigated
37
, such as different levels
of aggregation: involving individual or team-level or even department and 
organizational level  (Merchant, 1981; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). However, there 
is scare knowledge of the details of designing performance targets that point out 
performance level when specifying causality in the operational maps. This is despite 
the identified roles of performance targets in guiding and communicating task 
knowledge. Dekker et al (2014) define task knowledge as assumptions of how input is 
transformed into output, which echoes the design of means-ends relations in an 
operational map. One might argue that assumptions of casual means-ends relations 
involve perceived “theoretical knowledge“ of work processes. Thus, more knowledge 
can be developed on the relation between the detailed design of performance targets at 
operational level and the knowledge i.e. of means-ends relations’. Or 
correspondingly, how target design specifies and coordinates knowledge of 
operational causality seems fruitful to explore in more detail. Thus, the role of 
designing target in order to facilitate the implementation of the operational map 
potentially insightful for the literature concerned with design of causality.  
2.5.3.2. Benchmarking 
A novel target design is relative performance evolution, which defines adequate target 
level ex-post (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Relative target design involves comparing two 
or more peers’, teams or units’ performance ex post of measurement period, described 
as the practices of collecting information in order to compare performances at 
individual, team or divisional levels (Aranda et al, 2014; Matsumara & Shin, 2006). 
Designing benchmarks is advocated in situations with high level of common 
uncertainty and low levels of local uncertainty
38
. However, prior research suggests
that firms have difficulties in obtaining adequate information of peers’ performance 
(Dekker et al, 2012). However, how benchmarking design are used to facilitate the 
37
 The rich literature concerned with budget targets has explored a variety of design and use of ex-ante 
defined performance targets  (Brownell & Merchant, 1990, Frow, Marginson, & Ogden, 2010, 
Indjejikian, Matejka, Merchant, & Van, 2014, Jensen, 2003, Merchant, 1981, Merchant & Manzoni, 
1989, Merchant, Sandino, & Huelsbeck, 2011). 
38
 Common risk is defined as common uncertainty, with equal performance consequences on all 
members of the peer group, whereas local uncertainty denotes uncertainty that only produce 
consequences for one or a few of the members in the peer group.   
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studied roles of PM in an operational context, where individuals or teams are 
dependent on some degree of cooperation, is relatively unexplored
39
.
2.5.4. Subjective target setting 
Performance targets might also be design in subjective processes, involving 
performance target designs that are non-verifiable by third parties. Subjective target 
design involves the managers’ personal judgment (Bol, 2008; Hansen, 2015; Mores, 
2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1998). Some researchers has explored the advantages of 
subjective target design, such as how subjective targets might improve accuracy by 
adjusting for uncontrollable risk (Bol, 2008; Lazear & Gibbs, 2009) or completeness 
by adapting to dynamic context (Bol, 2008; Hansen, 2015). On the other hand, others 
have investigated disadvantages from the use of subjectivity in performance targets, 
as manager bias might occur and reduce target accuracy (Moers, 2006; Prendergast & 
Topel, 1993)
40
. Bol (2008) find that subjectivity in target design occurs at different
points in time i.e. ex-ante, during the process and ex-post (Bol, 2008). Yet, there is a 
general lack of knowledge of the many ways in which subjectivity emerge in target 
design.  
2.5.4.1 Participation in target setting 
A key concern in studies of subjective target setting processes is the level of 
employee participation (e.g. negotiation, consultation or participation) (Lau & 
Roopnarain 2014; Webb et al. 2013; Webb 2004). The choice of participative design 
is dependent on the value of employee specific knowledge in designing more accurate 
performance targets (Jensen, 2003). However, a much-debated concern is the 
potential cost of gaming in the target setting processes  (Jensen, 2003). Newer 
research also identify that participative design might facilitate other coordinating 
roles, such as communication and organizational learning, as target participation 
involves formulation of tacit knowledge across the organization (Abernethy et al, 
2005). Also, participative target setting is also fund to facilitate the motivating role by 
39
 Benchmarking design is suggested to lead to more controllable and accurate targets (Matsumura and 
Shin 2006; Murphy 2000), and reduce dysfunctional effects from manager and employee influences. 
Yet, benchmarking other problems is identified, such as collusion, sabotage and externalities (Gibbons 
& Murphy, 1990; Matsumura & Shin, 2006). 
40
 Manager bias is studied as a unintended consequence of cognitive limitations, leading to bias in 
weighting between multiple performance measures  (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1993, Ittner & 
Larcker, 2008, Moers, 2005), or as a indented consequence of manager opportunism, where manager 
use the subjective targets for personal gains (Bol, 2008; Moers, 2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1993).  
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increasing commitment to target level 
41
 (Webb et al., 2013; Webb, 2004). The design
of participative target setting processes, and to which extent these processes 
emphasize the coordinating or motivating role, is in need of further investigation.  
2.5.5 Future research possibilities on setting of performance targets at operational 
level 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992) suggest that performance targets might be designed with 
assumptions of task knowledge form ex-ante knowledge of work processes (e.g. how 
input is transformed into output). This echoes the ideas of knowing and therefore 
mapping operational causality e.g. the operational map with performance targets. It 
therefore seems interesting to explore in more detail, how targets might be deigned to 
specify coordination of operational employees work processes by detailing how much 
to perform on different tasks. Hence, by exploring the design of targets for individual 
performance at operational level, one might also address the call for more insight in 
how organization acquire knowledge to design casual relations  (Huelsbeck et al., 
2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Given the presence of multiple 
and dynamic goals in the operational context (Lillis, 2002), it also seems interesting to 
explore to which extent detailed design of performance targets improve specification 
of how employees should perform work processes. Thus, the design of performance 
targets to coordinate how individual employees should perform their work processes 
is to my knowledge not explored in much detail.  
Second, while much research is conducted on the use of multiple performance 
measures, it fewer studies focused on the design of multiple performance targets. This 
is somewhat puzzling, given the highlighted trade-offs between designing targets for 
coordination and motivation. Drawing in the insight from the use of multiple types of 
performance measures, it seems reasonable to argue that different performance targets 
might be set on the same performance dimension in order to facilitate the coordination 
and motivation of employees. It seems fruitful to explore how multiple targets are 
designed, and associated to particular ideas of how different targets might coordinate 
and motivate operational decision-making. Yet, to which extent such use of multiple 
targets occurs, the criteria of when different target designs are used and the weighting 
in-between target design in operations are questions that must be answered in future 
41
 Target commitment is here defined on the basis of Webb’s (2004) notion “the anticipated 
satisfaction from goal attainment"(Webb, 2004; P: 932). 
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research. Following, it also seems productive to explore how different types of 
performance targets are combined in practice.  For example, little research is made on 
the use of alternative ways to set targets, such as threshold targets, and in which 
situations organizations adopt such target design as part of coordinating and 
motivating operational employees.  
Lastly, while it is widely acknowledged that performance target are closely 
interrelated to performance measures, prior studies are not very clear on how 
performance target are designed to coordinate and motivate in their own specific way. 
For example, Webb (2004) studies how leading indicators might influence how 
performance targets motivate target commitment. Webb (2004) demonstrates an 
interrelation between performance measures and targets, as the perceived causality 
between performance measures influenced managers’ perception of target 
achievement (Webb, 2004). However, this also implies separate roles of leading 
indicators and targets, where the target motivates effort on the defined performance 
dimensions. Hence, this also indicates that further investigation of how performance 
targets might complement performance measures in facilitating motivation and 
coordination of value creation is beneficial. In consequence, it seems fruitful to 
advance the knowledge of how performance targets are designed to facilitate the role 
of coordination and motivation as an independent design choice.  
2.6. Processes of providing feedback for employees at operational level  
The last element under the microscope in my study of PM is feedback. Feedback 
design choices are also suggested to influence the coordinating and motivating role of 
PM. For example, feedback is suggested to coordinate and motivate problem 
identification, corrective action as well as assisting organizational learning from 
revising of strategy and planning (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et al, 2010; Otley, 
1999). The producing, providing and communication of feedback is widespread in 
organizations, where prior research report that feedback design choices range from 
quality control charts to strategic information focused at developing organizational 
learning. Feedback is defined as socially produced routines and rules that seek to 
shape the scheme that interpret, analyze and communicate information. These “human 
schemes” might follow a formal structure or emerge informally (Pitkänen & Lukka, 
2011). Furthermore, contemporary studies argue that feedback involve both future-
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oriented (feed-forward) and backwards oriented (feedback) information processes 
(Grafton et al., 2010; Hall, 2008; Hall, 2011; Otley, 1999; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). 
Pitkänen & Lukka (2011) find that feedback exist in formal and informal ways in 
organizations, where the informal processes of interaction is recognized as equally 
critical in coordinating and motivating employees’ decision-making. For example, 
informal feedback is part of producing organizational culture and social norms, which 
is found to coordinate and motivate behavior in daily operations (Pitkänen & Lukka; 
2011). Novel studies have focused on the co-existence of multiple forms of feedback 
(Pitkänen &Lukka 2011) or how different designs of feedback facilitate different 
types of operational decisions  (Grafton et al., 2010). Another popular focus is how 
feedback communicates strategic direction and thus, aligns operational objectives 
with overall company objectives. Feedback is viewed as a means to coordinate a 
common understanding of value creation (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). However, the 
various feedback designs, as well as how feedback design seeks to perform the 
coordinating and motivating role of PM is yet to be discovered. 
Pitkänen & Lukka (2011) discover that feedback has received scarce attention in 
recent decades, and call for more studies on feedback design. Little is known of the 
processes of designing feedback processes with the aim to facilitate performance in an 
operational setting. It is, however, suggested that designing feedback is complex as it 
is the processes of moving between calculation systems of information and human 
systems of information (Pitkänen & Lukka; 2011). The next outline prior discussion 
of feedback, focused on 1) the various forms of feedback 2) the various roles of 
feedback, either linked to the coordinating role of PM (e.g. individual learning, 
planning resource allocation) or the motivational role of PM (e.g. goal achievement, 
goal commitment, personal appraisals) as well as 3) the various design choices of 
feedback.  
2.6.1 Design of feedback processes 
Research identifies multiple ways in which feedback facilitate the studied roles of 
PM, such as scorekeeping, facilitating problem solving or guiding decisions and 
activities. Furthermore, feedback is complex, as it serves multiple roles 
simultaneously.  For example, information form rolling budgets facilitate motivation 
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by monitoring of actual outcomes, and coordination by enabling future planning and 
forecasting of activity (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). The complexity of feedback designs 
in the operational context emerges from real-time use of logistics systems, risk 
management systems and customer-relationship systems, which all provide feedback 
of various dimension of operational performance simultaneously. Yet, feedback 
processes are often addressed implicitly as part of performance evaluation. For 
example, few studies look into the details of the design of how to interpret and 
communicate the performance evaluation. However, some do address, such as the 
handful of studies which are concerned with design of feedback with regards to the 
use of information, such as enabling PMS (Adler & Borys, 1996, Ahrens & Chapman, 
2004; Jordan & Messner, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008) or interactive controls 
(Henri, 2006; Simons, 1995). However, most of these studies explore the design of 
the PMS, rather than the design of providing feedback.   
Feedback design involves choices of how to structure dialogs, such as the frequency 
of information, scope of information, and the communicator of information.  There 
are a few attempts
42
 to make account for how various forms of feedback facilitate
motivation to perform or coordinate resource allocation across individuals, teams or 
departments. However, few of these studies are concerned with the details of the 
design choices of the feedback processes, but rather focused on how feedback might 
facilitate decision-making, learning or target commitment. The design of feedback 
involves a range of design choices with regard to the feedback processes. Table X 
provides an overview of some of the criteria highlighted in prior literature concerning 
effective communication (Malina & Selto, 2001) and feedback design choices 
(Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011).  
42
 The scope of the project is literature within management accounting. However, noticeable is the 
sizable work on feedback within psychological literature, such as within various motivational theories 
(e.g., goal setting theory, self-efficacy or intrinsic motivation). See more in (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
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Table 1: Overview of design choices on feedback in PM 
2.6.1.1 Formal and informal feedback processes 
Pitkänen & Lukka (2011) suggest a wider definition of feedback, including both 
formal and informal systems of feedback information “We underline our view that 
feedback in management accounting should not only be seen mechanistically as a 
formal control loop, but also as a set of formal and informal feedback practices 
mastered by managers in organizations, coexisting in an intertwined manner” 
(Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011, p: 126)
43
. The operational context is filled with various
formal and informal opportunities for social interaction, such as face-to-face 
meetings, telephone conversations, mail correspondence, routines and periodic 
reporting. According to Ferreira and Otley's (2009) PM also compromise informal 
information networks that go beyond the formal information systems (e.g. PMS), 
where it is argued that informal processes play a critical role in the organizations. 
Feedback is here defined to compromise all evaluative and corrective information 
regarding operations and their results (e.g. performance) or about work related 
behavior (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2001), where formal feedback involves all systematic 
feedback produced by the formal measurement system.  
2.6.1.2 Feedback and feed-forward information processes   
Feedback is often defined as “backward-directed comparative information between 
actual performance and pre-set goals, deviations revealing the need for actions (ex 
post control with output feedback) (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011, p: 127). Here, the role of 
feedback is strongly linked to the motivating role of performance evaluation as an ex-
post control device. Here, feedback is facilitating coordination and motivation by 
43
 Pitkänen & Lukka (2001) suggest three dimensions of feedback, source time and rule, as constituting 
analytical principles of different aspects of the formality of feedback. Pitkänen & Lukka (2011) explore 
the dichotomy between formal and informal feedback, and find that formal and informal feedback co-
exists more as a continuum. 
Design choice Range of choices Dimensions of design  Criterion  
Source  Provider of feedback Manager 
Peers 
Self 
ERP system 
Autonomy  
Formality 
Time scale of 
information  
Frequency of occurrence (time 
scale)  
Hourly  
Daily  
Weekly  
Monthly  
Annual  
Timeliness 
Reliability  
Routineness 
Scope of information  Aggregation, integration One-way or multiple channels 
Individual or team 
Future or past oriented  
Level of detail 
Relevance 
Selectivity 
Purpose of feedback Task performance, outcome 
performance, 
 Work processes or performance 
outcome 
Enabling or coercive  
Feed-forward or feedback  
Learning  
Control 
Predictability  
Accountability  
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corrective and evaluative information between the planning system (pre-defined 
objectives), operations and the performance evaluation. The role of feedback is to 
facilitate corrective and adaptive courses of action, influence decision-making and 
exploit current capabilities.  However, newer research finds that feedback facilitate 
the role of coordination as feedback inform future planning, learning and enable 
anticipating occurrences in organizations. Thus, feedback design also compromise 
feed-forward information, which is defined as ”future-directed feed-forward 
information, which can be used to forecast the need for actions prior to any observed 
deviations, with a view to changes that could occur in the environment (ex ante 
control with input feed-forward)”  (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011, p: 127). 
Feed-forward feedback promotes the role of coordination by facilitating 
organizational learning: “Feedback and feed-forward information flows are 
omnipresent in contemporary organizations and they are directly related to the 
notions of single loop and double loop learning” (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, p: 273). 
Feed-forward information facilitates learning from experience, idea generation and to 
rework strategies and plans (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et al, 2010; Lillis, 2002; 
Otley, 1999). Feed-forward design also facilitates motivation in new ways, by 
producing accountability on future performance from variance analysis between 
predicted and desired outcomes (Grafton et al, 2010).  
2.6.2 Design choices on providing feedback 
Within management accounting literature, there is a general scarce knowledge of how 
organizations design feedback processes. The traditional view of feedback design 
involves control of outcome achievement, whereas newfound design of feedback 
involves assisting future-oriented decisions or facilitating learning on the job. Also, 
feedback is argued to coordinate common understanding of task knowledge, by 
producing role clarity (Hall, 2008) and goal alignment (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
However, the specific ways in how feedback is designed to facilitate different roles, 
such as control outcome achievement or enable employees master their tasks
44
 is still
unclear. The next provides an overview of how prior research link design of feedback 
with the coordinating or motivating roles.  
44 Inspired by Adler & Borys (1996) notion of enabling PMS portrayed feedback as useful for 
employees decision-making, and thus, oriented towards operational task (Adler & Borys, 1996; 
Ahrens & Chapman, 2004) 
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2.6.2.1 Cybernetic feedback design for motivation and control 
Traditionally, feedback is based variance analysis of outcome achievement, such as 
financial performance evaluation, often leading to feedback designs that: 1) inform of 
deviation from the expected performance level or 2) record achieved performance 
(Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999). Here, feedback is oriented towards motivating 
outcome achievement (DeNisi & Kluger, 2000). This echoes cybernetic roles of 
feedback (Pitkänen & Lukka, 201), similar to coercive design choices, denoting the 
use of performance information for control (Adler & Borys, 1996). Feedback designs 
oriented towards outcome achievement are often linked to management uses of 
information, such as facilitating goal alignment or reduce opportunism (Adler & 
Borys, 1996). However, insights from goal-setting theory suggest that feedback 
designed with orientation towards outcome achievement moderate how performance 
targets improve motivation by stimulating individuals’ persistence, duration or 
intensity in task performance (Latham & Pinder, 2005).  
2.6.2.2. Operational feedback designs for coordination and learning   
Malina & Selto (2001) argues that for operational employees, out-put based 
performance evaluation might produce too aggregated feedback, which is insufficient 
in guiding operational decision-making. Thus, feedback might be designed to directly 
inform operational employees of their performance in the work processes. Feedback 
might be designed to coordinate task knowledge  (DeNisi & Kluger, 2000). For 
example, leading indicators are argued to provide feedback that assists in-time 
decision-making in operations (Chenhall, 2003; Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Feedback 
on task performance is then suggested to improve individuals’ task knowledge, which 
facilitates employees in performing their job. Task knowledge can be understood as 
the insights into the operations transformation processes, denoting feedback of how to 
optimize the production of inputs into output (Chenhall, 2003; Dekker et al, 2012). 
Design choices of operational feedback are often linked to flexible use of information, 
task relevant information, and high transparency of feedback.  
Furthermore, feedback might facilitate strategic planning and implementation of 
organizational goals. Feedback might involve communication of (1) strategic 
guidance to operational managers and (2) links between operational actions and 
financial outcomes. A common argument is that feedback designed to communicate 
means-ends relations, might reduce ambiguity in operational decision-making 
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(Abernethy et al, 2005; Franco-Santos et al, 2012; Huelsbeck, Merchant & Sandino 
2011; Malina, Selto, 2001, 2004). Thus, an emerging design is feedback oriented 
towards transparency of operations in order to produce a common understanding of 
value creation. Hall (2011) suggests that this involves comprehensive feedback 
design, in order to inform managers’ assumptions of how business operates by 
developing and configuring mental models
45
 (Hall, 2011). Within this stream of
research, feedback is designed to developing and communicating business models 
across the organizations (Abernethy et al., 2005; Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Malina & 
Selto, 2001). 
2.6.3 Future research possibilities on designing feedback processes at operational 
level  
A recent critic is the current lack in knowledge of specific ways to design feedback, 
as well as to learn more of the role of designing feedback in facilitating the 
coordination and motivation of operational staff. There is a call for more detailed 
studies of the design choices of feedback, especially to develop insight into the 
multiple ways that feedback might be designed in practice. Recent findings suggest 
that comprehensive feedback facilitate the motivational role of PM, as this provides a 
“richer and more complete feedback about operations and results” (Hall, 2008, p. 
144).  Likewise, a trend is also to promote the value of feedback generated by leading 
indicators, as this facilitates coordination of a common understanding of vale creation. 
Yet, how organizations design feedback processes to facilitate employees in how to 
perform their tasks at operational level is still unexplored territory. For example, there 
is scarce insight into whether, and if so, to what extent it is the scope of feedback 
(comprehensiveness) or how it is provided (system or managers) that coordinate and 
motivate operational employees’ behavior in desired ways. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that leading indicators provide comprehensive and 
transparent feedback of operations, as feedback on task performance inform of 
outcome achievement (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). However, it is unclear how to design 
the interpretation and communication of feedback in order to provide such 
coordination or motivation of employees’ performance at operational level. Feedback 
is defined as socially produced rules and routines, which imply interaction in-between 
45
 Mental models denote the assumptions of how business operations, involving knowledge of how 
actions, activities and outcomes are related (Hall, 2011; p 69). 
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organizational members in the feedback processes. Yet, how organizations seek to 
design feedback that shapes the social interaction of communication and 
interpretation needs further exploration. It is unclear how design of feedback seeks to 
cope with the challenges that emerge from the social interaction of feedback. We 
know little of how design choices of feedback seek to shape how to provide, interpret 
and even act upon the feedback information. Thus, there is scarce knowledge of the 
format, orientation and form of feedback, and how this in turn, might shape the 
coordination and motivation of operational employees.  
2.7 Main conclusions  
Table 2 provides an overview of the main arguments presented in chapter 2, where the 
identified areas of current knowledge direct the study of the performativity (e.g. 
framing and overflowing) of design choices in the development of the operational PM 
in Nordic Bank.   
Table 2: Overview of main conclusions from literature review 
Design 
choice  
Definition  The focus in current research  Identified areas to develop current knowledge 
Operational 
PM 
Formal and 
informal systems, 
networks and 
processes that 
coordinate and 
motivate day-to-
day operational 
management 
The meaning of motivational is often 
specified as target commitment, 
interest alignment and effort intensity. 
The meaning of coordinating is often 
specified as strategic integration, 
planning, allocating of resources and 
organizational learning.  
The details of how design choices shape 
motivation and coordination of operational 
employees in specific ways in practice is scarce  
The details of how design choices in operational 
PM motivate and coordinate by pointing out how 
operational employees should perform in order to 
contribute to value creation is unclear. 
Choice of 
performance 
measure 
Defining the 
dimensions of 
performance  
Leading indicators at strategic level 
coordinate task focus, activity 
planning, task knowledge and 
communication of key value drivers 
throughout the organization as part of 
a strategy map,  
Leading indicators coordinate by 
enabling more complete evaluation 
and communication of value creation 
Detailed specification of how leading indicators 
are designed in order to coordinate and motivate 
how operational employees contribute to value 
creation, by pointing out what to do in order to 
perform their job is scarce.  
How design of leading indicators are shaped by, 
and shape the articulation and communication of 
operational causality i.e. operational map 
Target 
setting  
Defining the level 
of performance  
Designing targets involves trade-off 
between coordinating planning of 
performance level and motivating 
higher effort intensity.   
Setting targets define expected 
performance level (achievable targets) 
or performance potential (stretch 
targets).  
There is scarce detailed knowledge of how 
targets might be design to specify the 
coordination or motivation of operational 
employees performance level  
Little detailed knowledge exists of the use of 
multiple targets on the same performance 
measures in order to balance coordination and 
motivation of individual performance. 
Feedback  Define routines 
and rules that 
shape the schemes 
that interpret, 
analyze and 
communicate PM 
Feedback compromise both formal 
and informal processes defined by 
source, time and rules of feedback 
Novel definition includes feed-
forward information for future 
oriented planning and decisions.  
The specific ways to design feedback to 
coordinate and motivate operational employee 
performance is scare  
The specific ways that feedback shape how PM 
coordinate and/or motivate individual 
performance is in need of more exploration 
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Chapter 3: Studying design choices as framings  
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlines some ideas of how the studied elements of PM (Performance measures 
as leading indicators, setting targets and providing feedback) shape coordination and 
motivation of employees. More precisely, it is acknowledged that design choices 
influence the coordination and/or motivation of organizational members’ behavior. Yet, 
less detailed insight exits of how design choices specify how to coordinate and motivate 
employees at operational level. Taken the conflicting findings of how PM design choices 
unfold in practice (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Luft, 2009; Otley, 2012), there seems to be a 
need to future explores this in practice. Thus, there is a general need for studies that in 
more detail describe how design choices of PM produce the coordinating and motivating 
of employees in their own particular way. This project does so, by studying the 
performativity of the design choices on leading indicators, setting of targets and 
providing feedback.  To this end, Callon's (1998) idea of framing is used to study how the 
design choices produce the boundaries, and thus the specific meaning of, the coordinating 
and motivating role of PM. I study performativity as act of framing by applying Callon’s 
(1998) concepts of framing and overflowing. Studying design choices as a framing allow 
more insight in how design choices seek to shape the coordinating or motivating role of 
PM in a particular way. 
Applying Callon (1998) notion denotes a performative ontology. The performative 
ontology in my approach denotes that the meaning of coordination and motivation is not 
given a priori. Being framed produces this, which also shapes the meaning to 
coordination and motivation in particular ways. Of course, it takes much more than 
design choices to frame specific meaning to coordination and motivation of employees, 
but my analysis show how the studied design choices point out some directions of how to 
coordinate and motivate operational employees’ behavior. It’s not possible to take into 
conclusion how the studied design choices shaped coordination and motivation of 
operational activities, as this is an on-going endower made by a whole network of actors. 
The design choices are partakers in a network of heterogeneous human and non-human 
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actors that operate as more or less stable whole in constructing the meaning (e.g., 
boundaries) of coordination or motivation. I friendly remind you that my attempt is not to 
take into conclusion how the design choices craft the boundaries of the coordinating and 
motivate role of PM, nor predict how the design choices shapes coordination and 
motivation in general. This is underlined by my analysis of overflows. As all framings are 
unavoidably linked to overflows, I also study the limitation of design choices in framing 
motivation and coordination into distinct meanings. 
My aim is to take design choices seriously by study them as actors that partake in setting 
the directions of how coordinate and motivate employees’ value contribution. The focus 
here is to add to the general question of how PM operates in practice, by provide one, 
detailed account of how the design choices studied here; seek to produce the boundaries 
that shape the meaning of coordination and motivation in this particular context.   
3.1 Studying performance management as a practice 
A much-debated topic within management accounting research is how to study the 
theoretical ideals in practice. This has sparked widespread discussions concerning the 
relationship between theories and practice, exemplified by discussion of the role of the 
researcher in reflecting upon observed practices  (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006b; Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson, Hardy, & Harley, 2008; J. Baxter & Chua, 
2008; J. A. Baxter & Chua, 1998). This concern is also exemplified in various attempts to 
define the design or the criteria for research method that improve clarity in how 
observations in the field are linked to theory  (Abernethy, Wai, Luckett, & Selto, 1999; 
Alvesson, 2003; J. Baxter & Wai, 2003; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993; Hansen, 2011). 
Ultimately, most of these inquires is a matter of the ontological assumptions applied in 
the research, as the ontology influence the epistemology of how produce knowledge of 
the phenomena in question  (Alvesson, 2003; Latour, 1997; Latour, 2005; Strum & 
Latour, 1987). 
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3.1.1 The ontology of research  
Strum and Latour (1987) 
46
separates ostensive from performative ontology, where the 
ostensive ontology produces types of as research informed by positivistic (Ahrens, 
Chapman 2006a), scientific rationality (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) or deterministic  
(Felin & Foss, 2009) assumptions. Research informed by ostensive-assumptions is 
criticized by other scholars, as not reflecting the complex and dynamic functioning of 
management control systems in practice  (Andon, Baxter, & Chua, 2007; W. F. Chua, 
1995; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992; Robson, 1992). For 
example, several highlight how the ostensive assumptions portray PM as involving linear 
relations between design and implementation (Abernethy et al., 2005; Andon et al., 2007; 
Stringer, 2007) or accounting change  (Andon et al., 2007; Preston et al., 1992), where 
for example the assumption of ex-ante knowledge of how PM function is put into 
question (Abernethy et al, 2005). These deterministic assumptions
47
from the ostensive 
ontology is argued to “…foregrounding the subject-object relations, invites the 
researcher to look at organizations as collections of discrete entities whose patterns of 
contingently linked abstract properties are to be identified and represented” (Sandberg 
& Tsoukas 2011; p: 350). Thus, even researchers who have applied ostensive 
assumptions in their explanation of PM draw attention to the lack of reflecting the 
complexity of practices  (Otley, 2012).  
 
The dispute about the relation between theory and practice is no novelty and therefore a 
widely debated subject, boiling down to the question of how ontological assumptions 
inform research  (Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson et al., 2008; J. Baxter & Chua, 2008; Callon, 
1998; F. W. Chua, 1986; Latour, 2005; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Strum & Latour, 
1987). To this end, the central concern is how different ontological positions understand 
the relation between theory and practice (Ahrens, Chapman 2006a, Chua 1986; Sandberg, 
Tsoukas 2011; Strum, Latour 1987), where the critique of positivistic informed research 
                                                        
46
 See Strum, Latour (1987) for detailed explanation. Strum, Latour (1987) use of the term ostensive 
ontology similarly to Sandberg & Tsoukas, (2011) use of the term scientific rationality. Their idea of 
performative ontology is here understood similarly to Callon (1998) framing and overflowing.   
47 Deterministic assumptions denote the assumption that social or psychological phenomena are 
causally determined by preceding events or natural laws (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/determinism)  
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is the dichotomy made between theory and practice. Positivistic research, implicitly or 
explicitly, assumes the existence of an objective empirical reality, which is external to its 
subject (Ahrens, Chapman 2006a; Chua 1986). This further implies that empirical reality 
can be verified by more or less appropriate scientific methods, where the mix between 
methodology and method results in unrecognized ontological assumptions (Ahrens, 
Chapman 2006a). 
 
However, this is not to argue that ostensive informed research is not concerned with 
practice, rather that the ontological assumptions of how a reality exists are different from 
performative informed studies. As noted: “...contrary to the possible impression that 
scientific rationality is merely concerned with theory (ignoring practice) and that 
practical rationality merely with practice (ignoring theory), they are equally concerned 
with both theory and practice, where the two frameworks differ is in their assumptions 
about how theory and practice is related” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011: p: 339). 
Consequently, the highlighted limitations of positivistic research of PM is that 
“Positivistic accounting researchers are frequently unaware of the possibility of social 
reality’s emergent, subjective, and constructed properties—constructed possibly in 
response to their own theories”  (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a, p: 301)In order to address 
the importance of social realities’ emergent, subjective and constructed properties, a 
stream of researchers suggest that research should be informed by performative 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of how theory and practice is related 
(Callon, 1998; Latour, 1986,  2005) 
 
The main argument is that ostensive propositions fall short of reflecting the logics of 
practice, as they 1) underestimate the meaningful totality in which practitioners are 
immersed, 2) ignore the situational uniqueness that is the characteristics of the tasks 
practitioners perform, 3) abstract away from time as experienced by practitioners 
(Sandberg, Tsoukas 2011). Thus, research approaches that enable focus on how particular 
practices and their specificities are represented and enacted are advocated (Sandberg, 
Tsoukas 2011). Chua, (1986) argues that what distinguishes qualitative field research is 
how the field is understood by acknowledging that “social reality is emergent, 
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subjectively created and objectified through human interaction” (Chua, 1986; p: 615). 
Correspondingly, Latour (1986) argues that: “we have to shift from an ostensive to a 
performative definition of society” (Latour, 1986a, p. 272), denoting the appreciation of: 
“Society is not the referent of an ostensive definition discovered by social scientists 
despite the ignorance of the informants. Rather it is performed through everyone’s effort 
to define it” (Latour, 1986, p: 273).  
 
Consistently, as noted by Butler (2010) “performativity seeks to counter a certain kind of 
positivism according to which we might begin with already delimited understandings of 
what gender, the state, and the economy are”  (Butler, 2010, p: 147)Thus, performativity 
seeks to counter the “limitations” of the ostensive ontology by emphasizing how states of 
affairs have been constructed into being, rather than assuming, their a-priori existence, 
including the boundaries of their existence. In that event, Latour (2005) notes “The social 
has to be explained instead of providing the explanation….oldest etymology of the word 
socius – someone following someone else – a follower, an associate” (Latour, 2006; 
p.108). Consequently, the central focus is on how a phenomenon is constructed as it is 
argued that “performativity works, when it works…. to draw our attention to the diverse 
mechanisms of that construction” (Butler 2010, p: 147). Accordingly, the performative 
ontology suggest that what begs to be studied in making sense of a social reality, is how 
certain realities comes into being e.g. are constructed. 
 
This echoes a growing body of literature which argues the importance of reflecting on 
how concepts emerge and are interrelated in complex and new ways in practice: ”A 
particular problem arising from entity-based approaches is that while they identify 
necessary prerequisite (list of attributes) for carrying out a job, such a list of attributes 
does not demonstrate whether the workers use the prerequisite attributes or in what way 
they use them in accomplishing their work” (Sandberg, Tsoukas 2011, P:347).  For 
example, Sandberg, Tsoukas (2011) argue that developing a theory of practice is 
important, as practice theory will shift focus away from “listing attributes “and defining 
a-priori boundaries, towards an examination of how these attribute, emerge, act and 
interact in practice (Sandberg, Tsoukas 2011). On this subject, the rich literature inspired 
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by the performative ontology represents one way to study practice, by emphasizing 
“action”. Here, how “attributes” emerge and interact as well as how it is via the 
interaction that action is generated, is the primary concern  (Butler, 2010; Çalışkan & 
Callon, 2009; Callon, 1998; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011; 
Latour, 2005; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007; Strum & Latour, 1987) 
3.2. The notion of performativity  
According to Latour (2005), the performative ontology
48
 produces an alternative theory 
of action, as it introduces a different approach to studying how social realities are 
produced. For example, how PM seeks to produce realities by acting to discipline entities, 
process and people in organizations. In an ostensive episteme, theory of action entails to 
study the attempt to discipline organizational life by the perception of PM as “that of a 
cause in search of a consequence, a mediator looking for some passive intermediaries 
that would faithfully carry its forces” (Latour, 2005; P; 217). This corresponds to the 
postulations represented in the ostensive inspired studies of PM, implying assumption 
that it is possible to predict outcomes of design choices, as no distortion occurs in the 
force that links the cause to its effect. However, the performative ontology recasts the 
assumption of the nature of the relation between action (effects) and its cause 
(intervention), by suggesting that the relation should be viewed as “mediators making 
other mediators do something” (Latour, 1996; P. 217). The difference is that in this 
alternate theory of action (e.g. the performative perspective) it is impossible to predict the 
effects of a cause (e.g. design choice of PM), as any intervention is transformed and 
distorted in its mediation into action. As Latour (2005) underlines that “making do is not 
the same as causing or doing – there is a dislocation, a translation that modifies at once 
the whole argument.” (Latour, 2005; P: 217).  
 
The next looks into the notion of performativity a bit more in detail. However, it is worth 
noting that the following description of performativity is in no way a complete overview 
of the concept. The aim is to provide a selected elaboration of the notion of 
                                                        
48 As noted, Strum, Latour(1987) outline some principles of ostensive and performative ontology’s, 
and this project follows a performative ontology 
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performativity, and when suitable, I will use PM as an analogy, in explaining 
performativity.  
3.2.1 Looking into the notion of performativity  
The notion of performativity originates from Austin’s (1962) conception of “performative 
utterance” within the field of linguistics. According to Austin (1962), language does not 
only describe, but also constitute the reality that it describes  (Butler, 2010).  Hence, a 
performative utterance is a statement that pronounces and performs what is pronounces 
instantaneously (Butler 2010; Mackenzie 2006). For example, “I now pronounce you 
husband and wife”, is a performative utterance, as it simultaneously pronounces marriage 
and makes it true: “A ‘performative utterance’ is one that ‘makes itself true’, that brings 
into being that of which it speaks, as when an absolute monarch designates someone an 
‘outlaw’, an appropriate authority designates a couple husband and wife, a ship is 
authoritatively named, and so on (Austin 1962)” (Mackenzie 2006, P. 305).  This 
inspired a performative science, which defines performativity as a science concerned with 
studying how objects simultaneously describe and construct their subject matter (Miller, 
Power, 2013). This implies that rather than being subject to, and describing a reality, the 
elements of PM are active participants in the construction of a reality. Consequently, 
performative research has been preoccupied with exploring how the object of study is 
empowered to produce realities, and how the processes are altered and transformed in the 
attempt to produce realities.  
 
Conversely, looking at the literature, scholars have adapted different meanings and 
approaches when studying performativity. The common focus across performativity 
research within management accounting is explained by Miller, Power (2013): 
“Accounting as a frame of meaning for actors and sets of actors, capable of shaping their 
cognition and their actions, rather than being purely external to it” (Miller & Power, 
2013, p: 579). Indeed, performativity studies are concerned with how “actors” such as 
accounting devices, calculations, or statements are more than neutral representations of 
the world; rather how these are constitutive parts of the world. This line of reasoning is 
well expressed by Hopwood (1992): “Economic discourse is not merely a reflective 
phenomenon, providing insights into the way in which the world is, but it can also be a 
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constitutive phenomenon, having the potential to play a role in forging a reality that is 
more in line with our economic understandings of it”  (Hopwood, 1992, p: 
130)Performativity is often used to signify the constitutive relationship between the 
representation (measure) and what is being represented (subject of measurement), 
departing from the notion of performance measures as neutral representations of reality 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Mackenzie 2006; Miller & Power, 2013 ). 
 
Likewise, Butler (2010) argues, “performativity starts to describe a set of processes that 
produce ontological effects, that is, that work to bring into being certain kinds of 
realities” (Butler 2010, p: 147). This quotation is an excellent explanation of how I 
understand the essential concern in the performative theory of action, which is to study 
the processes or attempts to constructing certain kind of realities. This is also the implied 
concern in highlighted research, where the preoccupation is to study the relationship 
between what describes and the subject of description (Callon, 1998). To this end, Austin 
(1962) distinguished between illocutionary and perlocutionary performativity (Butler, 
2010; Mackenzie 2006).  This distinction denotes different nature of relation between PM 
and the reality it seeks to transform, where the former suggests that the PM produces a 
reality in its image and the latter that PM depend upon its context in order to perform in 
it. 
 
On this subject Butler (2010) points out: “Let us remember that Austin distinguished 
between illocutionary and perlocutionary performative: the first characterize speech acts 
that bring about certain realities, as when judgments are pronounced by a court or 
federal increase rate changes are announced by the Federal Reserve chair in the US. The 
second characterizes those utterances from which effects follow only when certain other 
kinds of conditions are in place” (Butler 2010, p: 147). Illocutionary performativity 
signifies that the representation instantaneously formats a reality in its image, whereas 
perlocutionary performativity suggests that the representation is conditioned on the 
context in order to perform. Thus, for the sake of this argument, this distinction implies 
that PM could perform by producing a reality in its image or perform by taking part in 
producing a reality, that negotiate how it performs a reality.  
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3.2.1.1. Illocutionary performativity  
Illocutionary performativity denotes how PM shapes practice in its own image. To this 
end, prior research has studied types of illocutionary performativity of representations
49
, 
such as Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) study of university rankings. Here, illocutionary 
performativity is understood similarly to the notion of self-fulfilling prophecies (Merton; 
1948; Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Ferraro & Pfeffer, 2005; Mackenzie 2006). Espeland 
and Sauder (2007) describe the strong relation between the university rankings and the 
way in which the rankings produces new realities in the law universities. However, as 
Butler (2010) carefully points out, in order for PM to be characterized as illocutionary 
performativity, it will require a specific context of strong institutional support. For 
example, when a priest announces marriage, the marriage is instantaneously performed 
because of the strong institutional support and acceptance of the priest’s position. It might 
be quite rare conditions under which PM would enjoy the same institutional support and 
acceptance. However, Mackenzie (2006) illustrates how the Black-Scholes option model 
emerges to perform illocutionary by enjoying strong institutional support in the option 
market. In the words of Mackenzie (2006), illocutionary performativity corresponds to 
barnesian performativity, which occur if the use of the economic model makes its 
prediction truer; when economic process and outcome altered to better correspond with 
the model.   
 
Consequently, studying the illocutionary performativity of PM implies studying how PM 
constructs its reality; and, hence, the concern would be how the introduction of 
calculation or measures intervenes in and shapes a reality in its image. It is important to 
note that in Austin’s (1962) illocutionary performativity, the utterance performs reality 
instantaneously, which is rather unrealistic outside the science of language (Butler, 2010). 
Therefore, studying illocutionary performativity can be understood as studies concerned 
with how representations produce realities in their own image, demonstrated by 
Mackenzie (2006) However, what might be more reasonable is to study PM as 
                                                        
49 In Austin’s (1962) interpretation of illocutionary performativity, the utterance performs reality 
instantaneously, which is difficult outside the science of language. Thus here the concern with 
illocutionary performativity can be understood as studies concerned with studying the making of 
self-fulfilling prophecies (Merton; 1948) (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  
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perlocutionary performativity, suggesting that PM is part of producing a reality, but the 
reality produced is also modified and transformed by the interaction between PM and the 
context in which its seeks to intervene.  
3.2.1.2. Perlocutionary performativity 
Austin (1962) also noted that certain types of performative utterances can only emerge as 
performative over time, given that specific conditions are met “So a certain utterance can 
only bring about a state of affairs in time (and not immediately) if certain intervening 
conditions are met”  (Butler, 2010, p: 151). Hence, illocutionary performativity produces 
realities, while the perlocutionary depends on them to be successful. The notion of 
perlocutionary performativity implies that, in order for PM to shape a reality in its image, 
it is subject to additional conditions, which must be in place. The perlocutionary 
performativity of PM therefore denotes a study of how PM is one of several elements in 
the production of a reality, which is transformed and modified in the ongoing processes 
between PM and its context. As I will explain shortly, this is the type of performativity 
that I study when applying Callon's (1998) notion of framing and overflowing. Overflows 
can be understood as demonstrating how framing is subject to the context it seeks to 
frame, which transform and modify the framing in ongoing processes.  
 
Mackenzie (2006) identifies three levels of performative effects where the third and 
strongest is barnesian performativity. However, perlocutionary performativity might be 
understood as producing effects in accordance with generic performativity, which is the 
weakest form of performativity. Here, design choices would only weakly produces a 
reality in their image, as reality is co-produced. The design choices might also be 
effective performative, denoting a stronger role of the design choices in the composition 
that is producing a reality, meaning that reality has become something new. Thus, 
designing PM has brought something into being which was not present before, for 
example from Espeland, Sauder (2007), where the benchmarking produced new concerns 
in the universities that did not exist prior the university rankings (e.g. degree of diversity 
among students, salary of alumni students or number of scholarships). However, taken 
the conditional nature of perlocutionary performativity, it also follows that the context 
might perform the design choices into something new. Therefore, perlocutionary 
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performativity involves studying the continuous generation of new realities, which I will 
study by using Callon's (1998) twin notion of framing and overflowing.  
3.3 Studying the performativity of design choices in PM  
In order to study the performativity of design choices, I will draw upon Callon’s (1998) 
conception of framing and overflowing, as this perspective enable me to provide a 
detailed account of the role design choices in shaping how PM coordinate and motivate 
financial advisors in Division PerMark. The performative ontology implies that I study 
how design choices partake in constructing coordination and motivation, as this is not 
given a-priori. It is the very construction that needs to be studied. Studying design 
choices as part of framing means to study how design choices seek to shape the 
investments, strategies and processes that attempt to produce the boundary within which 
the organization and its members interact. Callon (1998) argues, “The calculative nature 
of the decision depends only on the framing, the tracing of a boundary between 
relationships and events which are internalized and included in a decision or by 
contrasts, externalized and excluded from it” (Callon, 1998; p.15). Next provide an 
introduction to the concepts of framing and overflowing, followed by more detailed 
descriptions of how I understand the concept of framing in the context of PM. In my 
concluding remarks I summarize how I plan to apply Callon (1998) in making my 
account of PM in Division PerMark. 
3.3.1 Framing and overflowing 
According to Callon (1998), the performativity of any representation can be studied as a 
dual movement of framing and overflowing. Skærbæk & Tryggestad (2009) define 
framing as “the material arrangements and investments create a taken for granted 
boundary within which actors’ interaction occurs” (Skærbæk & Tryggestad; 2009; p: 
110). Callon (1998) explains that framing establishes a boundary within which 
interactions – the significance and content of which are self-evident to the protagonists – 
take place more or less independently of their surrounding context (Callon, 1998, p. 249). 
Design choices can therefore be studied as part of what shapes how material 
arrangements and investments craft the boundaries of interaction, by specifying the 
significance and content of coordination and motivation of behavior. Henceforth the 
design choices are part of a network of actors that frame.  
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Callon (1998) also emphasize how framing is a continuous process of boundary making. 
Accordingly, framing is a collative making of boundaries, and it is via the interaction in 
the network that the “boundaries” of decision-making and action is shaped and 
constituted. However, the crafting of boundaries is also subject to interaction with the 
context, which the network seeks to frame. Christensen & Skærbæk (2006) explains the 
relation further: “Framing is the production of order while overflows are the production 
of disorder and they are produced simultaneously” (Christensen & Skærbæk, 2006; P: 
106). Thus, framing attempt to produce order by defining the boundaries of decision-
making and action. Hence any act to frame, simultaneously overflow, which alter how the 
framing craft the boundaries of interaction. Christensen & Skærbæk (2006) describes 
overflows as “sociological revision of the economists’ concept of externality, where 
overflows comprise both the positive or negative externalities that are produced during 
the framing attempts” (Christensen & Skærbæk, 2006, p: 106). Callon (1998) stresses 
how overflows are the norm and not the exception, which means that framing, is always 
imperfect (Callon, 1998). In this view, overflows are not unintended effects of 
imperfection, but rather the norm and unavoidable Thus; the attempt to frame interaction 
will always produce variety of overflows, which alter the boundaries of the interaction.  
 
Framing overflows because the emerging relationships and events act to alter how the 
boundaries are crafted. Thus, overflows exemplify the difficulty in crafting boundaries 
that shape the significance and meaning of decision-making and action. Returning to 
Butler (2010) line of reasoning, the fact that overflows is the norm means that a framing 
perform perlocutionary. Thus, the act to frame is an ongoing project of making 
boundaries, as the overflows modify how the boundaries are produced (Callon, 1998). 
Miller and Power (2013) remind us that to frame involve on-going investments in the 
frame, denoting actions taken in order to advance how the framing constitutes the 
boundaries of interaction. Consequently, Callon's (1998) echoes Butlers (12010) notion 
of perlocutionary performativity, which Callon (1998) conceptualize as the twin-notions 
of framing and overflowing. However, Callon (1998) add that overflows matter if and 
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when the overflows are organized in a way that formats the morphology of the framing
50
 
(Callon, 1998). Thus, the overflows must be organized in order to change the boundaries 
of the framing. 
3.3.2 Studying framing and overflowing in a PM context 
Chapter 2 portrayed that design choices shapes the coordination and motivation of 
organizational members toward value creation, but also that few have studied how the 
design choices point out the details of how to coordinate and motivate at operational 
level. I use Callon's (1998) framing and overflowing in order to study how design choices 
shape the boundaries, which produce significance and meaning to motivation and 
coordination. I will now describe more in detail how I study how design choices are 
actors that seek to frame. Skærbæk & Tryggestad (2009) study framing as a “taken for 
granted” boundary, which establishes as set of stable assumptions, conventions, 
mechanisms and settings (Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2009). Thus, the design choices are 
part of an “actor-networks” that partake in creating and sustaining the boundaries within 
which action occurs. 
3.3.2.1 Framing boundaries of coordination and motivation with propositions  
Studying the design choices as actors that seek to frame the motivating and coordinating 
role of PM means to study how they shape the crafting of the boundaries of “value 
creation”, by seeking to direct behavior within these boundaries. Design choices are part 
of a network of human and non-human actors that jointly attempt to craft the significance 
of the coordinating and motivating role of PM. I study how design choices contribute in 
framing the coordinating and motivating role of PM, by following how design choices 
seek point out directions of the boundaries. Design choices do so, by proposing 
propositions that outline how to coordinate and motivate employees towards value 
creation. Thus, by proposing the propositions, design choices seek to frame, by 
specifying the “how” and “why” of the coordinating and motivating role of PM. The 
meaning of propositions is explained by Latour (2004) as “‘proposition’ conjugates three 
                                                        
50
 In order to internalize i.e. overflows, they must be made measurable, which means that the overflow must 
be defined in a casual relation that link the overflow to the framing – this relationship between framing and 
overflowing must be possible to prove and the overflow also be expressed in the same unit in order to be 
internalized in the framing (alter the boundaries within which action occurs) (Callon, 1998). 
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crucial elements: (a) it denotes obstinacy (position), that (b) has no definitive authority 
(it is a pro-position only) and (c) it may accept negotiating itself into a com-position 
without losing its solidity” (Latour, 2004, P. 212). Applying Latour's (2004) notion in my 
research setting denote that design choices carries propositions, which is how they seek to 
frame coordination and motivation. Thus, the design choices hold an idea of how to 
coordinate and motivate (a position), but that idea is only a pro-position (anticipated 
effect), because it has not yet been performed into a position. Thus, the pro-positions 
carried by the design choices may accept negotiating itself into a com-position when 
being performed. This corresponds to the dynamic relation between framing and 
overflowing.   
3.3.2.2 Framing devices as actors that seek to frame  
Callon (1998) emphasize the role of non-human actors, which here is referred to as 
framing devices, in the processes of framing: “in order to become calculative, agencies 
do indeed need to be equipped” (Callon, 1998, p: 6). Here, a framing device involves 
elements of both material and immaterial nature. For example, design choices might 
involve non-human actors such as performance measures, performance targets, 
spreadsheets, or customer lists, as well as immaterial actors, such as norms, cognitive 
business models or rules. This corresponds to Callon's (1998) argument that framing also 
requires coordination of collective expectations, such as norms or conventions, which 
partake in producing the boundaries of actionable space. Furthermore, Callon (1998) 
underline that framing devices have agency, which means that the design choices actor-
network compromise elements that mediate the meaning of coordination and motivation 
in unexpected ways. The overflowing of the framing reflects the mediating role of these 
framing devices.  
3.4 Concluding remarks on how I study design choices as contributors in framing 
This project studying designs choices with a performative perspective. I do so, by study 
how design choices of performance measures, setting of targets and providing feedback 
seek to frame motivation and coordination in particular ways. My motivation has been to 
study PM in practice from a design perspective, in order to explore the role of design 
choices as key actors in shaping the direction of how to coordinate and motivate 
employee performance at operational level. To this end, it is argued that it is the people in 
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the organizations, such as management or employees that moderate how designs of PM 
unfold in practice. Acknowledging this, I believe that we can become even wiser on PM 
in practice, by understanding the role of design choices in shaping how PM unfolds in 
specific ways. I therefore set out to trace how these design choices are part in framing the 
coordination and/or motivation of financial advisors behavior in the branches in Nordic 
Bank.  
 
Studying design choices as contributing in the process of framing denote to study design 
choices as part of an actor-network, compromising heterogeneous human and non-human 
actors (elements) that craft the boundary within which organizational actors interaction 
occurs. Here, this involves making and shaping the coordinating and motivating role of 
PM. In my study, the design choices seek to shape the framing of coordination and 
motivation by proposing propositions. Thus, the design choices hold an idea of how to 
coordinate and motivate, but this idea cannot be taken into conclusion, as the ideas are 
only pro-position (anticipated effect) which has not yet been framed into action. 
Certainly, Callon (1998) carefully reminds us, that any framing is inescapably linked to 
overflowing. Hence, I will also study the limitations of design choices in producing 
specific meaning to coordination and motivation, as each attempt to frame simultaneously 
produce challenges, which convolute the way in which the design choices comes to 
perform the coordinating and motivating roles. Studying how the framing produced by 
design choices are unavoidably linked to overflows, informs of the limitation of design 
choices in framing coordination and motivation of individual performance in specific 
ways.  
 
I take the design choices seriously as actors that partake in setting the directions of how 
to coordinate and motivate value contribution. The applied performative ontology means 
that the meaning of coordination and motivation is not given a priori, but constructed 
when framed by design choices. I use Callon's (1998) concepts of framing and 
overflowing to study how leading indicators, target setting and providing feedback seeks 
to frame coordination and motivation in distinctive ways. Of course, it takes much more 
than design choices frame specific meaning to coordination and motivation of employees, 
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but my analysis show how the design choices frame some aspect of how to coordinate 
and motivate individual performance. My analysis does not take into conclusion how 
design choices shape coordination and motivation of performing daily activities, as this is 
framed by whole network of actors and framing devices. Hence, motivation and 
coordination can be specified in multiple ways, and my study shows some of the 
possibilities to frame their meaning, partly specified by the design choices made in PM.  
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Chapter 4: A reflexive research method   
4.0 Introduction 
“Field researchers need to be prompted not only to discuss their tacit knowledge in- 
action, but to problematize the meta-theoretical issues that are latent in the craft of 
fieldwork. Otherwise, method gives the impression of being nothing more than a set of 
mechanical procedures that are to be "correctly" followed, a formula empty of 
epistemological tension. It is our contention that method is always grounded in larger 
meta-theoretical currents. Hence, in doing fieldwork, we enact philosophy“(Baxter & 
Chua, 1998; p: 70). 
 
Arguably, the chosen research method reflects the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions that guide the research  (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a; Alvesson, 2003; J. 
Baxter & Chua, 2008; J. A. Baxter & Chua, 1998; Latour, 2005). This appreciation has 
received increasing attention  (Ahrens et al., 2008; Alvesson, 2003; J. Baxter & Chua, 
2003; J. Baxter & Chua, 2008). Accordingly, method is not a set of mechanical 
procedures but conscious design choices reflecting the researchers’ methodology. The 
performative perspective applied in this project involves a specific set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. The constructivist ontology
 51
  (Justesen & Mouritsen, 
2011) is addressed by the principles of the case-research method reflexive pragmatism  
(Alvesson, 2003) Following recent discussions of the case-research method  (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006a; Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Ahrens et al., 2008; J. Baxter & Wai, 2003; 
J. Baxter & Chua, 2008; J. A. Baxter & Chua, 1998; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & 
Kuorikoski, 2008b; Lukka, ; Lukka & Modell, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), 
ontological assumptions influence the design and use of research devices such as 
interviews and observation  (Alvesson, 2003; Alvesson et al., 2008). Thus, the reflexive 
case-study design  (Alvesson, 2003) is applied as this method corresponds with the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions in the performative perspective  
                                                        
51 See Justensen & Mouritsen (2011) for more detailed elaboration of how ANTs notion of 
constructivism is different from social constructivism  
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4.1. Motivation of the case-based research method 
The case-study method is partly motivated by the fundamental interest in studying how 
performance management (PM) exists in its social context. Following performative 
assumptions  (Callon, 1998; Latour, 1997; Latour, 2005), the boundaries of PM as well as 
the way in which new elements emerge, as part of PM is unknown ex ante. Because the 
boundaries of PM are unknown, a case method enables the study of the way in which 
elements are connected and mobilized as part of PM in practice. This research design 
allows the study of the way in which the boundaries of PM are defined and under which 
conditions they change, in practice.  
 
Also, because the performative ontology rejects a priori knowledge of the boundaries that 
defines PM, a case method allows the researcher to study new elements, relations or 
concerns, beyond ex-ante knowledge of its existence. New meanings and associations of 
what PM is might be revealed as one enters the field, providing insights into new and 
hitherto unknown relations associated with PM. This is because, in a case study, the 
researcher can study the organizational participants in their dynamic and complex social 
context. Thus, it is possible to study how emerging changes and unforeseen events are 
managed, ignored or provoke a new set of PM practices that did not exist before. 
However, this is only possible if one enters the field with a method designed to be 
sensitive to this i.e. the performative ontology. This denotes a case study design that 
allows the researcher to follow how things are performed. 
4.1.2 Different methods of case studies  
The benefits of developing knowledge through in-depth studies of management 
accounting are widely advocated  (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a; Ahrens & Chapman, 
2006b; Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Ahrens et al., 2008; J. Baxter & Wai, 2003; J. Baxter 
& Chua, 2008; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & Kuorikoski, 2008a; Lukka & Modell, 2010). 
This project is based on a qualitative case study, designed to explore “the how” of 
contemporary PM practices (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a; Ahrens & Chapman, 2006b; 
Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Berg & Lune, 2012). A case-based research method has been 
chosen as this method allows the study the necessary sensitivity of the field, required to 
explore the practices of PM. However, researchers never fully represent the field  (J. 
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Baxter & Chua, 2008). Hence, a key concern is how to document the quality of case 
study  (J. Baxter & Chua, 2008; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). A central discussion has 
been the distinction between subjective and objective research  (Ahrens, 2008; Kakkuri-
Knuuttila et al., 2008a; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008b). What is at stake is the 
contextualization of accounting in action, meaning how to connect subjective insights of 
management-accounting practices with academic debates and wider social phenomena  
(Ahrens, 2008). The way in which this is possible is understood differently within 
different case methods. 
 
Traditionally, case method is informed by realist scientific epistemology  (J. Baxter & 
Chua, 2008). This is sometimes also referred to as ostensive ontology  (Hansen, 2011; 
Strum & Latour, 1987) or neo-positivism  (Alvesson, 2003). Here, the dominant ideal of 
research is to “establish a context-free truth about reality "out there" through following a 
research protocol and getting responses relevant to it, minimizing researcher influence 
and other sources of bias. Here, "the interview conversation is a pipeline for transmitting 
knowledge" (Alvesson, 2003, P: 15). Because of the ideals of objectivity and neutrality, 
the criterion of the case study design is to retain reliability and validity in data collection  
(J. Baxter & Chua, 2008). For example, a case-study method that “tests” whether the pre-
defined theoretical hypotheses are confirmed or rejected, as an objective truth of the field  
(Hansen, 2011). Here, good qualitative research is based on well-informed theoretical 
hypotheses of the world that are to be tested in the case study  (Hansen, 2011). 
 
Correspondingly, a stream of interpretive case research  (Ahrens et al., 2008; J. Baxter & 
Wai, 2003; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008a; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008b; Lukka, , 
2014; Lukka & Modell, 2010; Lukka & Vinnari, 2014) corresponding to what Alvesson 
(2003) denotes romanticism, criticizes the use of reliability and validity criteria in case-
study methods.  (J. Baxter & Chua, 2008) suggest a different view on generating and 
linking knowledge to general academic debates. Here, a different set of criteria for case 
research is used, such as for example trustworthiness, methodological rigor, interpretive 
rigor, and convincingness  (J. Baxter & Chua, 2008; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993; 
Lukka & Modell, 2010) For example, Golden-Biddle, Locke (1993) argue that 
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convincingness of the case study is achieved by the criteria of 1. Authenticity: convincing 
argument of having been in the field, 2. Plausibility: connecting the field with the 
theoretical frame, 3. Criticality: the implications of the case study for knowledge 
(Golden-Biddle, Locke 1993).   
 
There is also a line of critical research within management accounting research  (Andon 
et al., 2007; W. F. Chua, 1995; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011; Mouritsen, 1999; Mouritsen, 
Hansen, & Hansen, 2009; Robson, 1991; Robson, 1992). This is similar to what Alvesson 
(2003) denote localism, which is based on constructivist assumptions. This line of 
research challenges the assumptions, claims and identified purposes of case research from 
the neopositivist and interpretive streams. Here, the notion of an objective truth is 
rejected, indicating different ideals of research (Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011). Due to the 
performative ontology  (Strum & Latour, 1987), studies informed by ANT for example, 
reject the dichotomy between a subjective and objective world (Ahrens, 2008; Latour, 
2005). Here, focus is on the way in which the world is produced by a network of humans 
and non-humans  (Callon, 1998; Latour, 1997; Latour, 2005) where actions either leave a 
social footprint or not.  Alvesson (2003) argues within such a case study design, 
interviews are not used as instruments for generating knowledge or social facts, but to 
produce socially embedded accounts. Furthermore, the researcher is not a neutral 
observer, but also embedded, and part of what constructs that account. Thus, research 
produces specific, situated accounts rather than the report of events (Alvesson, 2003).  
 
Consequently, despite outlined efforts to suggest general criteria of quality for case-
study-method, it is the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the research that 
defines suitable criteria for case-method quality. For example, within the realist scientific 
episteme, the criteria of objectivity or reliability are used to evaluate the quality of 
research. However, the notion of objective truth is rejected in a constructivist episteme; 
and, hence, objectivity is a useless criterion in performative, informed research. 
Therefore, various case methods exist which understand and design case-based methods 
quite differently (Ahrens, 2008; Alvesson, 2003). Method is fused with ontological and 
epistemological assumptions as these assumptions frame the design, and the way in 
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which data is processed and understood by the researcher (Ahrens, 2008; Alvesson, 
2003). Table 1 summarizes the three purposes of method for interviewing suggested by 
Alvesson (2003).  
Table 3: Based on Alvesson (2003) 
Paradigms  Epistemic 
assumptions 
Principles Research method design  
Neopositivist 
case-research 
design  
Objectivity, 
neutrality 
Validity  
Reliability  
Transparency  
The quantitative ideals for data production, analysis, and 
writing. Rules, procedures, avoidance of bias, detailed coding, 
large quantities of material, and so forth are emphasized in 
methodological texts, as well as empirical writing  
Interpretive 
case-research 
design   
Emic (cultural 
self-concept, 
feelings, 
intensions)  
Etic (research 
observer)  
Social facts 
Trustworthiness, 
convincible 
Methodology 
rigor 
Interpretive rigor 
The quantitative ideals are to establishing rapport, trust, and 
commitment between interviewer and interviewee, in particular 
in the interview situation. This is a prerequisite in order to be 
able to explore the inner world (meanings, ideas, feelings 
intentions) or the experienced social reality of the interviewee. 
Constructivist 
case-research 
design  
Embeddedness 
(no objective 
truth) 
Situated 
accountants  
Ethno-
methodology, 
conversation, and 
Discourse 
analysis 
As a critical approach: it challenges the assumptions, Claims, 
and purposes of those wanting those interviews instrumentally 
Reflexive interviews -  focus on producing situated accounts  
4.2. A reflexive case method  
Conducting a case study is a dynamic process, as the processes of theorizing place the 
researcher in between theory and practice (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006a; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006b; Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Ahrens et al., 2008; J. A. Baxter & Chua, 
1998). It is generally argued that theorizing is characterized as a reflective pause, 
occasions when the researcher moves from the present to the distant, in an attempt to 
reorganize the unique, i.e. the emic, and the common, i.e. the etic
52
  (J. Baxter & Chua, 
2008). The on-going activity of theorizing also implies that the truth of the field is both 
constrained and enabled by the account made by the researcher; and, hence, the “truth” 
becomes a reflexive, authorial accomplishment (Baxter, Chua 2008; Baxter, Chua 1998). 
However, reflexive pragmatism moves beyond this notion of theorizing, by blurring the 
concepts of emic and etic, there is no inside-outside dichotomy. Rather, theorizing 
happens continuously, within the field, together with the social context, as assumptions 
are challenged, viewpoints are different and limited a priori privileges are given to any 
perspective (Alvesson, 2003).  
 
                                                        
52 Emic denotes the viewpoint from within the social group (subjects’ perspective); and etic signify 
the viewpoint from the outside (observers’ perspective)  (J. A. Baxter & Chua, 1998) 
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In Alvesson’s (2003) definition, the reflexivity method “stands for conscious and 
consistent efforts to view the subject matter from different angles and avoid or strongly a 
priori privilege a single, favored angle and vocabulary” (Alvesson, 2003; p: 25). 
Pragmatism denotes the researcher’s readiness to stall some doubt and still use the 
material in the best possible way (Alvesson, 2003). Thus, pragmatism corresponds to the 
awareness “that time, space, and patience are limited” (Alvesson, 2003; p: 25). All in 
all, reflexive pragmatism denotes a compromise between reflexive ideals and the ideal to 
generate knowledge (Alvesson, 2003).  Alvesson (2003) advocates two advantages with 
respect to the reflexive case research method: 1. this method relaxes the assumption that 
data reveal a reality 2. This method provides creativity from appreciation of the richness 
of meanings in a complex social context. This implies that theorizing involves 
challenging assumptions and statements, in order to understand under which condition a 
particular practice or statement holds true and under which conditions this is altered into 
something different. 
4.2.1 Implications of a reflexive method  
There are certain important implications for using a reflexive research method related to 
theorizing and the way in which research tools, such as interviews and observation, are 
applied, understood and used. Firstly, reflexivity involves the interplay between 
producing interpretations and challenging these by exploring more than one set of 
meanings of a given phenomenon (Alvesson, 2003). Reflexivity means a research 
processes “acknowledging ambiguity in the phenomena and the line(s) of inquiry favored, 
and it means bridging the gap between epistemological concerns and method” 
(Alvesson, 2003, p: 25).  Thus, when conducting data collection, such as interviews, the 
researcher is working with alternate types of interpretation to recast the observation in 
new light, forming understanding via a systematic involvement in multiple points of 
departure. Accordingly, theorizing involves moving between different interpretations, 
confronting an earlier assumption in order to produce a different point of view. The 
researchers are confronting themselves as well as the study-subjects assumptions. 
 
Secondly, this shift between different lines of interpretation presupposes a relaxation of 
the assumption of a unique meaning or truth whilst embracing the assumption that 
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meaning and truth are produced and re-produced on an ongoing basis. This is consistent 
with the performative ontology of the project, as this method acknowledges the richness 
and complexity of how a social context is constructed. Thirdly, as reflexive 
considerations inform the results, the knowledge produced by a reflexive study might be 
quite far away from what was intended in the initial stages of the research process, and 
multiple results might be generated (Alvesson, 2003). As argued by Alvesson (2003): 
“this means challenging the initial interpretations and the researcher challenges himself 
or herself and possible the reader with alternative views, these views may facilitate 
arriving at the "strongest" or most interesting interpretation and/or producing 
alternative ones, in which the study may offer more than one type of result” (Alvesson, 
2003, p: 25).  
4.2.2 Design on the literature review   
“Domain theory refers to a particular set of knowledge on a substantive topic area 
situated in a field or domain such as management accounting, while a method theory can 
be defined as a meta-level conceptual system or the study of the substantive issue(s) of 
the domain theory at hand” (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014, p:1309). I have structured the 
design of my domain theory in accordance with a management-problem-based orientation 
(Merchant et al, 2003). This design is chosen for several reasons: firstly, the 
management-problem-based orientation is consistent with prior conceptualizations and 
studies of PM  (Franco-Santos et al., 2012; Melnyk et al., 2014). As multiple disciplines 
are concerned with PM, it is fruitful to include the insights from various research fields 
when relevant (Merchant et al, 2003; Atkinson et al, 1997; Melnyk et al, 2014). This also 
includes the different streams of research within management accounting journals. Also, 
it is suggested that interdisciplinary approach is more likely to provide a richer and more 
complete account of the research topic (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Atkinson et al, 1997; 
Merchant et al, 2003).  
 
I draw upon multiple perspectives on PM, to that extent that multiple perspectives are 
present in the management accounting research I have selected to use as my domain 
theory. For example, prior research within management accounting often involves 
insights from agency theory (economic), as well as psychology and sociology (Merchant 
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et al, 2003). Thus, I understand interdisciplinary approach as using different research 
methods and theories, also applied within the same research field (e.g. agency theory and 
psychology). I also use some insight from different research fields, which include 
motivational theory found in behavioral accounting research and performative theory to 
study PM in practice
53
. I believe my approach shed light on phenomena of PM by inform 
and inspire new and exciting ideas of PM, but at the same time, keep my literature review 
within the boundaries of the field of research I seek to contribute to. I find that the 
interdisciplinary design allows me to include important insights and plausible 
explanations from relevant research, thus avoiding isolated focus generated from just one 
discipline, such as agency theory or Actor-network Theory. However, I have done so 
with a selective “interdisciplinary” focus towards the research disciplines and topics 
presented in management accounting journals. Therefore I might exclude valuable insight 
from other research fields, such as operational management, human resource 
management or organizational studies. Despite this selective approach to the 
management-problem-based literature review, I am confident that I have provided a 
sufficient overview for the purpose of this thesis.   
4.3 The case study design  
This case study was conducted over a period of two years, where I made several 
periodical visits in the field. The initial visit was made in June 2012, followed by visits in 
September 2012, December 2012, and May and June 2013. Furthermore, a considerable 
number of phone interviews and substantial email correspondence took place in between 
and after the field visits.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
53
 Behavioral explanations from psychology and sociology have been widely recognized since the mid 
1990s  (Birnberg & Shields, 1984, Birnberg, Luft, & Shields, 2007, 2007, Merchant, Van der Stede, & 
Zheng, 2003, Shields, Birnberg, & Frieze, 1981). For example, the goal-setting theory has exerted 
significant influence on the study of the motivational effects of goals and target setting  (Latham & Pinder, 
2005, Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988, Webb, 2004).  
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Table 4: Overview of my research activity (2012-2014) 
Research activity 
2012 2013 2014   
May  June September October  December  June August  Fall  March  April 
Contact 
with the 
case 
company 
Introdu
ced to 
case 
Visit and 
Talk with 
Nordic 
Bank 
Visit and 
talk with 
Nordic 
Bank 
Visits and 
Talk with 
Nordic bank 
Talk 
with 
Nord
ic 
bank 
Phone 
meetin
g 
Nordic  
bank 
Mail 
corresponden
ce with 
Nordic bank  
Phone 
interviews  
Data 
collection  
 
The design of the data-collection is based on the notion of data triangulation (Berg, Lune 
2012). Data triangulation was used in the collection of the data, involving research tools 
such as: interviews, observation and meetings as well as annual reports, strategy and 
performance documents together with internal correspondence  (Berg & Lune, 2012). 
The primary sources of data were interviews, observations and various conversations in 
cars, at lunch breaks, by the coffee-machine, by phone and by greetings. Such informal 
conversations, valuable for the researcher’s appreciation of the social context within the 
field study, revealed important insights contributing to a richer account of the field. 
Secondary sources of data were Webpages’, newspapers, company documents such as 
strategy documents, codes of conduct and internal audits. Data triangulation was used to 
ensure a richer account of the complexity of practice and the social context within the 
field study. 
 
 
Figure 1: An overview of data triangulation 
Interviews 46+3 in-depth interviews  
• Divisoonal management  
• Regional management  
• Branch level  
• Personal interviews , phone interviews  
Observations and meetings  
• Four formal performance meetings 
• Own desk and acess card  
• Lunch, coffee machine talks  
External and  internal reports  
• Annual reports 2011-2014 
• Internal performance reports  
• Internal PowerPoints  
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4.3.1 Company access 
“Access must be constantly negotiated (and re-negotiated) by a field researcher. All 
access is provisional” (Baxter & Chua, 1998, p: 71). The access to the company was 
administered via a gatekeeper (Baxter, Chua, 1998; Berg, Lune, 2012), who arranged 
most of the interviews contacts and visits. My gatekeeper, Thomas (Chief controller in 
Division PerMark) had a central position and a wide network, both at central and 
decentralized levels. For example, the branch managers considered Thomas as the most 
pragmatic person at central level, someone who listens and make adjustments based on 
operational needs. He was a valuable asset in terms of access, as the contact with Thomas 
provided me with access to a wide network as well as information from both central and 
decentralized levels. Moreover, additional access was granted by the snowball effect 
(Berg, Lune, 2012).  The case research began mainly at central level, talking to the 
management. After the initial contact, additional contact was established with people 
from internal control and risk management. The snowballing effect was used during 
observations where the group of subjects I shadowed and talked to, partly comprised 
people who approached me after having learned about my presence and subsequently 
introduced me to others.  
4.3.2 Reflexive observation  
The reflexive principles have guided the design of the case observations. The filed 
observation was carefully designed before entering the field, following the principles of 
reflexivity; and, hence, new methods or adjustments were introduced in the course of the 
study, when more knowledge about existing assumptions or contradictory assumptions 
was gained. Methods were also adjusted in accordance with their reflexivity-enabling 
capacities. Thus, the researcher was constantly alert to being reflexive of own presence in 
the field. All employees knew my identity as a researcher of PM and had been informed 
about my visits by mail and oral announcement. Upon my arrival, the most immediate 
manager introduced me, ensuring me that there was no confusion about my status. This 
was important, as it granted me more trust and made my integration into the group 
smoother.  
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Observation was a mix of techniques such as shadowing (Baxter, Chua, 1998; Berg, 
Lune, 2012), informal coffee-machine and lunchroom chats, desk-time in the office-
space. Although the employees of the company were not asked to keep a diary, which is 
one way of observing, the daily encounters and talks about the proceedings of the day 
produced oral diaries that added to the researcher’s understanding of practices and 
tensions. The researcher’s observations, shadowing and talks were recorded in the field 
notes  (Berg & Lune, 2012). The observations were conducted in three different branches 
with full access to everyday conversations, management meetings, employee meetings 
and customer meetings.   
 
Table 5: An overview of observation from meetings 
Branch Monday meeting Pep talk Customer 
meeting 
Regional meeting Divisional 
meeting 
Branch X yes yes no yes yes 
Branch Z yes yes yes no no 
Branch Y yes yes no no no 
 
Furthermore, in order to enable movement between different lines of interpretation and 
challenge own assumptions and interpretations, field notes were recorded. The field notes 
were recorded as soon as possible after each visit and, at the latest, in the afternoon. In 
order to provide as detailed notes as possible, I used my mobile phone to jot down brief 
notes and facts, which could be elaborated when I had more time.  The field notes were 
recorded to provide reflexivity at three levels, divided by observational notes, theoretical 
notes and method notes, respectively (see table 3).  
 
Table 6: The structure of my field notes 
Category  
The structure of the note  
Observational notes 
 
Learning about the logics of practice: 
What I thought and observed to take place  
What I recorded as happening during the day  
Broad summary of my field observations 
Theoretical notes 
 
Producing inductive insights 
Ideas about theory prompted by the experience:  
What have I learned theoretically? And what do I need to learn theoretically? – What 
happened during the meeting? And what were the theoretical implications of this?  
What must I learn or read about? 
Method notes 
 
Improving the research methods:  
How can I do this better next time?  
What seems to work? 
What seems not to work?  
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The notes are critical for developing a better understanding of the logics of practice and 
an important supplement to generate alternative propositions that can be used in the 
reflexive interviews. The observational notes improved the richness of practices, where 
contradictory types of practices could be followed up and further explored. The 
observational notes are also important in the processes of reflexive theorizing upon case 
data in the theoretical notes.  In a reflexive research method, the researcher is the main 
instrument of generating knowledge and interpretations. Theoretical notes are the 
researchers’ diary facilitating structure within the theorizing as the recording of 
reflections, surprises and ideas are important to ensure a rich theorization of the 
complexities of the field context.  The method notes develop the researcher’s ability to 
study the logics of practice, by improving the appositeness of research methods. I also 
made notes of the interviewee’s personal traits and background to trace my overall 
impressions and reflections during my study. I provided a few examples in table 7. 
 
Table 7: examples of personal impressions of interviewees’ traits and background 
Interviewee Position  Description  
Sarah Branch 
manager 
Sarah is very energetic. She has a lot of charisma. She does not take herself too 
seriously, but have a light and humor approach to leading the group. She uses a lot 
of superlatives – and really makes and effort to enhance good performance and to 
put energy in the FR. She is the motivator, the inspiratory. She is very solution 
oriented. She is a bit risk seeking, a person who constantly seeks new 
opportunities, and she sees the opportunities not the risks. And she does not take 
no for an answer, as she stated for one of her employees “who ever said that 
something is not possible-everything is possible”.. She is very charming, at the 
same time as she appear as cool, good and self-confident, she is clumsy, laugh 
about herself and do not take herself too seriously. But my impression of her 
biggest virtue as a leader is that she sees everyone. And that is because she has a 
talent of reading people, and talk to them based on their needs. In some sense, she 
is a Camelot.  She sees people, reads them and adjusts how to talk to them – so 
they feel that she understands and levels with them. Every single person in the 
team of people between 35 – 60 years, men and female, all feel that she sees them.  
Tim Regional 
manager 
Tim is the region manager. He spends three days a week in branch Q, 1 day in 
branch T and 1 day in branch F. He is a very positive and always mean well. He is 
joyful; the laugh is never far away. Still is can be serious, and you sense that he is 
respected, well liked and that people feel they can share with him. He is solution 
oriented, and wants to give from himself. He is very reflective. He is also frank, 
says what he means, and stands for it. He is open, he is humble, he is clear, he is 
involved, and he does not take his role seriously. He is very personal. He has been 
the coach of the national team of orienteering (tracking).  
Victor Financial 
advisor 
Tore is the youngest person in the team. And the new rising star. Since he started 3 
years back, he has always delivered high results. He is polite, but also funny and 
somewhat dominant in the group. Not in the sense that he makes much out of 
himself, he is a very pleasant person, but more that he is a person that everyone 
likes. And he is good at what he do, so the other tends to involve him. He is father 
of two younger children, and live close by. He is educated at Bi school of 
economics and in Leads (UK). He used to work within shipping and logistics, green 
cargo in Oslo. He applied for this job when he got tired of traveling to Oslo and 
back. He has a background in sales from his study times. Tore is identified as one 
of the banks young talent, that they offer further education and on a career track. 
He declined.. But performing on sales results triggers him.  
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Accordingly, by refining the ways of interviewing, observing and ‘hanging around’, I 
refined the information and knowledge collected in the field.   The types of field notes are 
interdependent and important for the production of insights and knowledge within each 
respective note type. For example, the refinement of research methods facilitated the 
making of better observations, thus allowing for improved insight into practices that 
could be theorized upon.   
4.3.3 Reflexive interview design  
Interviews constitute a central research tool for learning from and about the behavior of 
organizational participants (Baxter, Chua, 1998; 75). Alvesson (2003) argues that 
interviews are traditionally viewed as effective instruments or as human encounters 
encouraging the revelation of authentic experiences. These views correspond with the 
neopositivistic or romanticism episteme, but are criticized for moving the focus away 
from important aspects of conducting interviews in a reflexive episteme, where the 
interview is defined as a complex social situation (Alvesson, 2003). Both interpersonal 
and phone interviews were conducted during the case study (see interview overview in 
tables 4 and 5 in Appendix 1). 
 
The second major part of this case study was based on reflexive interviews. The initial 
interviews where designed to follow a semi-structured set-up (Berg, Lune, 2012). The 
function of the initial interviews was to learn about the context in order to produce 
propositions of various lines of interpretations that could be used for reflexive interviews. 
As I learned more about the tensions, and the dilemmas of the case, I adjusted the focus 
of my questions towards the contradictory assumptions, themes and lines of 
interpretation. Thus, the interview guide was continuously developed and adjusted as I 
learned more about the case company. I used my observational and theoretical notes for 
reflection and as input to adjust the focus of the next set of interviews.  
 
The reflexive interviews do not follow the fixed structures of semi-structured interviews, 
but are focused on uncovering the underlying logic of the argument presented. The 
interview technique is driven by an understanding of the implications of the presented 
argument – and structures the follow-up questions according to this logic.  Reflexive 
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interviews are centered on understanding the richness and complexity of practice by 
generating different lines of interpretations – and test under which conditions the 
argument changes. The researcher is theorizing and reflecting during the interview, trying 
to mobilize an alternative explanation – “why is it that we observe one outcome when the 
alternative could have been just as probable?” – In order to appreciate the conditions that 
explain a particular interpretation.  This is in line with the focus on the conditional 
behavior in perlocutionary performativity.  
 
As the appreciation of the richness and complexity of the context was improved, the 
interviews shifted toward being more reflexive in nature, where, rather than a formal 
guide, the theorization of alternative interpretations of statements structured the 
interviews. For example, reflexive questions, such as “could you explain this for me in a 
different way?” or “what does that mean?”, was used if standard jargons such as 
“customers interest” or “selling based on customers’ needs” were used. Furthermore, 
markings with respect to particular themes or statements were made during the interview, 
returning to the theme later in the interview, asking from a different perspective.  The use 
of reflexive techniques made it possible to test alterative propositions, or to test the 
boundaries for when a particular assumption, interpretation or statement is true. This 
way, the interviews allowed the researcher to understand the performativity (e.g. framing 
and overflowing) of different associations and the links made by the practitioners. This is 
important, as the focus is to study the performativity of performance management.  
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Chapter 5: Introduction to case company  
Nordic Bank is a savings bank located in the third largest county in Norway. The county 
is the largest agricultural and forest county in Norway, where the sectors manufacturing, 
building and construction together with the public sector constitute the largest employers 
in the area. The bank dates back to 1845, and the present company is the result of 22 
merges between saving-banks. The bank is currently the largest player within this 
geographical area, with a 50% market share (approx. 176 000 customers) with branches 
in 20 of the 22 municipalities of the county
54
. As of 2012, the bank moreover expanded 
with branches in neighbor counties, strengthening the market position in Oslo. The bank 
alone employs approximately 540 people, across headquarter and in the 28 branch 
offices. In addition, the bank group includes subsidiaries with an additional 150 
employees. Nordic Bank is an independent financial institution, with equity of 7.1 Billion 
NOK in 2014and rated A2 by Moody’s, with stable outlook55 . Nordic Bank enjoys 
synergies from an alliance partnership with other savings banks across Norway, which in 
all constitutes the second biggest lending service in Norway. Nordic Bank owns 12% in 
the alliance company, which has the function to develop products, ensure quality, IT-
services, and effective transfer. By the partnership, Nordic Bank can offer nationwide 
services.  
5.1 Division Personal market (Division PerMark) 
Nordic Bank is organized by market-based divisions in order to focus sales and service 
after different market segments. My case study is conducted in the personal market 
division (in the following division PerMark), which is led by the Divisional director 
Molly. Division PerMark is responsible for the implementation as well as control of, high 
quality in investments and developments of banking solutions and services within the 
personal market segment. The main employee group in division PerMark is the financial 
advisors, who work in the branches, providing the main contact between the bank and its 
current and potential customer. The main “product” in division PerMark is the customer 
sales meeting, where the financial advisors evaluate customer profitability for the 
                                                        
54 Information provided by the Annual Report 2013.  
55 Information provided by the 3rd Quarter Financial Report 2014. 
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purposes of selling banking products and provide additional services to make the 
customer happy. The customer meeting is also considered to be critical in process of 
getting new customers for the bank.  Division PerMark offer a range of banking products 
and services in relation to loans, deposits, insurance, pension, and payment services. The 
main customer operations linked to sales and services are provided in the branches. 
Division PerMark are supported by multiple support functions, where the central support 
functions are markets, HR and credit and risk management.  
 
 
Figure 2: Organizational structure of the Private Market division 
5.1.1. Hierarchy  
The divisional director Molly reports directly to the CEO, who in turn reports to the 
board of directors. Division PerMark is divided into 5 regions, led by 5 regional 
managers who report to Molly, the divisional director. The 5 regional managers are 
responsible for the daily operations of the branches located in their region. Each branch is 
in turn lead by a branch manager. Each branch employs between 3-15 financial advisors 
who have the daily contact with the customers via activities such as customer meetings, 
phone calls, emails, or other forms of customer services. The formal hierarchy is also the 
dominant flow of communication, where it is the regional manager who is the main 
communicative channel between branches and top management level. 
Personal Market division 
Director of 
personal 
Market  
Region 5
 
  
Region 4 Region 3 Region 2 Region 1 
Support 
functions: 
HR 
Risk 
Management  
Market support  
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5.2 The case setting   
The financial sector experiences challenges to perform in the aftershock of the financial 
turbulence (Wu, 2012, p: 303). Nordic Bank, similar to most organizations, is constantly 
working on more effective ways to manage ambiguity from uncertainties caused by 
increased competition and increased legislation as well as changing customer demands. 
The increased competition and decline in market growth has positioned sales and market 
growth as key objectives (KPIs) for division PerMark. My study of the design of 
performance management, by designing a new performance management system 
(PERFORM) in division PerMark follows how PERFORM is designed to facilitate 
achievement of the KPIs market and sales growth, by seeking to define how to coordinate 
and motivate financial advisors towards proactive sales activity.   
5.2.1 Managing performance in Division PerMark 
The newfound strategic priorities of generating sales and market growth resulted in a 
critical look on the existing ways of performing customer sales and service in the 
branches. The current performance related to customer service and sales are talked of as 
“breaks” achieving targets on the KPIs: growth in customer market and sales (hereafter 
sales growth). The key strategic focus on sales growth is due to declining growth rates in 
terms of customer market share and sales. Thus, in order to achieve the targets of sales 
growth, Division PerMark want to establish more proactive sales routines and processes 
in the branches. This is described as work processes, which facilitate and promote 
frequent and outgoing customer contact, high levels of customer happiness, and “gently” 
pushing sales of banking products in customer meetings. It is often emphasized that these 
are “new” times; and that banking operations have changed into operations of sales and 
services, as a result of the changing market conditions: 
 
“You can say that the competitive orientation has improved the service orientation in 
Norwegian banks... Because, in general, I am not that impressed of how services have 
been in banks, but I think that our industry is beginning to understand the fact that the 
customer is a value, and that is influencing the operations of Norwegian banks” ”(Molly, 
Director of Division PerMark) 
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The changes in customer demands together with the increased competition increased 
number of banks have made the customer more powerful, as banks are now competing 
for the customers. This has led to a stronger focus on the “softer” in order to create value, 
such as customer satisfaction (Interview Molly, Divisional Director, Alistair, Director of 
customer and markets). Thus, Division PerMark is evaluated on achievement of the 
targets on sales growth. Consequently, implementing proactive routines and processes on 
sales activity culture means to coordinate and motivate higher frequency of activity 
directed at sales as well as higher services level when performing sales activities.   
5.2.1.1 Coordinating value creation  
Coordinating a proactive sales culture requires the coordination and communication of 
what customer profitability is, which is complex because customer profitability includes 
many things: 
 
“Well, customer profitability is a topic that is much debated how we understand customer 
profitability…. We have to be careful, understood as an 18-20-year old is not profitable, 
because we have many different customer initiatives from they are born, as we support 
school trips, we give a confirmation present, and we have customer meetings at 18 and 
23. As you can see, we do actually invest quite a bit, so if you only considered the figures, 
these customers are unprofitable...” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
In the short-term perspective, profitable customers are younger, married couples with 
children, with relative high loans for housing, or in some cases, and middle-risk 
customers paying higher interest rates. However, in the long-term perspective, profitable 
customers are also young people, who in the future will need to loan money to buy 
houses, cars and so on (Alistair, Director of customer and markets). The complexity in 
coordinating congruent sales and service routines and processes is linked to balancing the 
customer activity between current profitable customers and future profitable customers. 
Due to the time lag in value creation from focusing on future customers, it is difficult to 
coordinate and motivate sufficient level of attention towards these customers: 
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“Segmenting and prioritizing customers based on a net-present value calculation is 
highly misleading, because by calculating net present value, the focus on the customer’s 
true profit over the course of life is neglected” (Alistair, Director of customer and 
markets) 
 
It is difficult to coordinate the allocation of resources between short-term and long-term 
value creation, as it is difficult to find performance measures that represent future value 
creation in current activities: 
 
“Of course it is important that we work effectively, but I think this means that we also 
remember to focus on and invest in younger customers… I think it is very important that 
we distinguish between working with effects and working effectively. Effects differ from 
effectively, because a meeting with an 18-year-old is not effective, but it might have a 
huge effect. Of course, this is a heavy input factor, but this is what it takes for us to 
ensure future value and market position” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Value is created, by emphasizing effectiveness (current value creation) and effects (future 
value creation), because both effectiveness and effect are necessary “ingredients” in 
achieving sales growth. Consequently, this is a key concern when making design choices 
in PERFORM.  
5.2.1.2 Motivation in sales and service activities   
Another key issue in designing PERFORM in ways that facilitate new work routines and 
processes towards sales growth, is how to motivate financial advisors to perform the sales 
and service activities in desired ways. The current situation is described as high variance 
between the level of sales and service activity between financial advisors: 
 
“The big challenge in division PM is how to make the performance level more even 
among the financial advisors... Currently, only 15-20% of the financial advisors are 
complying with the above desired level of performance on sales, and the objective is to 
move the middle-level performers up to a higher level because here there are many, many 
potential resources to be freed...” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark) 
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The quotation underlines a general concern with a too low levels sales and service 
activity, as only 15-20% of the financial advisors are perceived to perform above the 
acceptable level. There is also a general lack of motivation to “push” sales in customer 
meetings; such notifying customers of additional products in customer meetings or 
making outgoing sales telephone calls. This perceived high variance in the levels of sales 
activity across financial advisors is viewed as a key challenge in producing new proactive 
sales routines and processes with PERFORM. Motivating a higher average level of sales 
activity is suggested as a key concern in motivating value creation, as a higher average 
level of activity leads to more capacity to provide sales and survives to customers.  
5.3 Introducing performance management: PERFORM 
PERFORM, the new operational Performance management system, is introduced in order 
to coordinate and motivate achievement of sales and market growth in the branches. This 
involves facilitation of new proactive sales routines and processes. Thus, PERFORM is 
designed to guide attention to key value drivers (i.e. activity in the branches) that leads to 
the desired ends: growth in sales. PERFORM communicate the operational map, which 
specifies the assumed means-ends relations of how to achieve the KPIs of sales and 
customer market growth. The overall assumption regarding the means-ends relations is 
high frequency and high quality in performing key sales activities leads to achievement 
of the targeted sales and market growth. PERFORM is perceived as a main tool in 
coordinating and motivating the financial advisors behavior towards achieving the KPIs. 
Developing PERFORM involved multiple design choices on various elements.  
 
I traced three out of many elements introduced in PERFORM. I followed the choice of 
performance measures, the setting of performance targets and providing feedback, over a 
period of 3 years. Thus, my study provides a detailed account of how the design choices 
on these three elements seek to frame coordination and motivation of financial advisors 
towards proactive sales routines and processes.  A key choice involved the design of non-
financial performance measures (e.g. leading indicators) in order to specify the key 
activities, which are believed to lead to growth sales. The leading indicators specified 
three key behavioral indicators i.e. number of customer meetings, outgoing-phone calls 
and customer satisfaction, which is believed to coordinate proactive sales activity and 
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thus, predict increased sales outcome. Furthermore, the setting of performance targets in 
PERFORM specify expected level of activity on the key activities outlined by the leading 
indicators. In PERFORM; the target setting involves setting Threshold targets, denoting 
weekly targets that communicate minimum required level of activity on number of 
customer meetings, outgoing phone calls and customer satisfaction. Also, benchmarking 
on the number of customer meetings and outgoing phone calls where designed. Likewise, 
how to provide feedback was considered as critical, and resulted in design of self-
management feedback. This particular design on how to provide financial advisors with 
feedback denotes that it is the financial advisors themselves that are responsible for 
interpreting and acting upon the feedback regarding their activity level.  
 
The next chapters, chapter 6-8, will provide detailed descriptions of the design choices 
made as well as their development, on each of this PM elements. 
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Chapter 6: Designing Leading Indicators to coordinate 
Financial Advisors customer operations  
6.0 Introduction 
Central design choices when developing PM often involve the choices of how to 
design performance measures. A recent focus has been different design choices when 
measuring non-financial performance dimensions (NFPM), such as subjective 
measures or leading indicators. Chapter 2 disclosed how a dominant stream has 
looked into the design choices of NFPM involving casual relations, often referred to 
as leading indicators. This is what happened in division PerMark when they in 2012 
decided to develop a new PM system PERFORM, in order to manage the financial 
advisors sales performance. PERFORM is developed in order to point out what the 
financial advisors should do, in order to improve their performance on sales. The 
design of leading indicators, highlight a set of key activities, which supposedly 
predicts desired, ends (sales growth). The three leading indicators, referred to as key 
behavioral indicators (KBIs) are: 1) number of customer meetings, 2) number of 
phone-calls and 3) customer rating of satisfaction. The KBIs seek to coordinate the 
financial advisors by specifying what the advisors should do in order to contribute to 
value creation in Division PerMark. The amplified key activities are suggested to be 
all the financial advisors need to know and concentrate on, in order to contribute to 
the achievement of the KPI: sales growth.  
 
This specific design of the KBIs is interesting as it denotes a strong belief in 
operational causality, implying that if the key activities are performed (meetings, 
phone-calls and production of high customer performance) then desired sales results 
surly will follow. Thus, the choice to design the KBIs show how this choice specifies 
coordination as only guiding behavior when performing the means, as the financial 
advisor only need to concentrate on how to perform the key activities, as this is the 
way to coordinate achievement of sales growth. However, the KBI specifying 
coordination of operational activities together with other elements such as IT systems, 
descriptions of the best practice; customer lists. Thus, the strong trust in coordinating 
only on activity level is influenced by best practices and the operational map. 
Consequently, coordinating activity involves not only guide what to do but also how 
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to do it and towards which customers. 
 
In division PerMark, this casual relation is taken very seriously, so seriously that it is 
decided that the KBIs are sufficient in coordinating financial advisors performance on 
customer sales and services. Yet, it proves too complex to guide financial advisors 
contribution on sales growth, by only coordinating their daily activities. Therefore 
new ideas of how to coordinate this challenge the KBIs. The modified belief in the 
causality between key activities and desired ends results in re-design of the choice of 
performance measures in PERFORM. The added performance measures that record 
the sales outcome of activity i.e. lagging indicators shape how to coordinate the 
financial advisors in new ways: the individual financial advisor needs to know and 
focus on how to perform activity as well as the sales outcome of that activity, in order 
to contribute to sales growth. Thus, this chapter illustrates two distinct ways that 
leading indicators might unfold in shaping the framing of coordination of the financial 
advisors. 
 
Naturally, literature has informed us of that leading indicators specify how to 
coordinate, by linking current decision-making to future outcomes. Yet, only a limited 
number of the multiple ways in which leading indicators can be designed to shape 
causality and thus, coordinate operational performance has been described in detail. 
This chapter addresses this gap by illustrating how the specific design of KBIs frame 
the coordination of performance at activity level, by specifying operational causality 
of how financial advisors should perform their tasks, which have received scant 
attention. Besides, we also learn that KBI are not alone in specifying how operational 
activities leads to desired ends, due to the complexity of coordinating individual 
performance at operational level What is interesting in this story is how the KBIs 
promote a belief in operational causality that shapes distinct ways to coordinate the 
financial advisors towards growth in sales, by only coordinating them with their work 
processes. Yet, the conditions of causality is challenged and modified in new ways as 
the KBIs unfold in practice. It proves impossible to only specify the key means i.e. 
activities, as the specification of key activities excludes too many of the dimensions 
that are relevant in achieving sales growth. Thus, the interaction with the branches 
leads to new ideas of how to coordinate causality between activity and sales growth, 
framed by the KBIs together with lagging indicators. 
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The analysis starts out with describing the design the KBIs, with an emphasis on how 
the design of the KBIs carries specific ideas of how to coordinate financial advisors 
performance. Following, the analysis shows how this coordination of financial 
advisors performance overflow, as the specification of key activities excludes too 
many of the relevant dimension to achieve sales growth. Thus, new ways to 
coordinate causality between activity and sales growth emerge from re-design, where 
coordination is framed by the KBIs together with lagging indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1. The choice of designing leading indicators  
When developing PERFORM, the choices of performance measures reflects the belief 
in coordinating financial advisors with “action plans”, that point out what to do in 
order to provide customer value:  
 
“We need to have a simple and clear market plan, which carve out clear action plans 
focused on the drives of customer value – so, we cannot focus on too many different 
things, but we must on becoming good at one customer method. I think. Well 
PERFORM is three factors 1. It makes it possible to change our organization, 2) it 
enables us to meet the customer requirements, which are the drivers of a good 
relation with our customers, and 3) to me this is also about improving the level of 
activity and improve the level of quality in the meeting with the customer. That is the 
key factors of our plan”. (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Alistair explains the key role of PERFORM, which is to coordinate the financial 
advisors performance, by focusing on quality and activity. What is also implied is that 
all the financial advisors need to know and focus on is the action plans of how to meet 
customer requirements. This in turn denotes the perception of knowing what and how 
to coordinate improvements in financial advisors customer processes:  
 
“...We must become better at using the systems and work fast in them and be more 
attentive to those who "indulge" (free ride" in the processes and system of customer 
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
Designing 
KBIs 
Overflowing 
Re-design with 
KBIs and lagging 
indicators 
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proceedings) because some employees - quite a lot actually - find it more comfortable 
than to pick up the phone and call the selection of customers and thus be proactive in 
the dialog with the customer.” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark)  
 
Molly specifies what coordination of financial advisors means, which is to direct 
focus towards making customer phone calls and engage in pro-active sales-dialogs. 
Likewise, coordinating financial advisors work routines and processes in ways that 
lead to sales growth also involves directing focus on quality of customer related 
activity:    
 
“Yes, absolutely… the soft values become hard if you see it as a happy customer 
compared with an unhappy customer which can be what decides whether we will 
make any money on that customer in the future. So the soft values are probably much 
more important than what we perceive them to be” (Molly, Director of Division 
PerMark) 
 
Molly emphasize why, and how, quality, specified as “softer values”, such as happy 
customers is considered to be part of the key value drivers to coordinate focus on via 
PERFORM. Thus, there is a strong attention on coordinating the performance on the 
value drivers of customer sales when developing PERFORM. The choice to design 
leading indicators to coordinate financial advisors attention on the key activities in the 
customer processes is explained further: 
 
 “If we believe that focus on the correct activity towards the right customers at the 
right time, with the right quality lead to results, – but at the same time measure on 
other performance dimensions, then we focus on too many dimensions, and then we 
lose focus of the very essentials that drives the result. I believe that if we say that all 
the results comes from increased and improved activity, and then we must also work 
with activity, quality and method” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Alistair clearly underlines how the design of the leading indicators shapes 
coordination as focusing on the “essentials that drives the result”, which implicitly 
means to focus on coordinating the means i.e. key activities in ways so that they lead 
to the desired ends. In fact, the belief that the key to success in increased sales is by 
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coordinating financial advisors focus towards “the method” i.e. the key activities is so 
strong that the leading indicators are viewed as equally informative of sales as 
measures of sales performance:  
 
“Well, the idea is that it is activity that produces results, but instead of counting the 
number of credit cards you sell, we will count the number of customer meetings you 
have” (Julie, HR-director) 
 
The somewhat surprising outcome of designing leading indicators is that they are 
designed as the only measures in PERFORM. Furthermore, this choice is even argued 
to be beneficial with regards to the coordinating individual performance, as this 
remove confusion from adding lagging indicators in PERFORM: 
.  
“To remove some of the focus away from sales performance, because the sale results 
will come automatically right. Rather focus on performing the activity as well as I 
can, and then the sales results will be generated. This is the complete opposite than 
how we have measured earlier, and to be frank, I think it is the right way to do it, to 
reduce the focus on the sales results” (Julie, HR director) 
 
Because the leading indicators frame coordination of how to produce happy customers 
and more sales from customer activity, this is all individual financial advisor needs to 
know and focus on. However, in order for the leading indicators to properly 
coordinate financial advisors, all other measures are removed as this might distort the 
way that the leading indicators coordinate activity that leads to sales. This is quite a 
paradox, as leading and lagging both coordinates towards sales, just at different stages 
in the sales processes. On the other hand, this specifies how the two measures designs 
frame coordination differently, as the leading indicators coordinate the means to reach 
the results:  
 
 “So I am confident that we are about to achieve something very good with 
PERFORM - then it all fits together, back to this picture again, as you can see: Now 
we have priorities, we measure activity – number of telephones and meetings, and 
that is the only thing we measure together with measuring quality… and then we 
measure on what drives the results, by focusing on the core operation of what we do: 
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which is performing customer meetings and telephone calls which reflects the market 
plan” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
As emphasizes by Alistair, the design of the leading indicators, enables coordination 
of “what we do” in order to achieve desired outcomes, are perceived as to coordinate 
a more balanced and “complete” focus in the day-to-day operations in the branches. 
What is implied is the strong belief in how leading indicators guide what it takes to 
perform customer sales and services, denoting the coordinating role of the 
performance measures that supplement the communication of new operational plan. 
The next introduce the details of the three leading indicators in PERFORM. 
6.2. The design of leading indicators in PERFORM   
Alistair explained that: “as soon as we introduce new performance measures, and talk 
about what it is to perform customer sales and services in a correct way”, which 
implies that 1) “correct performance” is known and 2) can be coordinated via 
appropriately designed performance measures. The choice to design leading 
indicators is to highlighting key activities of “correct performance”, which supposedly 
predict desired ends (sales growth). The design choice of leading indicators is 
believed to specifying what the advisors should do to perform well for Division 
PerMark. Thus, coordination is produced based on a strong belief in operational 
causality, implying that if the key activities are performed correctly. This leads to 
three leading indicators that specify the value drivers to achieve sales growth. 
6.2.1 Number of customer meetings  
Maybe the most central leading indicator is the number of customer meetings, as 
customer meetings is considered by far as the most important, and main activity in 
terms of providing customer services and selling banking products:  
 
“…. It is centered on the in-depth customer meetings, what we are trying to 
emphasize is that the more customer meetings you hold, and the higher the possibility 
that we get a sale… It is not important if that sale is a credit card, or if it is insurance 
the customer actually need” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark) 
 
This leading indicator communicates speed and quality in activity, by guiding 
attention towards the value of performing customer meetings. This leading indicator 
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is suggested to communicate importance of performing customer meetings, and thus, 
produce attention towards customer meetings in daily routines and sales processes. 
Thus, it also reduces the current variances across financial advisors in performing 
customer sales and service activity (Alistair, Director of customer and markets). 
6.2.2 Number of outgoing phone calls  
The second leading indicator is the number of outgoing phone calls. The design of 
these leading indicators is based on very similar arguments as the design of number of 
customer meetings. The number of out-going phone calls coordinates pro-active 
customer routines and processes by pointing out the importance of making out-going 
phone calls to customers. This is important as the phone calls produce more booking 
of sales meeting or even potential new customers. Thus, the making of customer 
phone calls is considered as a part of pro-active routines and processes, which predict 
increase in sales outcome.  
6.2.3 Customer satisfaction  
The third leading indicator coordinates attention on customer happiness when 
performing the sales activity of customer meetings and phone calls: 
 
“We send out a questioner to the customers and ask how did I perform, did you feel 
well received by me, how good was I in addressing your banking needs, and how 
satisfied are you with the solutions I presented to you – did it match what you told me 
of your needs. So not a lot of questions, but a few key questions” (Julie, HR director) 
 
The customer satisfaction indicator specifies the importance of customer happiness in 
order for the customer meeting and phone calls to lead to increased sales outcomes.  
The customer satisfaction measures guide financial advisors attention towards the 
“soft values” of providing customer service in sales activity or other customer related 
activity.  
 
“If you think of how to perform the best customer process, well the Achilles-heal for a 
good performance, is preparation right? How well did you prepared for the meeting 
you are about to have with the customer? If you are well prepared, then you perform 
best customer process. Because then you have acquired necessary information: not 
just the banking information but also information on the customers’ personal profile. 
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However, if you have not prepared on who this customer you meeting is, the customer 
remembers that, and then you fail to provide quality. But if we measure the quality: 
where we actually ask the customer how good the financial advisors were 
prepared….” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Customer satisfaction is believed to coordinate increased sales growth by guiding 
quality in the performance of customer meeting. It does so, by specifying the 
importance of preparation in terms of knowing the customer needs, customers’ 
personal finances and history with the bank. This guide attention towards what it 
takes to perform quality in customer meetings 
6. 3. Designing leading indicators as Key Behavioral Indicators 
As shown, the leading indicators frame coordination of what financial advisor should 
do when they come to work, in order to contribute to sales growth. And this is all the 
financial advisor needs to know and focus on in order to contribute with increased 
sales performance. However, the leading indicators, that specify what the key value 
driving activities are, are not the only design choices made in order to coordinate 
financial advisors in how to perform their tasks. Additional elements contribute in 
specifying coordination of activity in order to specifying how to perform the 
operational activities in ways that lead to desired ends. The design of leading 
indicators involves comprehensive task knowledge, denoting insight of how input is 
transformed into output. Consequently, the leading indicators are designed as Key 
behavioral indicator (KBIs), denoting that the measures together with design choices 
on additional elements i.e. best practice, customer lists etc., are believed to coordinate 
desired ends by guiding what to do as well as how to do it and towards which 
customers. 
6.3.1 Designing operational map  
What is so interesting with the design of the KBIs is how their design reflects a strong 
belief in knowing the operational causality. Thus, it’s possible to coordinate the 
means of how to reach the ends: focus on the key dimensions of activity, and perform 
them, and the desired results will follow. The KBIs communicate the aggregated KPIs 
of market and sales growth, by specifying what market and sales growth means in 
terms of customer activities: 
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“A: so the performance measures which specify the activities we work with in order 
to realize our goals. The KBIs are specifying the main activities in order to realize 
our strategic market-related goals … and one of the most important areas of us the 
next two years; it is to succeed with this structure right here (the operational map)”  
Q: so, PERFORM is linked to your KPIs? 
A: yes, for example, one of the KPIs the TRIM index, means happy customers from 
customer satisfaction in PERFORM, so many of the KPI are represented in 
PERFORM… but you see, PERFORM is on its own a very pedagogical user tool - 
because PERFORM is about operational activities” (Alistair, Director of customer 
and markets) 
 
Thus, the design of the KBIs involves the design of an operational map, which 
specifies and guides the meaning of the aggregated KPIs in the operational context. 
This involves coordinating how to best exploit input resources into output, by guiding 
attention towards the key value driving activities, 
:  
“We cannot keep hiring more people, we must manage with the resources we have 
now. Therefore it is important that we work on the right things, and stop doing 
everything else. We must create the right pressure to become good on those activities. 
I believe in becoming good at something means to define and communicate a 
“production plan” and work on improving that production plan” (Paul, Internal 
consultant in Division PerMark) 
 
All in all, designing the KBIs specify how to coordinate financial advisors 
performance by communicating the operational map. The simple logic of the design 
of the KBIs makes the operational map easy to communicate and understand: just 
focus and know these things of what to do and how to do it: 
 
“It works without giving a lot of extra work and I think the KBIs are” easy to work 
with” (Paul, Internal consultant in Division PerMark) 
 
The closeness to the financial advisors daily activity makes the KBIs relevant for 
shaping their daily performance. 
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6.3.2 Communicate task knowledge with best practice processes 
The design of the KBIs seeks to coordinate financial advisors in performing customer 
related activity, by pointing out new work routines and processes: 
 
“This is a process of incremental adjustments, there will be continuously 
improvements- this involves adaption in accordance to new information along the 
way, but we need to be strict about adapting as well. It is so easy to get caught up in: 
we just include this and that". And suddenly, it’s too comprehensive and then we ruin 
the key focus- I think it is important to state that this is our production plan, and this 
consistent over time.” (Paul Internal consultant in Division PerMark)  
 
Paul implies the assumption of knowing how to include and exclude activities in the 
production plan e.g. defining the key routines and processes of pro-active sales. Thus, 
the coordinating role of leading indicators at operational level is specified further with 
task knowledge of “best practice”: 
 
“When you see how we measure performance, we are measuring best practices” 
(Alistair, Director of Customer and Markets) 
 
Thus, the KBIs do not only communicate what activities to perform, but also how to 
perform the activities and towards which customers the activities should be 
performed. Furthermore, the coordination of how to perform the activities and 
towards which customers’ is coordinated in interaction with the CRM system.  
6.4 Framing the coordination of financial advisors with the CRM system   
The KBIs is believed to coordinate what to do, but also how to do it and towards 
which customers, via their interaction with best practice descriptions and the 
operational map. In extension, the KBIs are perceived to coordinate new routines and 
processes of how to make pro-active sales, by improving the exploitation of digital 
resource such as the digital customer systems when performing customer activities:  
 
“The important part is to increase the activity level in the branches, also so that we 
can take better advantages of the digital parts in the branches” (Molly, Director of 
Division PerMark) 
 
The KBIs show how leading indicators seek to coordinate improvements at activity 
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level by focusing attention on exploitation of organizational resources. The KBIs is 
designed to guide attention towards the use of digital resources that support more 
effective performance of the customer meetings, phone calls and customer happiness 
in the branches. However, what is interesting is the way in which the digital resources 
also specify how the KBIs might coordinate quality in the customer activities, by 
specifying the dimensions of quality with information from the customer log and 
customer selection lists in the CRM system. The CRM system is an ERP-system, 
which provides an overview of the key customer processes within customer sales and 
services. The CRM specify how the KBIs guide quality in the activities in customer 
processes, for example how providing high quality in customer services involves 
logging customer activities in the customer log:  
 
“We developed the CRM system with the basic idea of structuring the activities into 
the CRM system, making the CRM the one-to-one dialog with the customer. For 
example, our initiative of the 18-year-old meeting: We work with the processes linked 
to that activity, the activity is described and you need to log each step of what you 
have done. Here you can also see your rate of completion” (Alistair, Director of 
customer and markets)  
 
The customer log coordinates the planning of financial advisors customer meetings 
activity, informing when and whom financial advisors should book customer 
meetings with, such as: 14 year, 18 year and 23-year old meetings:  
 
Within the age group 20-25, our last measurement 18-25 years, we have the average 
of 75% of each age. And that is a 25% higher market share as compared with the 
total market. So I think it demonstrates that if we are able to have the correct 
activities and educate the organization in why we perform the various activities, such 
as here, where we build a memory of the customers” (Alistair, Director of customer 
and markets) 
 
Thus, the customer log not only specify when and towards whom to plan activity, but 
also coordinates how to provide higher quality in customer meetings, as the logging 
customer history provide a customer memory that informs the preparation to the next 
customer meeting. The CRM system specifies how the KBIs guide customer activity, 
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by specifying how and towards whom the activity should be directed. The next 
provide a more detailed account of how the KBIs and CRM coordinate the financial 
advisors customer activities.  
6.4.1 Guiding how to perform customer activities 
The interaction with the CRM system communicates knowledge of how to perform 
the activities measured by the KBIs, as the customer log provides descriptions of how 
to prepare for customer meetings:  
 
“I will give you a good example: Two of our best performers in the pilot branch, 
received somewhat low score on preparation from the customer satisfaction…from 
this, they said: well, what is it that I do wrong? From this they learned a new method 
to prepare for customer meetings, where they used a bit more time on customer 
history and needs. And suddenly they peaked and scored high evaluations. So now 
they see how the KBIs provide them with additional value” (Thomas, Chief controller 
Division PerMark) 
 
The KBI: customer satisfaction and the customer log coordinate knowledge of how to 
perform customer value in the customer meeting. This episode also witness how 
another coordinating role of the KBIs is to produce learning with regards to task 
knowledge, which will be analyzed in further detailed below. The in-depth meeting is 
a good example of how the KBIs seek to frame how to perform the key customer 
activities. The in-depth meeting coordinates by specifying what is perceived as 
performing a value driving customer meeting For example, customer meetings 
initiated on the basis of customers lending needs are not considered as a value driving 
activity, unless the meetings is converted into a general customer sales meeting. The 
specification of the in-depth customer meeting communicate knowledge of how to 
perform value adding sales meetings, which involves attention towards volume sales 
from broad scope of products (lending. insurance, savings and credit cards):  
 
“It is only the “in-depth” meeting that is measured, because this is what the customer 
wants: if they come in to speak with us, they want a complete review of their situation, 
and that review has better be good! The customer should experience added value, 
which implies that the financial advisor is perceived as being more knowledgeable, 
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only then will the customer be satisfied with the meeting… If they experience a 
mediocre meeting, they might just as well have skipped the meeting” (Alistair, 
Director of customer and markets) 
 
In-depth meeting seek to guide how to plan for the customer sales meetings with a 
structure that provide a complete “review”, which involves a broad-scale evaluation 
of customer needs with respect to a range of Nordic banks products. As the quotation 
highlights, in-depth customer meetings are viewed as leading by being more value 
creating, both in terms of sales and customer satisfaction.  
6.4.2 Coordinating with customer lists 
The selection of customers to direct the activity towards is yet another specification of 
how the KBIs, together with the customer lists, is believed to coordinate financial 
advisor in their customer activity. As the earlier quotations show, there exist 
numerous customer selection lists that guide the selection of customer to book 
meetings with and to call up: 
 
“And then we have customer prioritization lists, which involve prioritized customers 
to focus on. For example, right now we are working on the million-customers” 
(Kathy, Branch Manager) 
 
The branch manager explains how the KBIs are linked to customer selection lists, 
which in term specify how the KBI seek to coordinate financial advisors activity. The 
KBIs, via the interaction with the customer selection list, supposedly coordinate 
attention towards the “right” type of customer in the right type of activities.  
Furthermore, as underlined “there is no point in performing an activity which is not a 
priority”. Thus, guiding appropriate selection the type of customers is part of how 
KBIs guide “correct” activity among financial advisors. The customer lists are 
updated on a continuous basis based on particular segments of interest, such as 
million-customers (customers with engagements over one million), potential 
customers (tips-based), insurance (campaigns).  
6.4.3 Coordinating learning from work processes  
Furthermore, another way that the coordinating role of the KBIs is specified is by 
facilitating financial advisors learning in task performance. The specification of the 
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operational map into best practice, detail more transparency of what types of tasks, 
and how performance of those tasks, leads to higher sales outcome (achievement of 
the KPIs). The KBIs seek to specify what types of activities that are highest priority in 
day-to-day operations:  
 
“…This is not rocket science, the best practice processes towards customers, but this 
is about creating awareness of knowledge of the processes, so that everyone realizes, 
that this is how we work. And PERFORM is here, I cannot ignore this.” (Alistair, 
Director of customer and markets) 
 
The KBIs is believed to “push” specific task knowledge, as this cannot be ignored. 
This facilitates processes of new insight regarding how to perform day-to-day 
customer activities: 
 
“Q: In regards to learning, are there significant changes of the way of thinking about 
customer processes among the financial advisors? 
A: what they say at least, is that there is no big difference compared to what they did 
earlier on, but now they feel they perform the activities more correctly. And that is the 
whole point: we want to remove the focus form sales result and direct it on the 
activities that drive sales results” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Learning is not only about communicating new knowledge, but also to facilitate 
incremental changes in current routines and processes. The guidance of what to do, 
but also further specification of how to do it, and towards which customers from best 
practice descriptions and the operational map is perceived to coordinate a common 
understanding, and thus produce learning of the correct way to perform the measured 
activities.  
6.5 Overflowing from the KBIs framing of coordination   
The specific design of the leading indicators as key behavioral indicators (KBIs) is 
believed to shape coordination of financial advisors, by specifying what the advisors 
should do in order to contribute to improve the sales growth. The KBIs seek to shape 
coordination with a strong certainty in the operational causality between activities and 
desired outcome, implying that if the key activities (customer meetings, phone-calls 
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and high customer satisfaction) are performed, then surly sales growth is the outcome. 
The key activities are therefore the only dimension that financial advisors need to 
know and focus their resources on, in order to achieve sales growth. Also, the KBI are 
not alone in specifying how the specification of operational activities leads to desired 
ends. Together with best practices, it is not only pointed out what to do but also how 
to perform the activities and towards which customers. However, the attempt to direct 
the framing of coordination with these propositions are challenged, as it proves 
impossible to coordinate financial advisors contribution to sales growth, by only 
specifying how to perform outlined key activities. This is described next.  
6.5.1. Confusion regarding “what” of customer meeting activity is 
One of the main challenges emerging from how the KBIs frame coordination of 
financial advisors was the specification of “what” to do. In the branches, the KBI 
produce confusion regarding the “what”, understood as what it entails for customer 
meetings to suffice as “value driving”. This confusion is troublesome in terms of 
pointing out value driving activity:  
 
”The problem with the customer meeting measure is the registration. How do 
different individuals define a customer meeting? And what is the standard that defines 
a meeting as a customer meeting? It is not PERFORM, but the customer that should 
define this: It is, after all, the customers’ needs that should define this. It could be just 
a 10-minute meeting where we discuss loans and financing, as this was what the 
customer needed at this point in time, as everything else was under control. But in 
such a situation, who registers for an in-depth meeting and who does not? Where is 
the boundary of an in-depth meeting? I am not at all sure that we are measuring on 
the basis of the same criteria here” (Financial advisor, branch Y)  
 
The financial advisor stresses how the confusion about the customer meeting measure 
arise due to insufficient definition, expressing a lack of a common knowledge of 
which type of customer meetings that are “key activity”.  Thus, the KBIs overflow, in 
pointing out what to do, due to the confusion regarding “what” a customer meeting is. 
The overflow occurs as the KBIs misrepresent, rather than clarify transparent 
communication of operational causality. It proves more complex to define a universal 
understanding of what to do in order to perform value-driving activity. The 
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complexity of pointing out what to do is due to the ambiguous nature of customer 
meetings, which are complex and dynamic from ad-hoc customer needs. The low 
clarity limits the KBI communication of operational causality. This in turn leads to 
reduced trust in the casual link between customer meetings and sales growth:  
 
“In regard to customer meetings and phone calls, and these things that they focus on 
[divisional management], when you observe that some of the braches perform 7 times 
what we perform in terms of activity, but at the same time we are performing 
significantly better on sales results, then of course it seems to imply that the standard 
of when to register a meeting is highly different across the organization” (Branch 
manager) 
 
The KBI also overflow coordinating activity, as the casual relations between customer 
meeting activity and sales outcome is doubted. This reduces the trustworthiness of the 
KBIs in providing useful information that can guide financial advisors in how to 
perform the sales and service activities that leads to improvement of sales 
performance.  
6.5.2 Low flexibility towards customer needs from specifying “how “to perform  
The attempt to coordinate how to perform the key activities, described in best 
practices of how to plan and book customer meetings, as well as how to perform in 
the actual customer meeting, produces tensions in performing daily activities. The 
best practices reduces flexibility to adapt the customer services towards unforeseen 
occurrences, unique customer needs and as well as the uniqueness of customer 
preferences in the financial advisors’ customer portfolios. For example, the specified 
focus on planning of future customer meetings, end up reducing the customer service 
on ad-hoc customer requests, due to low levels of availability. Customers enter with 
very different needs; and, hence, the “happiness” for the customer does not always 
match with the best practice of how to perform customer meetings. Thus, the KBIs 
overflow, as the guidance of how to perform the activities distorts customer value:  
 
“There is a huge focus on planning meetings in the near future, if you can manage to 
register and show that you have planned meetings 2-3 weeks into the future, and then 
it is like hallelujah. But experience shows that with the workday we have, things are 
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coming in from the side, and when we are three weeks into the future, I did perform 
all the meetings required, I have reached my goals, but ideally I should have planned 
these three weeks ahead, just to satisfy the system. But my workday and my customers 
are not like that, the customers don't know my calendar, so I must be available for 
them. You can be structured, but structure does not hold, because I can have an open 
calendar Monday, and come Friday, my week has been fully booked- but that does not 
satisfy the system” (Financial advisor, branch X) 
 
The financial advisor emphasizes “my” customers and “my” workweek, which 
highlights how, the different types of customers in their customer portfolio, makes 
each financial advisor subject to different types of complexity in their work processes 
concerning the customer. The coordinating from best practice is limited in including 
the complexity of operational day-to-day activity. Thus, the KBIs and best practice 
overflow in guiding how to perform, plan and structure customer meetings, by 
distorting how financial advisor can provide higher customer happiness.  
6.5.3 The specification of “what” and “how” distort attention on customer needs 
The way that the KBIs specifies coordination with how to perform the customer 
meetings also overflows as the best practice structure of how to organize the meeting 
remove attention away from the customers real-time inquiries and needs. The 
financial advisors explains how the concern with meeting the “best practices” within 
customer related activities remove attention from the customers’ in-time service and 
product needs.  
 
“Something is missing here. We are hunting high and low to find anything we can 
register as a meeting, and in this search we somehow loose the focus on the customer 
in front of us” (Financial advisor, branch Y) 
 
The financial advisors are so occupied with trying to live up to the standard of “what” 
i.e. best practice customer meeting, and how to perform it, wherefore the coordinating 
role of the KBIs overflow by moving the focus away from the customer needs in 
order to “satisfy the system”. The customer satisfaction measure measures the 
“completed” structure of best practice, which enforces the strong focus on the best 
practice structure. Hence, the KBIs, is limited in coordinating improved level of 
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service and quality due to the overflows from low flexibility towards customer needs.  
6.5.4 Incomplete framing of “which” customers to select        
The KBIs seek to coordinate by guiding “which” customers to select, together with 
customer prioritization lists. However, coordinating customer selection overflows into 
“cherry-picking” of customers, as the registration of customer meetings and phone 
calls do not differentiate on type of customer selected: 
 
Q: So, what you are saying is that the implication of PERFORM is actually ineffective 
selection of customers? 
A: Yes, that is what is happening” (Sarah, Branch manager) 
 
Thus, the coordinating role of the KBIs overflow into a “manipulative” problem 
related to “Cherry-picking” customers. The insufficient coordination of customer 
selection is caused by the design of the number of customer meetings and number of 
phone calls, as they only measure activity:  
 
“In PERFORM, all activity ads up to the same, and this stimulates the opposite 
behavior than what I am trying to do” (Sarah, Branch manager) 
 
The KBIs overflow in coordinating customer selection, as the lack of measuring sales 
value of the selected customers, result in cream skimming of the easy, but not so 
profitable type of customers. The easiest customers are often picked in order to 
register the activity in terms of meetings or phone-calls. Thus, activities towards 
customers who yield low sales outcome are picked over more demanding, but 
profitable customers Furthermore, the KBIs also overflow in communicating attention 
towards new customers, which is considered to be important to achieve the KPI 
market growth. New customers are time- consuming and “risky”, which implies fewer 
registered meetings and phone-calls. Thus, because the KBIs measure on activity 
level, their design overflows in coordinating customer selection.  
6.5.5 Incomplete coordination of sales growth  
The interesting narrative framed by the KBIs is: just book customer sales meetings, 
call up customers, and make sure that the customer is happy with the service and 
products provided and sales growth will follow. However, the sole coordination of 
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what to do, how to do it and towards which customers’ overflows, as the KBIs 
coordination on activity is not enough to coordinate attention on sales: 
“For example, if you establish a savings agreement with a customer, let’s say a 
colleague establishes 3 agreements for 300 kr. and I establish 1 agreement worth 
1000 – then the 900 kr. is better than the 1000. That does not make sense. I mean, I 
don't add up, because after all, it must be the results on the bottom line that counts at 
the end of the day” (Financial advisor, Branch X) 
 
The financial advisor explains how the isolated focus on activity reduce overall sales 
outcome. The example clearly illustrates how the KBIs, by only measuring the 
processes of customer sales and services, distort coordination of attention towards 
sales outcome. Thus, the KBIs are insufficient in guiding the financial advisors 
towards improved sales performance: 
 
“During the last 10 years, the growth in lending has been around 1.7-2.5%, and now 
it is 8.5%, and this is not due to a higher number of customer meetings, rather the 
opposite, we have 1/10 of the customer meetings, but we have a very high acceptance 
rate, and we are focused on working on the right type of customers. And this is not 
weighted at all if you look at PERFORM, I mean, if you look at Branch X, they have 
performed best in the in-depth meetings 9 out of 10 weeks this year, with an average 
of 4.7 where we have an average of 1.9- 2.5. Based on these numbers, we should 
deliver half as much as them, but actually we are 6 million ahead of them. So if 
PERFORM reflected the actual financial results, then they [another branch] should 
outperform us, but the reality is just the opposite” (Sarah, Branch manager) 
 
Sarah, a branch manager, explains the conditional nature of the operational map. She 
explains why the KBIs are incomplete in coordination of higher sales growth. This is 
interesting as it demonstrates how the leading and lagging indicators seek to 
coordinate the same end: sales growth in different ways. All in all, the framing of the 
financial advisors contribution, by only coordinating how to perform the activities, 
overflows as this framing of coordination excluded relevant dimensions of how to 
achieve sales growth. This resulted in competing suggestions of how to shape 
coordination with re-design of performance measures.  
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6.6 Challenging the KBIs: the illusion of leading indicators 
As the KBIs unfold in the branches, their framing is challenged as the leading 
indicators prove to be incomplete in coordinating the financial advisors contribution 
to sales growth. The KBIs are challenged from excluding important dimensions in 
providing sales outcome: 
 
“Our measures are customer meetings, and you can have 5 meetings a week without 
one single sale. And that is not worth much. It might even be that you have prioritized 
the wrong type of customer” (Alex, Branch manager) 
 
The branch manager exemplifies how the KBIs exclude attention towards sales. 
However, the KBIs coordinate attention on activity, also customer care activities, 
which provide high customer happiness but no imitate sales: 
 
“Activity today might not yield results before after half a year or even after a few 
years. So in that sense, the focus on activity is positive, it produces results over time 
and we are improving customer relations. There are activities that don’t yield any 
immediate financial results, and given that you spend 10 times the amount of 
resources to get a new customer than to groom existing relations speaks to the 
importance of grooming new customer relations” (Financial advisor, Branch X) 
 
Thus, while lagging indicators on sales would provide more attention on immediate 
sales performance from the customer activity, the KBIs coordinate attention towards 
grooming future customers. This advantage of the KBIs is how they communicate the 
importance of long-term value creation:  
 
“The advantage of PERFORM is that you get credit even if the meeting doesn’t result 
in a sale. PERFORM documents that you have performed customer care, and made a 
good job of it. It might not be a sale today, but maybe in a month’s time” (Alistair, 
Director of customer and markets) 
 
The quotation emphasizes how the divisional management views the KBIs as 
coordinating attention towards activities of customer care, where the value of these 
activities is subject to a time lag. However, the branch managers experience 
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difficulties in guiding short term value creation, in terms of selecting customers and 
activity to focus on, and providing enough attention of sales Therefore, the 
trustworthiness of the design of the operational map is questioned in some of the 
branches. Two suggestions of how to re-design PERFORM exemplify alternative 
ways to shape the coordination of financial advisors contribution to sales growth. The 
suggestions seek to specify the casual link between activity and sales outcome, by 
specify further the linkage between customer selection in activity and sales outcome. 
One of the alternative performance measures was rate of acceptance: 
 
“For example, as regards insurance, we should calculate an acceptance rate in order 
to avoid just making 100 offers which never come to anything” (Sarah, Branch 
manager) 
 
The “hit rate”, denote the rate of acceptance compared to the number of offers made, 
which coordinate how financial advisors select customers activity, as the measure 
make level of activity compared to level of sales transparent. The second suggested 
re-design was average lending, which was argued to improve coordination of 
attention towards customer selection in customer meetings: 
 
“A measure which would have exposed this issue rather quickly is average lending- 
this is one of the calculations I used in this branch to uncover how the financial 
advisors allocated their effort. Because when I started here, we had a high frequency, 
but the average was around 70 000, while others had averages of 2.5 million. And of 
course, this means that the ones with an average of 70 000 are working very hard for 
low results. So if I could see an average rate on the individual advisor, then I could 
easily see who we make money on and who among the advisors are unprofitable” 
(Alex, Branch manager) 
 
The implied proposition is that the design of average lending coordinates financial 
advisors customer selection towards profitable customers when performing customer 
activity. Thus, this is suggested as a way to cope with the overflows such as cream 
skimming and distorted customer selection. 
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6.7 Re-designing choice of measures in PERFORM: Designing lagging indicators  
The KBIs attempt to frame coordination was challenged, as the specification of how 
to perform key activities as the only way to coordinate contribution to sales growth 
proved too incomplete. The KBIs way of coordinating financial advisors excluded 
many relevant dimensions. Thus, the responses as PERFORM unfold in the branches 
(overflows) modified the design of the KBIs, leading to new meaning of coordination, 
which is framed both by the KBIs and by the new lagging indicators. PERFORM is 
re-designed by include lagging indicators on sales performance on the key banking 
products: 
 
“The sales measures are back; and this is something my region has argued and made 
a strong case for; because in 2013, we were flying blindfold, without any measures 
other than activity, and this did not add up…It was a mismatch” (Regional manager) 
 
This regional manager emphasizes the relief of re-designing PERFORM with lagging 
indicators, expressed as removing the blindfolds when managing the financial 
advisors in their daily customer sales and service activities. The complexity in 
performing customer sales and services requires specification of additional 
dimensions, in order to provide more flexible solutions from financial advisors 
specific knowledge. The redesign lagging indicators reflects sales outcomes, adjusted 
for the individual customer portfolios, which coordinate attention on sales outcome 
from the key activities. The table provides an overview of the performance measures 
in the new framing of PM.  
Dimension Metric  
Leading indicators  
Customer meetings Number of meetings 
Phone-calls Number of phone calls  
Customer satisfaction Customer satisfaction  
Lagging indicators  
Credit cards Number of sold 
Insurance (personal insurance) Kr. sold 
Insurance (injury insurance) Kr. sold 
Savings in stocks and funds Number of sold 
Savings in bank  Number of sold 
Savings (youth 18-35) Number of sold 
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6.7.1 New ideas of coordinating value creation in the branches  
The responses in the branches, expressed by the overflows, emerged from how the 
KBIs specified coordination, which excluded relevant dimension of how to achieve 
higher sales growth. This demonstrates the complexity of designing leading indicators 
that point out operational causality in order to specify the activities that predict sales 
growth. The challenging of how the KBIs coordinate financial advisors in specific 
ways is interesting as this portray two different ways of how leading indicators shape 
causality when specifying coordination of value contribution. This also displays how 
the overflows contribute shaping understanding of causality, and how to coordinate 
financial advisors performance:  
 
“…And via this processes the focus on financial results is increased. In the beginning 
we had a very strong focus on activity and the activity standards, but then we realized 
that we must balance this focus with a similar focus on financial results. There is a 
better balance in PERFORM now” (Thomas, Chief controller in Division PerMark) 
 
The overflows contribution to the framing of coordination is expressed by the re-
design of PERFORM, which expands with lagging indicators. The re-design shape 
causality, and thus coordination in new ways, by adding relevant dimensions such as 
sales outcome from activity, as part of what financial advisors needs to know and 
focus on, in order to perform in desired ways. The lagging indicators add specification 
of what coordinating is, as the added dimension of sales performance supposedly 
details the causality between activity and sales results further, by adding the 
dimension excluded when only measuring on activity.   
6.8. Concluding remarks on chapter 6 
This chapter has described how the choice to design leading indicators in PERFORM 
frame coordination in a specific way, which is modified as the measures unfold in 
practice. The chapter informs my research question by describing how the design 
choice of leading indicators (i.e. non-financial dimensions of performance) frame 
coordination of financial advisors daily activities in division PerMark in a particular 
way. The chapter displays how the design of leading indicators, highlighting a set of 
key activities (customer meeting, phone-calls and customer satisfaction) is believed to 
predict desired ends (sales growth). Thus, the choice to design the KBIs shows how 
the leading indicators seek to specify coordination by pointing out how financial 
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advisors should perform their job. The financial advisors only need to concentrate on 
performing the key activities, as this surely leads to sales results. However, the KBI 
specify coordination of operational activities together with other elements such as IT 
systems, descriptions of the best practice; customer lists. Thus, the strong trust in only 
coordinating the means in order to research the ends is influenced by best practices 
and the operational map. Consequently, coordinating activity involves not only 
pointing out what to do but also how to do it and towards which customers. This also 
illustrates how conditions such as task knowledge and operational map influences 
deign of leading indicators, by directing how the KBIs seek to coordinate value 
creation. 
 
Chapter 6 contributes with detailed account of how leading indicators can be designed 
to shape operational causality in order to coordinate operational performance. This 
chapter illustrates how the specific design of KBIs seeks to frame coordination by 
specifying causality in ways that have received limited attention. In division PerMark, 
the belief in causality is taken very seriously when making deign choices, so seriously 
that only the KBIs are designed to coordinate financial advisors performance on sales 
growth. Yet, as it proves too complex to guide financial advisors performance on 
sales growth by only coordinating how to perform the daily activities, new ideas of 
how to coordinate emerge. The KBI overflow, as they are incomplete representations 
of operational causality, exemplified by the confusion of what to perform, how to 
prioritize customers and whom the resources should be directed at. Thus, the KBIs are 
perceived as incomplete in specifying all relevant dimensions of how to coordinate 
financial advisors performance towards sales growth. 
 
The modified conviction in the causality between activity and desired results is 
expressed in the re-design of the performance measurement in PERFORM. The added 
performance measures on sales outcome of activity i.e. lagging indicators frame 
coordination in new ways: the individual financial advisor needs to know and focus 
on both activity and sales outcome in order to contribute to sales growth. This 
demonstrates the complexity of designing operational causality with leading 
indicators that specifies how to perform activities in ways that predict desired ends. 
The re-design of how the KBIs coordinate financial advisors is interesting as this 
portray an alternative way of how leading indicators shape causality between 
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operational activity and desired ends. This in turn portrays how the overflows 
contribute in specifying causality, which shapes the framing of coordination. 
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Chapter 7: Setting multiple performance targets on leading 
indicators for financial advisors  
7. 0 Introduction 
As emphasized in chapter 2, part of designing Performance Management (PM) 
involves deign choices of how to set performance targets. This chapter traces the 
design choices made when setting performance targets in PERFORM and illustrates 
how the design of multiple performance targets seek frame coordination and 
motivation of the financial advisors in division PerMark. Of course, we are already 
familiar with the motivating role of performance targets from prior literature. For 
example, how performance targets shape motivation of individual effort is a much-
explored topic. Yet, only a limited number of the ways in which performance targets 
might specify coordination of operational employees’ behavior has been described. 
This chapter addresses this by illustrating how the design of multiple targets in 
PERFORM point out how to coordinate the financial advisors in ways that have 
received scant attention. Of course, my study also mirror already described ways that 
target seek to coordinate and motivate performance. Furthermore, this chapter 
uncovers how performance targets seek to specify coordination and motivation of 
financial advisors, which adds to the meaning framed by the first design choice 
studies in my empirical analysis – namely the choice of leading indicators (KBIs) 
described in chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 7 contributes with more insight to the practice of designing performance 
targets for operational employees, by providing a rich account of surprising 
combination of multiple performance targets in PERFORM. First, a somewhat 
unconventional design choice is to set multiple target levels on the same performance 
dimensions. The complexity in the operational context made designing target level 
difficult, wherefore multiple targets are set in order to specify coordination and 
motivation of financial advisors. Thus, not only one but also multiple targets were 
attached to each of the KBIs. The fact that the financial advisors should navigate 
towards two or more targets on the same performance dimension shaped the framing 
of coordination and motivation. While designing multiple targets levels might be a 
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relatively common PM design in practice, such combination of multiple targets for 
operational employees has not received much attention in research. 
 
Furthermore, a particular interesting design choice among the multiple targets was the 
design of individual threshold targets (TT), which communicate the minimum 
required performance level on number of customer meetings and number of outgoing 
phone calls. The TT specifies new conditions of when performing the key activities 
leads to desired sales growth, as the TT specifies how much financial advisors need 
perform along the KBIs, as a minimum, in order for the activity to contribute with 
improved sales outcome. The choice of TT, as opposed to a target representing the 
stretch level of performance, has to my knowledge not received much attention in the 
literature. In this chapter I study how this design choice proposes to frame 
coordination, but also how the attempt to frame minimum level of activity meets 
resistance, which leads to modification of the target design. This analysis provides 
more insight to the impact of various types of performance target designs in practice.  
 
The analysis starts with the processes of designing multiple performance targets to the 
KBIs, compromising the interesting combination of threshold targets (TT), 
communicating minimum level of performance and benchmarks (RPT), and 
communicating maximum level of performance. The analysis also show how the TT 
and RPT overflow in their attempt to coordinating and motivating financial advisors, 
as setting targets on activity level is unreasonable due to uncertainties in operational 
day-to-day. New ways to coordinate and motivate higher level of activity emerge 
from re-designs: 1) TT is redesigned into a dynamic threshold target, 2) which is 
combined with team based relative performance targets, and 3) personal sales targets 
(PST). The modified design choices seek to point out how to coordinate and motivate 
in new ways.  
  
 
 
 
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 
Re-designing 
performance targets  
Overflowing Designing 
performance 
targets  
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7.1 Designing multiple performance targets on individual performance  
The choice of setting performance targets to the KBIs resulted in multiple target 
design, involving to define multiple levels of performance on the same performance 
dimensions. The threshold targets (TT) define the minimum level of number of 
customer meetings, number of outgoing phone calls and customer satisfaction to 
perform. The benchmarking (RPT) define the highest achieved level of performance 
on the number of customer meetings and number of outgoing phone calls. The 
combined design of TT and RPT on the same KBI is quite interesting, due to the 
characteristic of the two target designs. The following quota implies the how the 
combined designs of the two targets add to the already established motivating and 
coordinating roles of the KBIs:  
 
“The targets define some leading structures of how to achieve a more proactive 
approach towards the customers...This is related to internal processes identifying task 
that can be downplayed so the finical advisors prioritize more time to perform 
customer activities... So PERFORM is designed to link this (long term goals) to the 
operational day to day activity, if only I have a focus on this task or that task” (Paul, 
Internal consultant in Division PerMark)  
 
As emphasized by Paul, the design of multiple targets is in order to specify the 
coordination of activity produced by the KBIs where the targets further specify how 
to coordinate and motivate focus in the day-to-day activities, which are in line with 
the long-term goals. The following specify the two design choices in more detail.  
7.2. Designing threshold targets (TT)   
A particular interesting, and somewhat surprising, choice of targets design is the TT, 
which communicate the minimum level of expected performance potential on 
customer meetings, outgoing phone-calls and customer satisfaction. It is quite 
unconventional to design targets that inform of the floor level of performance, rather 
than targets that communicate the expected level of performance (expected 
performance potential) or even stretch level of performance (desired performance 
potential). The TT is designed as an individual target that communicates the minimum 
level of financial advisors performance on KBIs  
 
“Q: So you have designed a common threshold level for everyone? 
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A: Yes, we decided that on a workshop with the financial advisors…  
Q: And that applies for all the different departments? 
A: We have decided to have one region first, that is quite big, and then we trust that 
this region is not that different from the rest, so we have decided to use the threshold 
which was decided in the workshops – and they defined the threshold targets and we 
did not say anything, just accepted the levels “(Thomas, chief controller in Division 
PerMark) 
 
The financial advisors in the workshops defined the TT levels, respectively 5 
customer meetings, 10 outgoing phone calls each week and a more informal TT on 
customer satisfaction rating at or above 6.5 out of 7. It is quite different to design 
target of the minimum level of performance in contrast to targets that actually define 
the desired level of performance on activity:   
 
“It is because we belie it is this type of activity that creates most value, as a financial 
advisor you get a lot of phone calls, you answer sms and mails, so this is the daily 
operations, and it is in the operations that these are the most important value drivers.. 
Therefore, for all financial advisors, we set a minimum standard on this activity” 
(Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
The explanation of choosing TT is that the TT directs attention to the minimum level 
of effort expected to be allocated to the activities measured by the KBIs, as these 
activities are viewed as the activities that create most value. Thus, by setting a 
minimum level on how much to perform, the TT specify how to prioritize these 
activities, at least at the level sufficient for the activities to contribute to achieving the 
desired ends. This way, the TT specifies how to coordinate financial advisors by 
communicating conditions of operational causality. The TT detail how much to 
perform, as a minimum, to ensure that performing the key activities actually 
contributes to sales growth. Also, the design of TT as opposed to target designs that 
set average expected level or the top level of performance, reflect ideas to coordinate 
by allowing some slack in performing the tasks. The proposition is that by doing so, 
the TT provides space to learn how to prioritize between activities and planning of 
weekly activity level: 
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“No, it is because… it is important to focus on the financial advisors development and 
not just the number of meetings performed” (Kathy, Branch manager)  
 
Kathy explains how the TT is set to allow focus on development of competences that 
in time benefits value creation, as this development leads to higher frequency and 
quality in the future. Furthermore, the TT also educates the financial advisors inn 
planning of activity, because in order to meet the TT, the financial advisors must 
improve routines of planning of workweek activity (customer meetings, out-going 
phone calls). Thus, the TT design reflects ideas of guiding financial advisors towards 
a higher performance level; as the minimum required level of performance allow 
“slack” to learn.  
7.2.1. Setting of Threshold level on the key activities  
Even if the TT communicates the minimum level, the design of “correct” minimum 
level of key activities was difficult. This is explained by Paul, an internal consultant, 
who outline the idea of performance targets in terms of exploiting branch resources 
with PERFORM:  
 
“.The targets are necessary for us in order to pay attention to how we are performing 
on the key activities...and then we can ask: are 5 customer meetings a week an 
adequate level? Or should a financial advisor perform 20 meetings a week? If it is the 
customer meeting that is the most value driving activity, maybe the target should be 
20. That, however, requires knowledge of key tasks and task we can remove from the 
financial advisor job…” (Paul, Internal consultant Division PerMark) 
 
Setting performance targets seems to produce more questions with regards to defining 
adequate performance level on the key activities. Thus, designing relevant 
performance targets on the KBIs require more knowledge with regards to how to 
guide appropriate trade-offs between operational tasks. This compromised 
information generated from workshops: 
 
“Yes, we organized workshops, I think it was in February, where we gathered the 
financial advisors and branch managers we perceive to be the top performers, and 
then we conducted group interviews focused on learning what it is that these 
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individuals do in order to perform so well. And then we formulated best practices in 
PERFORM, which is the benchmarks that everyone is evaluated against” (Julie, HR 
Director)  
 
The top performing branch managers and financial advisors were asked to 
communicate their task knowledge i.e. know-how such as typical work-day routines, 
including level of activity on the key activities, which was used to articulate 
knowledge of minimum level performance for financial advisors:  
 
“we analyzed a lot on the customer processes, we held several workshops with groups 
of representatives, where the workshops worked on mapping what it was that we used 
time on” (Paul, Internal consultant Division PerMark)  
 
The TT level communicates minimum level of activity in order to be performing the 
key activities to a level that contribute to increased sales growth. Thus, the TT force 
planning and prioritizing sufficient resources to be able to perform sufficient level of 
the key activities. Consequently, the TT contributes to coordination by specifying 
prioritization between multiple activities, by informing of their importance and force 
planning of weekly activity in order to reach the weekly minimum activity level.  
7.2.2 The choice to design threshold target 
When designing the TT, there was quite a lot of discussion regarding the appropriate 
level of the TTs. Thus, designing TT rather than designing performance target that 
inform of expected or stretch level was not without debate. For example, the 
alternative to designing a stretch target where one suggestion was to set the individual 
target based on the average performance level of the top 20 percent. Yet, the chosen 
design was to set TT on the KBIs due to the complexity of defining expected 
performance level on activity across all financial advisors. This was perceived as too 
dysfunctional to set stretch level targets on the key activities. Also, Sarah, a branch 
manager, explained another suggestion: 
 
“Defining a minimum level of activity for the financial advisors, which states that we 
expect you to lend out this and this amount of kr., where the level reflected the where 
the cost of having the financial advisor at work break even. I mean… this is how much 
you must perform to break even, and for me to justify having you here at your job” 
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(Sarah, Branch manager) 
 
Here the suggestion was to set TT at the level of break even, meaning that the TT 
should inform of when the financial advisors have contributed enough to cover the 
cost of their employment. Thus, this target would inform at what level financial 
advisors contributes to value creation for the bank. However, there are some clear 
arguments of why it was chosen to set TT and not stretch targets, expected 
performance targets or even breakeven targets:   
 
“I have said this many times, my goal is not that PERFORM provides 75% growth, I 
want 25%, because I do not believe in campaigns: If you are to run 1000 m run on a 
permanent basis, you cannot keep it up - but this is more about getting the 
organization to take a small step towards improvement” (Alistair, Director of 
customer and markets) 
 
The TT coordinates incremental improvements across all financial advisors, by 
propositions that the TT guide all employees towards consistent higher levels of 
activity measured by the KBIs. The threshold level of the TT is argued to coordinate 
more durable improvements in activity levels, even among the lower level performers. 
Furthermore, the complexity of setting adequate targets on activity in complex 
operations also made designing minimum level more appropriate, as the TT is 
perceived to allow balance between tasks at operational level: 
 
“I think that the current targets in PERFORM might seem, well not directly over-
ambitious to make an understatement, so I think they could be set at a more stretch 
level... but that requires us to be clear on: it actually is this we should perform on, by 
freeing time on that…and if we need to reach even higher levels here, we must be able 
to balance that “(Paul, Internal consultant Division PerMark)  
 
It is clear that even setting a minimum level of performance is complex and involves 
discussion of what that minimum level should be. However, it is also clear that the 
choice of TT is viewed as an appropriate design, as setting more stretch targets 
requires more clarity of the trade-offs between the many tasks at operational level. 
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7.2.3 Coordinating common understanding with TT   
An articulated proposition of setting TT in PERFORM, was how the TT is suggested 
to facilitate processes of dialog and communication of learning:  
 
“I think it is dangerous just to keep going with the targets we have defined, 
completely uncritical and state that" you just have to perform", but the process in 
which we actually start to discussing what the targets means- that is the value” 
(Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
Alistair highlight how a proposed value of designing TT is that the value of setting 
targets emerges from the dialog of making sense of the meaning of the target design 
Thus, TT contributes to framing coordination, by produce a common understanding of 
what acceptable level of activity is: 
 
“Well, best practice customer activity involves the key steps of the advisory processes, 
of course adjusted for the needs of the customer...   so it's a check list…you need to 
ensure that you have a good dialog with the customer, and that means to follow the 
identified steps in the best practice processes. We believe that these steps are the best 
way, which we learned in our market research. This is how our customer says they 
want to be cared for by us...eh, and we want the financial advisors to perform that 
standard every time. …” (Julie, HR Director)  
 
A market report from a customer questioner sent out to the banks current and 
potential customers are used to inform of the minimum standard necessary to meet 
customer preferences The HR director explains how the market report is yet source 
information used to design of adequate performance targets. Setting TT facilitate a 
more common understanding of minimum required performance level, which can be 
used to reduce variance in current performance level in customer activity.  
7.2.4. Specify level of activity on KBIs with TT 
In addition to the role of the KBIs in communicating the operational map, denoting 
what to do, how to do it and towards which customers to focus on in order to 
produced desired sales growth, the design of TT contribute to coordinating this 
communication, by specifying the minimum level of effort on performing the activity: 
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“Well, I mean, we are not stupid, the sales outcome is the final goal, but we cannot 
lose our focus on production plan right? It has to create something more, and this is 
why I talk about the top line and not the bottom line… many in our industry are 
obsessed with the bottom line, but in my view, what actually cerates sales is to focus 
on the top line.. Many are blinded by the bottom line, by setting targets such as 500 
000 or 1000 000, producing a focus on result instead of the activity – but the result in 
a customer marked comes from quality in activity “(Alistair, Director of customer and 
markets) 
 
However, the contribution of the TT in specifying the operational causality with 
attention towards minimum level of activity is perceived to be somewhat different 
than how the KBIs specify operational causality. Setting TT involves guiding 
minimum expected level of performance on customer activity in order to make this 
activity predictive of sales growth:  
 
“It removes some of the focus on sales, and to communicate that the sales will 
automatically show if I perform the activities as best as I can, then the results are 
generated. This is the opposite focus than earlier, and to be frank: I think it’s is 
correct to remove the focus on sales, as long as the sales are generated as well” 
(Julie, HR Director) 
 
As Julie emphasized, the TT contribute to framing coordination by specifying 
causality with the minimum level of activity to achieve the desired ends. Also, the TT 
does so, without removing attention from how to perform the key tasks, defined by 
the KBIs. Thus, setting TT is suggested to supplement how the KBIs seek to 
coordinating the financial advisors contribution to value creation.  
7.3. Designing Benchmarking (RPT)  
The second target set on the KBIs involves relative performance targets (RPT). The 
RPT denotes benchmarking the financial advisors activity level on the number of 
customer meetings and number of phone calls. In contrast to the TT, who inform of 
lowest level of activity, the RPT communicate how good performance level should 
be, by visualizing highest achieved level of activity. Thus, the multiple targets on the 
KBIs are quite contrasting, as the RPT denote the desired level of activity to strive 
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for, denoting the level of activity that each financial advisor ideally should be 
performing (to be the best). This is in sharp contrast to the TT. As emphasized by 
Paul, the internal consultant in a coffee break, benchmarking is a way for the division 
PerMark to learn which level of activity is “good enough”. Thus, by visualizing 
maximum level of performance on the KBIs, the RPT also guide how to set 
expectations to overall performance level. 
7.3.1. Setting RPT to communicate desired level of activity on the KBIs  
When designing the KBIs in PERFORM, assumptions of casual relations between 
activity and sales outcome where articulated. However, part of communicating 
operational causality involves guiding prioritization among the key activities. Thus, 
previous data on frequency of meetings and sales results was used to establish more 
knowledge of how level of activity on the KBIs related to sales outcome:  
 
“what PERFORM communicates is that by increasing the level of activity on 
customer meetings and phone calls, the probability of generating sales increases as 
well…” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark) 
 
The assumption is that the higher frequency of activity on customer meetings and 
phone calls produce higher potential for growth in sales. This assumption is based on 
the statistical correlation between level of activity on meetings and measured sales 
outcomes. Figure 3 illustrate the two graphs that Alistair, the director of customer and 
market division showed me under the second interview in December 2012, where we 
talk of casual relationships between high frequency of activity (number of meetings 
and number of customer phone calls) and sales outcome (sales in NOK). 
 
 
Figure 3: Casual relation between frequency of activity and sales in kr. 
Designing RPT is viewed as a way to learn more of the performance potential, by 
guiding how “good” one could and maybe should be at performing high activity. 
Thus, the RPT motivate higher frequency in an almost normative way: Look, this is 
the level of activity that the best performers deliver- why don't you perform that level 
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of activity? (General discussions with Alistair and Molly). Thus, one of the arguments 
of combining the TT with RPT was that by designing RPT, it is possible to motivate 
higher levels of frequency on the customer meetings and outgoing phone calls, as the 
RPT produce attention to the importance of performing as high levels of activity as 
possible.  
7.3.2. Designing semi-transparent benchmarking of performance level  
In contrast to the individual design of the TT, the design of the RPT is by nature 
collective target that stimulate competition among compared peers. However, it is 
chosen to design the RPT with semi-transparent comparison: 
 
“A: yes, you do see how you are ranked compared to the others in the bank, but you 
cannot see the name of the others, just where you are just some pillars, and that is 
anonymous 
Q: but you don't want the names to be transparent 
A: No… maybe after a while that we want to have the top ten officially, but that is 
something we must think about, and let the organization settle with this design for 
now” (Thomas, chief controller in Division PerMark) 
 
The design of semi-transparent RPT reduces some of the competition of the RPT, as 
the lower degree of transparency reduce some of the performance pressure on 
individual performance level:  
 
“we want long term effect from this, and then I mean long term, and therefore 
our  expectations must be right, and we reflect on what is it that we do now… to work 
in an industry like this, there are so many factors in operational day-to-day it is very 
complex to work as a financial advisor in a bank, you need knowledge of insurance, 
lending, credit and general personal finance, as well as funding, stocks, and future 
investments, and then you need to know about the children, family, youth - it is very 
difficult” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets) 
 
The quota explains why semi-transparent RPT is chosen, as too much competition 
beneficial in complex day-to-day operations. Thus, full transparency of RPT was 
perceived to harm the working environment in the branches: 
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But I do suspect that a more competitive culture would emerge, with more individual 
focus, if we put the name on the rankings... in my opinion I have difficulties of seeing 
how putting the names on the ranking will do any good. What do we gain by naming 
the winners and the losers? It seems much more constrictive to give you an idea of 
where you fit in the total picture, and I think that is a sufficient pressure to perform 
for most people” (Thomas, chief controller in Division PerMark) 
 
The RPT is designed with semi-transparency to avoid pointing out winners and losers, 
and reduce the potential of creating a too competitive culture.  
7.3.3. Coordinating and motivating activity level with RPT 
The choice of designing RPT was the attempt to specify how to motivate higher levels 
of activity on the KBIs. The RPT is suggested to motivate higher intensity by 
exploiting the intrinsic desire to become the highest performer, which is perceived to 
exist in a “sales organization”. Setting RPT is associated to stimulating motivation 
from this drive, by visualizing top performance:  
 
“It is amazing, this human drive to be the best. You know this drive to win, and I think 
it is an amazing thing to have in an organization, because people want to succeed and 
that in itself is an important driver of performance, the fact that people want to 
succeed…and, in a performance culture, this is a driver that we should take care of, 
you must never take away the feeling of being allowed to be the best..“(Alistair, 
Director of customer and markets) 
 
Implied by the Alistair, the director of the customer and markets division is that 
setting RPT stimulates the intrinsic motivation to be the best. The assumption is that 
RPT visualize top performers, which motivate all peers to provide a higher level of 
effort on the measured performance dimensions. By visualizing maximum level of 
performance on the KBIs, the RPT also guide how to set expectations to overall 
performance level. Also, visualizing top performance might uncover how to adjust 
current routines to produce performance improvements (Interview with Paul, the 
internal consultant).   
7.4 Overflows from the design of performance targets  
The design of multiple targets levels on the same performance dimensions 
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compromised the TT and RPT, which make out an interesting combination. The 
branches challenge how these choices of targets on the KBIs seek to coordinate and 
motivate the financial advisors, as the setting targets of the level on activity produce 
tensions due to the uncertainties in operational day-to-day. Thus, the targets are 
perceived as unreasonable. For example, the TT overflows by distorting flexibility 
towards unforeseen occurrences, dynamic workflows and variance in customer needs. 
Furthermore, the RPT overflows by reducing cooperation and thus, hamper provision 
of customer services. The next describes in more detail how the multiple target of TT 
and RPT overflow in division PerMark.  
7.4.1 Neglected coordination towards sales growth 
The targets are suggested to specify how to coordinate and motivate all financial 
advisors to contribute to higher sales performance, by pointing out higher level of 
activity on the key activities. However, higher frequency of activity does not always 
correspond to higher sales performance 
 
“A: To book a meeting does not have to be anything more than say “hi”, or “lets 
meet Thursday at 12, you bring your insurance papers so we can go through them, or 
maybe even just call the customer to wish them merry Christmas”  
Q: But besides focusing on a good meeting – what else does it take to realize a sale in 
your opinion?  
A: Well, here I do differ from PERFORM- because in PERFORM the focus is on 
preparation, preparation, preparation – that is the key to success in this model. If you 
are well prepared you will perform a good meeting, it is as simple as that. But I focus 
to work towards the sales, in my branch no meeting is performed unless it leads to 
sales, but we have to focus on sales. You can hear people talk of: I sent out this offer 
last week, I think I got it or I don't think I got it...damn it! This is what I look for – are 
you really working for it or just almost... And this is different than in PERFORM, 
because in PERFORM it’s enough to only having the meeting. And the customer 
might find the meeting nice, without considering buying a product...When I worked as 
a financial advisor I thought to myself: don't spend time on the customers without any 
sales return, because this here is about finding the activity that leads to more money 
for the bank “(Sarah, Branch manager) 
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The branch manager, which was head hunted from another bank due to her talent 
within sales, emphasize how the targets on activity level overflow, by excluding the 
focus on sales outcome. A good meeting is not the same as a meeting that end in sale, 
wherefore sales performance is partly excluded by current target design in 
PERFORM. Furthermore, the design of TT and RPT exclude the extraordinary effort 
that comes from target commitment:  
 
“A: What is lacking here is something to reach for... we lack...you know, the feeling 
of: Damn it! We are only short of 5000 to make the target... this type of feeling is 
completely missing right now 
Q: But you do have the threshold targets? 
A: Yes, but that is only target on activity level, set at 5 customer meetings. And that is 
completely nonsense. I mean, look at Annie (a financial advisor), since she has spent 
9 days at another branch to help out, she has the drop in post in our branch on 
Thursday, which leaves her Friday to complete 5 meetings” (Sarah, Branch 
Manager) 
 
The current design of TT and RPT is described to lack of motivating role due to low 
commitment, which is stimulated by ex-ante set targets on expected sales 
performance.  However, not only does TT not motivate extraordinary effort on sales 
outcome, but it is also misinforming of actual performance level, as the TT is not 
flexible towards in-time occurrences (such as helping out other branches in sickness) 
or work flow such as the drop in customer post, which is rotated among the financial 
advisors. Thus, the TT neither motivates nor coordinates planning of higher activity 
level sufficiently. 
7.4.2 Misrepresenting level of activity with the TT  
In extension of the highlighted low flexibility towards in-time occurrences and 
different workflow processes in the branches above, the fixed level of the TT 
overflows as the TT do not coordinate more equal levels of activity among the 
financial advisors. The TT does not reflect the influence of variance in customer 
portfolio, which makes a norm level of weekly activity misinforming of real-time 
activity level. Therefore, the weekly TT is dependent on the composition of the 
financial advisors’ customer portfolio and unforeseen occurrences. For example, 
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certain customer compositions make the TT of 5 meetings easier reachable than 
others. As one financial advisor remarks regarding differences in performance on the 
TT: 
 
“..The variance could be due to many things…It could reflect my lack of competence 
or it could be due the composition of my customer portfolio. For example, my 
customer composition means customers with large loans...” (Financial advisor, 
Branch X) 
 
Another factor that influences the specificity of the TT is variance in specific 
knowledge across financial advisors between various banking products to sell in 
customer meetings and phone-calls: 
 
“What is a bit difficult in PERFORM is that some are very good at financing but not 
good at insurance, and how does one get the complete picture? Because if I have 
worked with insurance for 10 years and spend 90% of my time on insurance and make 
great results on this dimension, but poor results on financing or saving” (Financial 
advisor, Branch Y). 
 
The specific knowledge within different areas is due to specialization advisor 
responsibilities until 2010. The financial advisor describes a general perceived 
unfairness of the TT, suggesting that the conditions of setting specific targets at 
individual level is more flexibility towards individuals customer portfolio and   
specific knowledge.  
7.4.3 Reduced cooperation from RPT  
The design of the RPT, to coordinate knowledge sharing of expected performance 
level, as well as learning between high and low performers, distorts other types of 
knowledge sharing, such as cooperation. The individual competition overflows as the 
benchmarking reduce cooperation in-between the financial advisors in providing 
customer service and sales: 
 
“Would you say that cooperation is important to you in your job?” 
“Yes, I would. We often experience cases which are important to discuss, if there are 
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difficult issues, and it is important that we dare to talk about it, to discuss it and to 
admit that you cannot always do everything by yourself” (Financial advisor, Branch 
Z). 
 
The lack of cooperation reduces the overall value creation in the work processes, as 
cooperation is important in facilitating value and service to the customers. The 
cooperation that shares specific knowledge between different experts is crucial for 
providing high service in customer interaction, which increases the likelihood for 
more sales: 
 
 “It’s a bit problematic that the ranking functions in a way where we don't actually 
exploit each other’s competences sufficiently. It would make much more sense that – 
say if you are good at savings and I at financing – we then work together on this basis 
instead of both of us spending a lot of time on being best at financing and savings 
individually. This is what the system does. But I need to say that my manager is well 
aware of this, and instead of trying to pressure everyone to reach for top 20, his focus 
is on our exploiting and using one another” (financial advisor, Branch X) 
 
For example, as emphasized here, cooperation is important to coordinate type of 
specific knowledge with regards to the complex banking products, or customer 
solutions via discussions. The coordination of the types of specific knowledge is 
hampered by the design of the benchmarking targets, reducing exploitation of specific 
knowledge in customer solutions. Another financial advisor explains how the time to 
engage in dialog is reduced:  
 
“Do you find that the level of cooperation between you has changed?” “Yes, I’m 
much more focused on myself. But we are still a team, and I guess that some of the 
change in cooperation is also due to the increased workload. So we simply don’t have 
as much time for discussion among one another anymore” (financial advisor; Branch 
Z). 
 
The RPT overflows from individual focus and increased “work load” from more 
pressure to perform, which all in all reduce time and interest in engaging in problem 
solving dialog with colleagues. Consequently, the RPT lead to down prioritizing 
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cooperation, distorting customer value, as services is provided slower and risk of 
lower quality in customer solution due to lack of dialog between financial advisors.  
7.4.4 Reduced motivation from RPT   
The RPT, introduced to motivate higher intensity of effort from communicating 
maximum level of activity, overflow as the communication of maximum level of 
activity reduce motivation. The transparency of top level of performance, evoke 
feelings of failure: 
 
“In PERFORM, we are measured against the top 20 performers, but regardless of 
how good you perform compared with your previous achievements last year, last 
month, no matter how much you have developed you own performance or performed, 
you have red lines and squares all over the screen, and I find that highly 
demotivating. It is demotivating because I cannot reach that level, the level of top 20, 
no matter how well I perform in terms of myself, I am not good enough. It feels a bit 
like plying in the little league but being measured against the Ivy League” (Financial 
advisor, Branch X).  
 
The RPT frame motivation with individual competition, which overflows as 
competition reduce the motivation of the middle and lower level performers’. The 
transparency of maximum level of performance leads to low self-confidence and 
feelings of failure, rather than inspiring the financial advisors to become the best. 
7.5 Re-design of performance targets: designing flexible performance targets 
The fact that the financial advisors should navigate between two performance targets 
on the same dimension of activity shaped how the targets attempted to frame 
coordination and motivation. The branches challenge the design choices due to the 
uncertainties in operational day-to-day which makes the targets set on activity 
unreasonable. The complexity in the operational context makes the target levels on 
activity overflow, as their specification of how much to perform of activities excluded 
other relevant ways to motivate and coordinate growth in sales. For example, the lack 
of performance target on sales outcome excluded focus on level of sales from the 
performed activity. Thus, the responses in the branches (overflows) as the TT and 
RPT unfold into practice modified the targets, leading to new meanings of 
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coordination and motivation, which is shaped by the dynamic threshold targets 
(DTT), team-relative targets (TRPT) and personal sales targets (PST). 
7.5.1. Re-designing the TT: Dynamic threshold target 
The TT was designed a fixed minimum level of activity on the KBIs across all 
financial advisors. However, TT produced frustration due to unforeseen occurrences 
in daily operations, different compositions of customers in the customer portfolio and 
variances in financial advisor specific knowledge. Thus, the TT led to feelings of 
unfairness by misrepresenting individual effort level in work processes, exemplified 
by the example of Annie told by the branch manager Sarah in the quota above. More 
flexibility is suggested to lead to higher quality in activity: 
 
“I mean...It is impossible to standardize a customer meeting, I mean, the follow-up 
question is dependent on the answer of the first question. The meeting is about 
competences not standards” (Tom, Director of performance management)  
  
The unpredictability of customer meetings, needs and preferences lead to distortion 
from the fixed minimum level of activity each week, as the TT standard of level of 
activity removed priority of planning for “good meetings”. Thus, the TT distorted 
coordination of how to provide customer value, as the complexity of various customer 
needs requires flexibility towards in-time knowledge to meet customers’ compositions 
of needs. Consequently, these overflows resulted in redesigning the TT into a 
“dynamic “threshold target (DTT) that defines personal minimum level of activity 
each week: 
 
“Well, you can say this is a basic standard of 5 in-depth meetings and 10 phone-calls, 
and then the financial advisors can define own standards of what they expect to 
achieve the coming week, and this will vary individually” (Regional manager, region 
X). 
 
The DTT denote flexibility in defining personal minimum level of activity, by 
reflecting adjustment in accordance to individual’s specific knowledge, customer 
needs and customer compositions. The DTT coordinate minimum level of activity, 
but adjusted for variances in customer needs and financial advisors’ specific 
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knowledge: 
 
“Q: So who is setting the targets, the financial advisor? 
A: They set their own targets... 
Q: Are they different? 
A: Well, you do have the standards which still is 5 customer meetings and 10 phone 
calls, but then the financial advisors set targets corresponding to what they think they 
will achieve next week, and that might vary 
Q: Could they set a target below the basic standard? 
A: Yes, they can... and that is adjusted to various things, as I say, if they work three 
days that week, well, then the target is easier..” (Kathy, Branch manager)  
 
DTT adjust the threshold level in accordance to personal work weeks which are 
subject to emerging occurrences, changing work processes and in-time knowledge of 
customer needs, by setting personal threshold levels each Monday. The DTT 
coordinate how to plan individual processes of customer sales and services the 
coming week.  
7.5.2 Re-designing RPT: team relative performance targets (TRPT) 
An interesting re-design of the RPT is the team-based benchmarking (TRPT).  The 
RPT overflow as the communication of maximum performance level resulted in low 
self-confidence among many of the financial advisors. The re-design modify how 
communication of maximum performance level is communicated from benchmarking, 
by focusing on team-level: 
 
“It is the entire performance of the team – always the team that I focus on. I focus on 
what we achieve together as a team and how we can support each other in performing 
in the best possible way” (Alex, Branch Manager) 
 
As Alex emphasize, in the branch meeting, the focus is always on the benchmarked 
performance of the team. For example, one branch manager explains how she selected 
team information from PERFORM, and focus on how the team can help each other 
perform: 
 
“I only focus on the total number of customer meetings, total number of outgoing 
phone calls and branch performance... I am super focused at team level and how we 
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can reach our targets together, by making everyone the best version of themselves” 
(Kathy, Branch Manager)   
 
The branch managers do consciously only look at the aggregated team performance, 
and clearly signal that her force is on these numbers to her team of financial advisors. 
The reduced motivation, opportunistic behavior and lack of cooperation in complex 
customer cases produced tensions from the RPT, re-designing it into a team-based 
RPT. Sarah explains the common focus on team benchmarking instead of individual 
ranking among the branch managers: 
 
“I think that the foundation in succeeding with sales over time is trust, positive work 
environment where everyone wishes to see everyone else succeed. Where one protect 
and appreciate the value of teamwork and cooperation, and this is not what is 
promoted in PERFORM. Because in PERFORM, if I had been a financial advisor, I 
would have just taken everything myself and only focused on delivering high numbers. 
And that would have created quite a lot of discomfort and competition with my 
colleagues, and I would not be sharing, which would have resulted in delays in 
servicing the customers, as you would have kept all activity for yourself instead of 
sharing the work load across advisors” (Sarah, Branch manager) 
 
Thus, Sarah emphasized team-based ranking to coordinate and motivate cooperation 
across the financial advisors in providing high services levels and more sales. The 
branch managers modify the RPT into a relative team-performance target (TRPT), 
comparing a team’s performance relative to the other teams. The TRPT is based on 
the measures: Total number of customer meetings, total number of outgoing phone 
calls, however, the TRPT is also expanded by result measures, producing TRPT based 
on the measure: total branch performance. 
 
“So they are very much as team, and very focused on how we as a team can beat our 
internal competitors, such as branch X and Z, but also our market competition such 
as DNB and others.” (Thomas, chief controller in Division PerMark) 
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Ultimately, the redesign of team-level competition produces higher individual 
effectiveness in work processes as this internalizing cooperation in the framing of 
individual value contribution: 
 
“We have huge focus on full transparency at branch-level, because we believe that 
this motivates, I mean, we have seen that for example branch X is very focused on 
beating branch Y” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets).  
 
The design of the TRPT frames coordination and motivation of high performing 
teams, rather than high-performing individuals. This re-design is a gradual re-design 
from the branches, which gradually change the coordinating and motivating role of 
performance targets, by re-designing targets that motivate strong teams instead of 
individuals.  
7.5.3 Designing performance targets on personal sales outcome 
Yet another modification, due to the response produced in the branches, is the choice 
to design targets on sales outcome. The sales outcome targets mirror the re-design of 
performance measures with lagging indicators on the dimension of sales. The 
overflows leads to yet modification in design choices, by the setting of performance 
targets that specify how much financial advisors are expected to sell, based on their 
activity: 
 
“Q: so you say that even if you don't get five meetings a week, you can still produce 
high sales results? 
“A: Yes, I mean look at the branch statistics. Alex has an average of 4.7 meetings a 
week, and I have an average on 1.9, but then again, my sales result are twice the 
numbers that Alex have... so then it makes you ask, what is it that benchmarking level 
of activity actually stimulates? Would it not make more sense to have a threshold on 
sales number- we expect you to lend this amount annually…” (Sarah, Branch 
manager) 
 
The sole focus on key customer activities in the TT and RPT overflowed by excluding 
sufficient specification on expected level of sales outcome from the activity. The 
branch manager explains: 
 
“The part I‘m most skeptical about is the argument that high activity creates results, 
because more often than not, this will produce the wrong results, taken the group of 
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employees we have in the branches. We are not armed with 175 financial advisors at 
Victor’s level; the average financial advisor is at a totally different level…” (Kathy, 
branch Z). 
 
Victor is the financial advisor that performs with the highest sales outcome in the 
region. Yet, not everyone makes a customer meeting into a sales meeting, making the 
coordination of activity questionable. Thus, sales must be visualized in added in 
PERFORM: 
 
“The sales targets are introduced in PERFORM- and that is something my region has 
argued strongly for, because in 2013, we were flying with blindfolds, without any 
targets, besides activity targets, and this did not add up…It was a mismatch” (Jon, 
Regional manager) 
 
The regional manager Jon underlines how the re-design to expand with target levels 
on sales is welcomed at branch level, as it was perceived to be driving with blindfolds 
without benchmarking on sales result. As a branch manager added: 
 
“We must be informed of what all this activity actually produce in kroner and øre, 
otherwise how can we know how to adjust and focus activity... what works and what 
don't work?!” (Sarah, branch manager) 
 
It is clear that specifying expected sales level from activity adds aspects of 
coordination, wherefore setting sales targets is proposed to specify how to coordinate 
and motivate financial advisors. The next will describe the design of sales-based 
performance targets, as well as the process of setting the target level. Setting targets 
that specify the level of sales potential based on the level of activity on customer 
meetings and outgoing phone calls, seek to specify the link between activity and 
results, and is proposed to improve level of sales from activity. This reflect the 
uncovered contingency of the causality between activity and sales outcome, where it 
is believed that designing sales targets, that specify expected sales based on activity, 
improve coordination of causality 
7.5.3.1 Designing Personal sales targets (PST) on difficult to sell products  
The setting of performance targets on sales (PST) is made with a twist, as the PST is 
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designed to coordinate the expected performance potential on difficult to sell 
products. This gives the sales targets a distinctive way of coordinating and motivating 
financial advisors sales performance, compared to setting sales targets on all of the 
lagging indicators. Furthermore, the PST is designed to coordinate individual 
financial advisors sales potential within insurance, savings and credit cards, based on 
their activity, wherefore the PST is set from participative processes: 
 
“My figures on finance and lending are high, yes, among the highest. But as to 
savings, I am at the opposite range. This could reflect my lack of competence, or it 
could be due the composition of my customer portfolio... for example, my customers 
have big loans.” (Financial advisor, Branch X). 
 
The financial advisors explain how variances in the expected sales level might occur, 
due to multiple factors. Thus, when setting PST as expected sales potential, a 
participative process was necessary to include this type of specific knowledge in the 
target level. Furthermore, the PST specify coordination of financial advisors sales 
outcome, explained by Thomas, the chief controller, who describe the idea behind the 
design choice of the PST, and how the design choice is linked to coordinating 
attention towards the broad scope of products, when most customer meeting are 
performed with the basis in lending: 
 
“We experience a significant run of customers applying for loans, so the basic 
motivation for the customer to book a customer meeting is to get a loan from the 
bank. Therefore, we don't need to push sales on loans, but this requires us to become 
much better at make customer aware of the other banking products we can offer in the 
meetings that the customer book for lending”(Thomas, chief controller in Division 
PerMark) 
 
The PST specify how to coordinate attention to sales on banking products by focusing 
financial advisors attention on difficult to sell products. Thus, as most customers enter 
the meeting with a lending requirement, it is more important to emphasize the other 
products, to balance attention towards tem in decisions. The PST specify how to 
coordinate attention towards sales of key product groups, and thus, balance the easy 
sell of loans with more difficult sells of other products. Similar to the design choice of 
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the KBIs, the design choice of the PST is made somewhat “distorted” in order to 
counter-balance a distorted attention towards lending, somewhat neglecting other key 
product groups. Thus, the PST coordinates sales in customer activity in a new way. In 
addition, the PST also specifies how to motivate financial advisors performance level 
by producing commitment via the “target plan”: 
 
”Facilitating the development of the performance of employees within the boundaries 
of the job, is a matter of defining relevant targets in a process of establishing 
ownership for the individual employee, you have to envision a target plan from you 
get the target, to your realization and evaluation thereof, I mean performance is not a 
consequence of defining the target alone, we must also work with sub-targets, with the 
activities and initiatives necessary, what does it take to reach a target- this is about 
making a plan, about committing to the target” (Alistair, director of customer and 
Markets).  
 
Alistair explains how the design of PST specifies motivation, by producing 
commitment to the target level. The PST specifies new an aspect of motivation, by 
proposing that motivation is personal commitment to achieve the PST.  
7.5 Concluding remarks on chapter 7 
Chapter 7 enlightens my research inquiry, by portraying how the design of 
performance targets contributes in specifying the coordination and motivation of 
financial advisors in new ways. This chapter contributes to research on performance 
targets, by illustrating 1) design of multiple targets, denoting multiple performance 
levels on the same performance dimension, 2) the design of threshold performance 
targets, denoting defining the minimum level of performance, and 3) how target 
designs contribute in specifying coordination of operational employees in ways that 
have received scant attention in research. First, multiple targets were design to each of 
the KBIs, involving the design of multiple target levels of performance on the same 
activity. The complexity in the operational context makes designing target level on 
activities difficult, wherefore multiple targets are designed in order to specify 
coordination and motivation of employees However, because employees should 
navigate towards two or more targets on the same performance dimension, this design 
choice shaped the framing of coordination and motivation in interesting ways.  
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Second, a particular fascinating design choice included in the multiple target design 
was the design of TT. The TT set the minimum required performance level on number 
of customer meetings and number of outgoing phone-calls, and thus, specifies new 
conditions of when performance on the key activities leads to desired sales results. 
The TT specifies how much financial advisors need perform, as a minimum, in order 
to contribute with improvements in sales growth. Thus, coordinating operational 
employees contribution to value does not only involve to specify what activities the 
financial advisors needs perform e.g. customer meetings and telephone contact (which 
the KBIs provide), but also how many meetings and phone calls they need to perform 
in order to contribute to sales growth. Thus, the design of the performance targets 
seeks to provide more information about what desirable behavior is. Furthermore, the 
TT was combined with RPT in order to communicate the importance of high 
frequency of activity. The RPT specify motivation of financial advisors as the desire 
to become the best, stimulated from competition among peers. Thus, designing targets 
is not just a further specification of what to do (coordination), as to see a specific 
target (number) may also motivate higher effort intensity compared with just knowing 
about the performance dimension.  
 
The branches challenge the design choices due to the uncertainties in operational day-
to-day makes target activity level unreasonable. The complexity in the operational 
context makes the target levels on activity overflow, as their specification of how 
much to perform on activity level excluded other relevant ways to facilitate 
contribution to growth in sales. For example, the lack of performance target on sales 
outcome excluded focus on sales levels from performing the key activity. The way 
that the TT seeks to specify activity level produce tension from low flexibility 
towards unforeseen occurrences, variance in customer needs and financial advisors 
specific knowledge. The RPT overflow by producing lower levels of motivation, from 
reduced cooperation and low individual self-perception form poor ranking. Thus, the 
responses in the branches (overflows) as the TT and RPT unfold into practice 
modified the targets, resulting in new meaning of coordination and motivation, which 
is shaped by the dynamic threshold targets (DTT), team-relative targets (TRPT) and 
personal sales targets (PST). The dynamic TT (DTT) coordinates prioritization of key 
activity with flexible planning of minimum level, adjusted for unforeseen occurrences 
and variance in customer needs. The team RPT (TRPT) specifies coordination with 
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cooperation on customer services and motivate with team-based competition. The 
personal sales targets (PST) specify coordination, by defining expected sales potential 
based on level of activity. The PST also seeks to coordinate sales among products, by 
directing effort towards specified product categories. These modifications provide a 
detailed account of how overflows partake in shaping how target designs shape 
motivation and coordination of financial advisors performance.  This chapter clarifies 
the complexity of designing targets levels on operational activity in order to 
coordinate and motivate how operational employees should perform activities, by 
detailing how much they need to perform of key activity in order to contribute to 
value creation. 
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Chapter 8: Designing feedback on financial advisors 
performance  
 
8.0 Introduction 
In addition to the design of performance measures and performance targets described 
in chapter 6 and 7, making design choices with regards to providing feedback were 
also central when designing PERFORM. A recent focus has been to learn more of 
feedback as a separate element of PM. Chapter 8 informs of some of the possible 
design choices in terms of how to provide feedback to operational employees. Chapter 
2 defines feedback as socially produced routines and rules that shape the schemes that 
interpret analyze and communicate the evaluated performance. When designing 
feedback in PERFORM, designing the rules and routines involved choices of what or 
whom to provide the feedback, how to design the processes of interpreting feedback, 
and how to design the way that individuals act upon feedback. Accordingly, this 
chapter contributes by describing how the design choices regarding the rules and 
routines of feedback seek to specify coordination of operational employees, by 
detailing whom it is that provides the information (the system or manager), and who it 
is that do the interpretation of the numbers (the financial advisors him/her-self or 
manager) and who it is that finds out how to take action (also the financial advisors 
him or herself or manager).  
 
An interesting twist to the design of feedback in PERFORM was with regards to the 
choices of with whom to place the responsibility to act upon the information, by 
articulating action plans that seek to coordinate and motivate behavior based on the 
provided feedback. This chapter illustrates this with the design choice of “self-
management” feedback, which denotes that it is the financial advisors who have the 
responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided feedback. This is in turn also an 
attempt to specify how to motivate the financial advisors to perform in the desired 
ways, as self-management propose that the autonomy in self-management stimulate 
individuals feelings of ownership to perform in accordance to expectations. This adds 
insight into how design choices point out how PM might coordinate and motivate 
operational employee’s performance. Thus, studying how the design choices of self-
management seek to coordinate and motivate in distinctive ways, provides an 
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interesting setting to learn more about how feedback might be designed, to shape how 
to coordinate and motivate individual performance.   
 
Another key insight from studying the design choice of self-management is how this 
design of feedback made the feedback rules and routines into private (individually) 
processes of interpreting and acting upon the information. Even so, self-management 
still involved design choices regarding the rules and routines of the provision of 
feedback i.e. self-manager, as well as socially produced expectations of how to act 
upon the information in feedback meetings (Monday morning meeting and pep-talk). 
Thus, the design choices made on the self-manager (IT system) and feedback 
meetings attempted to coordinate the rules and routines of how self-management 
should be performed (i.e. interpret information and act upon it). The design choices 
do so, by shaping the rules and routines of how to manifest information into actions. 
This contributes with detailed an account of the nature of feedback as socially 
produced routines and rules that shape the schemes that interpret, analyze and 
communicate evaluated performance, as it shows how design choices attempt to, and 
are part of coordinating how these routines and rules produce the social processes of 
feedback. 
 
Self-management feedback is challenged in the branches, as financial advisors are not 
motivated by the added responsibility to interpret and act upon the feedback by 
themselves, as they are supposed to in self-management feedback. Also, the exclusion 
of manager feedback reduces moral from lack of acknowledgement. Furthermore, the 
design choices of self-manager and feedback meeting set the rules and routines of 
feedback in ways that hamper flexibility to perform self-management. Consequently, 
express new ideas of how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors. The re-design 
denote coaching feedback, where it is the manager that provides financial advisors 
with feedback, coordinated by rules and routines shaped by coaching dialogs, team 
feedback and pep talks. The coaching feedback design alter the private process of 
self-management into a social process, where the manager interpret, analyze and 
communicate feedback in dialog together with the financial advisors. Coaching 
feedback also details new ways to coordinate the financial advisors, by coordinating 
the style of how managers interpret and communicate feedback. Thus, Chapter 8 
demonstrate how various design choices of feedback result in different ways to 
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coordinate the rules and routines of how to provide, interpret and act upon the 
feedback. In other words, we learn more about the specific ways in which PM seek to 
coordinate and motivate by looking into the design of feedback.  
 
This chapter starts out with the design choice of self-management feedback, followed 
by description of how self-management feedback overflows, as self-management 
reduce motivation and hamper flexibility to adjust feedback in accordance to personal 
needs. The overflows lead to modification of how to shape the coordination and 
motivation of financial advisors performance with feedback deign. Thus, the re-
design of feedback into coaching feedback design specifies new meaning to 
coordination, by specifying how managers should interpret and communicate 
feedback in lined with coaching feedback.  
 
  
 
8.1. Designing feedback with self-management 
Feedback comprise the design choices of how to provide information of measured 
performance, and this can be provided in different ways, such as from an IT system, a 
manager or your peers. Furthermore, design choices of feedback also involved 
articulation of the rules and routines of how the individual should interpret and act 
upon the performance numbers, which shapes how design of feedback is proposed to 
shape behavior: 
 
“No, this is most definitely a development system, our idea with PERFORM is to 
design something else than a control system, this is a development system. We have 
discussed a lot how support everyone to become as good as they can be that everyone 
exploits their full performance potential. And then we believe that this regime (i.e. 
best practice), to put it like that, that it is this regime that enable the individual to 
exploit their fullest potential... and we cannot expect or ask for more than that, so 
PERFORM is about enabling performance, not to control it”(Thomas, chief 
controller in Division PerMark) 
  
Thomas, the chief controller explains how designing feedback reflects the desire to 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Designing coaching 
Feedback 
Overflowing Designing Self-
management 
feedback  
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coordinate financial advisors towards exploiting their fullest performance potential. It 
is quite interesting how design choices of feedback are articulated as a development 
system, that “support everyone to become as good as they can be that everyone 
exploits their full performance potential”. However, the development system involves 
a “regime”, which also involves setting the rules and routines of how the individual 
advisors should respond upon the feedback. In division PerMark the interesting twist 
to the design of feedback is “self-management”. The director of markets explains the 
idea of self-management feedback:  
 
“I am a firm believer in self-management, because we are a knowledge organization 
employing highly educated and high performing people, and when the financial 
advisors realize what this system (PM) can give them, to produce feedback relevant 
for their task performance, it will produce a new confidence in own performance in 
customer processes. And I think that this will produce an internal drive which I feel 
we have been missing, because it has been the managers’ job to motivate you, the 
manager’s job to keep you accountable for your performance outcome and figures, 
but now the control is placed with the financial advisors, we get an internal drive: I 
realize that this type of performance is what will work with this customer, and it is my 
responsibility to deliver that” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets). 
 
Alistair explains how self-management reflects distinctive propositions of how 
feedback coordinates and motivates financial advisors. Self-management does so, by 
making the financial advisors responsible to interpret and manage planning and 
learning from feedback. He also explains how this autonomy in turn, is expected to 
motivate by producing self-confidence. Furthermore, Alistair also emphasize that it is 
the IT system e.g. Self-manager that provide the financial advisors with the feedback 
which is interpreted and management by the financial advisors themselves. Thus, this 
design choice additionally specify who it is that provides the information (the self-
manager) and who it is that do the interpretation of the numbers (the financial 
advisors him/her-self) and who it is that finds out how to take action (also the 
financial advisors him or herself).  
8.2. Designing the rules and routines of self-management feedback   
The design of the rules and routines of how to interpret the numbers, and act upon 
them involves designing the IT-system i.e. the self-manager and feedback meetings. 
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The next describes how the rules and routines of self-management feedback are 
designed as private scheme of interpreting, analyzing and communicating the 
numbers produced in PERFORM, shaped by the design of the self-manager and 
feedback meetings. 
8.2.1 Designing the self-manager  
The design choice of self-management feedback compromises the interesting twist in 
terms of how to provide feedback to the financial advisors. It is the system i.e. the 
self-manager, and not managers or peers, who set the rules and routines of how to 
interpret and act upon feedback. It does so, by providing the feedback, which the 
financial advisors him/her-self is responsible to interpret and act upon. The self-
manager involved design choices that seek to shape how financial advisors interpret 
and act upon feedback, by specifying the “private” process of self-management 
feedback with detailed design of the “self-manager”: 
 
“This is why PERFORM is a system to organize self-management: you receive 
performance evaluation, maybe that you need to improve some areas of your 
performance, and then you reflect on the signal that you received, and then you need 
to think of corrective actions... and I think this processes will lead to financial 
advisors experiencing: yes, this is actually working, and my numbers are high, and 
this feeling of confidence gives you respect for the information that you get from 
PERFROM – PERFROM actually provides me with additional value. And of course, 
systems that don't provide the financial advisor with any additional value, are systems 
not worth having” (Alistair, Director of customer and markets). 
 
As emphasized, it is the system i.e. Self-Manager that provides the financial advisor 
with the performance numbers. Self-management involves design choices of the self-
manager; in the attempt to shape how the financial advisors reflects and act upon the 
feedback information in terms of how they response in concrete actions. Alistair 
explained to me how the detailed design of the self-manager is expected to shape 
financial advisor planning of corrective action and motivate higher effort in 
performing the key activities. How the self-manager set the rules and routines of self-
management with detailed design choices is exemplified with the reflective diary. The 
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reflective diary is a personal platform where the financial advisors interpret 
information and plan actions in accordance to that information: 
“But I am confident that I have explained how the self-manager is their personal 
diary of their performance, and this is something I will go through every week 
together with them. Here, they can reflect on what they were satisfied with regards to 
the potential of the week... I think they think this part is alright, they do like to get 
feedback” (Sarah, branch manager) 
 
The branch manager explains how the self-manager produces routines of how to 
interpret the performance evaluation, which coordination how to reflect and make 
sense of the numbers. Thus, self-management feedback is a private process between 
the individual and the self-managers, which function as an interactive virtual “diary”: 
 
“What is different is that you now have an arena for feedback, where you don't have a 
leader that ask you for a feedback but the individual have a responsibility and they 
have to come and tell not what they did not make, but rather what they will do for the 
next period, and the points is the insight of own performance, the self-reflection about 
your own performance and results and to create processes that are important to get 
visible” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark) 
 
Molly clearly outline how self-management feedback is designed differently than 
designs where it is the manager who provides, make sense of and manage feedback 
information, as now the responsibility to act upon the information is placed with the 
financial advisor themselves. Thus, self-management design involved additional 
designs that specify how financial advisors self-reflect: 
 
“Everything, when implementing the performance management system and 
philosophy (self-management), entails an extra high degree of learning within the 
organization. To the financial advisors, part of the learning comes from their own 
individual measurement card and the self-manager in PERFORM” (Molly, Director 
of Division PerMark). 
 
Molly implies that the proposition of self-management feedback is to shape how 
financial advisors learn from performing their tasks. Also, that self-management 
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motivates them to act upon feedback, because they are granted the responsibility of 
own performance.  
8.2.2 Framing self-management with feedback meetings 
Self-management denote a private feedback process between the financial advisors 
and the self-manager, which produce some of the rules and routines of how to 
interpret and take action on the numbers. Even so, self-management also involved 
design choices on feedback meetings in the attempted to shape the rules and routines 
that coordinate and motivate how to interpret and act upon feedback. This involved 
detailed design choices of the content and structure of feedback meetings with 
mangers and peers. This in turn, means that managers and peers are part of shaping 
the interpretation of self-management feedback, and point out how to act upon the 
numbers. They do so, in the Monday morning team-meetings and the one-to-one 
Thursday pep talks.  
8.2.2.1. Monday morning team-meeting  
The Monday morning team-meetings are design to shape the rules and routines of 
how financial advisors interpret and act upon the performance numbers, by 
coordinating communication and knowledge-share within the team:  
 
“Well, the basis is the key numbers in PERFORM. How did we perform last week in 
accordance to our targets? And maybe somebody, usually thee is, want to share 
something with the team. And then the focus is turned towards the coming week- what 
is the outlook? Can we achieve the TT, or do we need to generate some more activity 
maybe. We also usually discuss specific customer cases” (Alex, Branch manager) 
 
Alex emphasizes how he shapes the feedback dialog in the Monday morning team 
meeting in order to coordinate how financial advisors plan actions and interpret 
feedback. He also does so to get a capacity overview. Another branch manager, 
Kathy, explains how she structures her Monday morning team meetings to be in line 
with self-management:  
 
“Q: so, everyone participate in the meetings? 
A: Yes, we go all the way around the table, and one chip in with their experiences 
from last week, reflections and outlook for next week... We sit around the meeting 
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table, sometimes I show our team performance, and what the financial advisors have 
produced, like last week we had 20 meetings and 64 phone calls.” (Kathy, Branch 
manager) 
Here, the branch managers emphasize how the Monday meeting also informs the 
financial advisors of feedback across the entire team, which is necessary in order to 
organize capacity planning of the branch. Thus, the Monday meeting combines self-
management with more collective processes of interpreting, and deciding how to act 
upon the feedback: 
 
“To my mind, there is a lot of aiding elements in this design of feedback, because it 
involves continuous feedback on activity, and the customers experience of the 
meeting, and then you have self-reflection each week together with the Monday 
meetings where you share your insights and individual feedback from your manager” 
(Molly, Director of division PerMark) 
 
Thus, Molly suggests how the Monday meetings coordinate knowledge sharing from 
the individual reflections from self-management, which again improves transparency 
of task performance at team level. However, setting the rules and routines of self-
management with the Monday morning team meetings, without removing the 
responsibility from the financial advisors, is complex:  
 
“The key factor in PERFORM is openness and to create trust. It requires that trust 
exist among the team-members, and this is on the branch manager right. If I am to 
feel comfortable to open up, and admit that at this area I am not performing well 
enough, then there has to be trust within the team. This is also important in order to 
communicate where you are a high performer, and where you can contribute with 
insight in the team meeting. But like any other organization, our employees also 
follow a normal distribution, so the challenge here is to get the one from the lower 
end to feel comfortable to discuss their performance levels openly with the ones who 
are top performers, and perform on all the areas. How do they perceive these 
meetings if they week after week are the only ones who are in need of help?” (Julie, 
HR Director)  
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Julie from HR highlights how the design the rules and routines of self-management 
with the Monday morning team meeting is a design with contingent propositions, as it 
also might hamper self-management, if there is lack of trust or from poor manager 
competences in coordinating dialog and motivate contribution of experiences between 
top performers and lower performers.  
8.1.2.2 Thursday Pep talks  
The setting of rules and routines of how to act upon the feedback is also shaped by 
weekly one-to-one “Thursday pep talks”. The pep-talks denote dialogs oriented 
towards future actions based on feedback. The Thursday pep talks are designed as a 
short “15 minutes” dialog between branch manager and financial advisor, where it is 
the financial advisors who are responsible to suggest corrective action: 
 
“Part of it is what we call the Pep talk. And each employee has a pep talk with their 
most immediate manager, and this talk is much more future looking than backwards 
looking. It is like “Grandma mouse” (a Norwegian child fable) says: What is done is 
done, what is eaten is eaten” we must learn to look ahead, and the pep talk focuses on 
future activities, on what you are planning to do in the next week, and next on what 
you have done” (Molly, Director of Division PerMark). 
 
The “pep talk” is designed to facilitate the rules and routines of how to make 
reflection into actual learning from experience. This should be initiated by the 
financial advisors, but moderated by the manager: 
  
“My impression is that they like the pep-talks, and they express that they appreciate 
that I come by their office for a chat. So I try to prepare the pep-talks so I can provide 
a perspective on it, for example I can use the pep-talk to give them positive feedback 
on an achievement. Look how high you performed last week, that is very good 
numbers. Or I could maybe focus on, are you aware of that you still lack to perform 
on these targets and how what is your plan in order to achieve that? (Kathy, branch 
manager) 
 
The branch manager Kathy explains how she perform the pep-talks in different ways, 
both to provide positive feedback in situations of high performance, but also to 
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challenge current “self-management” by questioning the level of corrective initiatives 
for future performance. 
8.3 Specifying coordination and motivation with self-management feedback  
Self-management denotes private (individually) processes of interpreting and acting 
upon feedback. Yet, self-management involves design choices regarding the self-
manager (IT system) and detailing the feedback meetings, in the attempt shape how 
self-management should be performed (i.e. interpret information and act upon it). 
These design choices partake in setting the rules and routines of how to manifest 
information into actions in various ways, which illustrates how design choices of 
feedback seek to specify how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors. The 
propositions of how they seek to do so are discussed next.  
8.3.1 Motivation self-confidence with self-management  
Self-management design expected to motivate individuals to exploit their fullest 
performance potential, as the autonomy in the responsibility to self-management the 
interpretation and consequences of information stimulate develop feelings of 
confidence: 
 
“I am sure there are many points of views on this, but from my perspective as HR, I 
am very excited about the introduction of the self-manager “myPERFORM”. I am 
very enthusiastic about self-management, because we are a knowledge organization, 
with highly educated and talented people. So when the financial advisors realize what 
this system can contribute with, to provide them with feedback, feedback directly 
related to their everyday tasks, I am sure it will produce feelings of safety to know 
how you perform with regards to the customers, and that this will turn into an 
internal drive... And this is something that I feel is missing currently, because up until 
now, it has been the managers responsibility to motivate me, to follow up on my 
numbers, but with the self-manager and self-management feedback you are given the 
control” (Julie, HR Director)  
 
This corresponds to earlier quotas of how self-management stimulates self- 
confidence in performing sales activities. The HR director Julie explain how self-
management, which denote high degree of autonomy, seek to construct motivation, by 
stimulating intrinsic motivation from the confidence to perform the key activities. 
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Also, give the financial advisors the responsibility of coordinating activity and 
motivating effort on that activity is expected to motivate effort among tasks:  
 
“But of course, when PERFORM, for example record feedback from customer 
satisfaction on the entire best practice customer processes of a meeting, it is very 
central for their workday. And this does not directly reflect how well they are at 
keeping updated on the regulation, rules and so on. But then again, if you really want 
to become good at providing customer service in the meetings, then it goes without 
saying that keeping updated on these things is essential and therefore a means, and 
not and end in its self” (Julie, HR Director)  
 
Self-management is implied to motivate attentiveness to all types of task related to 
improving performance on the key activities measured in PERFORM, including 
“support-tasks”, such as updating knowledge of new products, regulations or interest 
rate fluctuations. Thus, self-management specifies motivation in other ways than the 
benchmarking targets, by stimulating intrinsic motivation from self-confidence in task 
performance.  
8.3.2 Planning of future sales activity 
Another proposed way that the design of self-management seek to coordinate, is 
expressed by the explanations of how self-management shape how financial advisors 
plan performance of future activity: 
 
“The most important purpose with PERFORM is to produce a higher effectiveness in 
customer processes than before, and therefore it is almost just as important with self-
management- to get control of own work processes, because in order to produce 
higher effectiveness, you need to take control of your work process, which is at the 
core of self-management. This will enable you to say: “ok, I have 8 meetings this 
week, how can I structure myself so I can manage all the meetings, because such level 
of meetings requires structure” (Paul, internal consultant in Division PerMark).  
 
Consequently, the detailed design of self-management, shaped by the self-manager 
and the pep-talks, is proposed to coordinate “effectiveness in customer processes” by 
setting routines of using information towards improved planning of activity.  
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8.3.3 Coordinating learning in how to perform key activities   
The self-management design is suggested to coordinate financial advisors by set rules 
and routines of individual learning. Self-management does so, by informing of their 
performance on the key activities measured in PERFORM:   
 
“Well, a high performing financial advisor received feedback from the customers that 
he did not appear very prepared for the customer meeting. He performed self-
management and acted on the feedback by reflected on how to improve, and made 
corrective actions, and then he have not received that feedback from customers 
since... so this at least indicates that the customer feedback stimulate self-reflection in 
terms of how to best perform with the customers in the room” (Thomas, Chief 
controller in Division PerMark) 
 
Thomas uses the example to illustrate how self-management feedback coordinate 
learning, as the financial advisors was informed of how to improve his performance to 
meet customer expectations. The feedback coordinates the financial advisors learning 
towards specific areas of improvement. However, it is not only the self-manager that 
shapes the rules and routines of learning, as part of self-management involves 
feedback from manager and peers as well:  
 
“I think that you will get, well… if we say that you are to become better at the entire 
processes at the same time it becomes too much, but rather we say: ok, there are a 
few areas here where I can improve, I can get help for my manager, and my 
colleagues, and that is what is the main difference with the design of this system.  
That sometimes the manager can fade a bit into the background and the let the peers 
discuss “I observe that you are good at this” or ask “I have a bit of trouble with that 
area, what you do in order to perform so well on it?” – the feedback focus the team 
discussions, rather than having general discussion, the discussion becomes more 
focused on specific areas – and this is what leads to learning, not the general 
discussions” (Julie, HR Director) 
 
Julie emphasizes how the rules and routines of how self-management coordinates 
learning involve other sources such as peers’ feedback. This in turn, coordinates 
awareness of how peers perform on different tasks.  
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8.4 The overflows from self-management feedback  
The design choice of feedback was supposed to happen in line with “self-
management”, denoting that it is the financial advisors who have the responsibility to 
interpret and act upon the provided information, This involved design choices of the 
self-manager who provide the information (the system), and design of how to 
communicate expectations of how to act upon the information in feedback meetings 
(Monday morning meeting and pep-talks). These design choices seek to specify 
coordination and motivation of how self-management is conducted (interpret 
information and act upon it), by defining the rules and routines of how to manifest 
information into actions. However, the choice of self-management feedback is 
challenged in the branches, as financial advisors are not motivated by the added 
responsibility to interpret and act upon the feedback, as they are supposed to in self-
management feedback. Tensions also arise as the financial advisor is hindered in 
adjusting the feedback and interpretation of the numbers according to their customer 
portfolio, and specific competences. The way that self-management overflow in 
coordinating and motivating financial advisors in an enabling way is described next.  
8.4.1 Lack of motivation to self-manage 
The design of self-management implies the proposition that the financial advisors 
welcome the responsibility of interpreting and managing their own performance. Yet, 
this produced tensions:  
 
“well, in my experience with PERFORM, since we started with the system, there was 
an implied expectations that the financial advisors would be active participants in 
performing self-management on their own initiative, and that is not what is 
happening. I, as a manager, need to go in and facilitate this processes quite a lot. I 
cannot sit back and expect them to perform self-management feedback by themselves, 
so just to sit back and think that they get the point does not work” (Alex, Branch 
manager) 
 
Alex, a branch manager, emphasizes how self-management feedback overflows due 
to the financial advisors lack of motivation to take on the responsibility of his or her 
own feedback: 
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“It requires a lot of extra work... the work load has increased after we started with 
PERFORM, because of all the meetings, logging, and self-manager... I preferred it 
was it was earlier, where we used the weekly report” (Financial advisors, Branch Z) 
 
The financial advisors express a common opinion, which is that financial advisors 
perceive the granted autonomy from self-management feedback as additional work. 
The low motivation to engage in self-management feedback is explained by a 
financial advisor: 
 
“The more time we spend in these systems, logging and reporting, the less time I have 
with the customers…” (Financial advisors, branch Y) 
 
There is a general problem of low motivation to self-manage, which is expressed by 
another branch manager:  
 
“Well, actually the self-manager is going under the nick-name “nagging” …. So this 
is a general sentiment in my branch…and sometimes, in the Monday meetings, they 
feel we just sit and repeat the same, and they don't contribute with any experiences...” 
(Kathy, branch manager) 
 
Kathy laughs when telling me how self-management is viewed as nagging rather than 
enabling in her branch. She also explains how she must “push” self-management upon 
the financial advisors in the meetings. This expresses how the proposition to shape 
motivation to perform from increased responsibility overflow, as it unfolds as low 
level of motivation from the added responsibility. Rather, the responsibility leads to 
stress of additional tasks. 
8.4.2 Low moral from excluding manager acknowledgement  
However, the somewhat low moral produced by the self-management feedback is also 
explained by the fact that self-management excludes motivation from recognition 
from manager feedback. Part of the low moral to self-manage is explained by the 
exclusion of manager acknowledgement:  
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“Of course, there are quite a few who are fairly self-managed, and perform some 
form of self-management. But every single one of them do want to hear from me that 
what they do is good enough, and if they don't get that… they want feedback from 
someone else, acknowledging that I see them and what they do well on. So self-
management… it does not really work to manage yourself, because we all want to be 
seen and acknowledge by others” (Alex, branch manager) 
 
Alex emphasizes how the private feedback process of self-management overflows as 
this exclude manager, and maybe peer recognition, which supposedly is an important 
motivating factor for the financial advisors. This in turn, shape how the manager 
might facilitate self-management in the Monday morning team meetings and 
Thursday pep-talks: 
 
“This is a difficult thing to balance… because they are supposed to bring it up and 
see it themselves, but that is not always how we people work... So if I observe 
performance over time that I am not satisfied with, I interfere and ask them: what do 
you think? Are you satisfied with this? I usually get an honest reply, and then we 
together look into how we can correct that performance… “(Sarah, branch manager) 
 
Sarah, a branch manager explains how it is difficult to be a manager with self-
management feedback, when the financial advisors won’t commit to interpret and act 
upon feedback themselves. Thus, Alex further reflects on how self-management 
design might be modified in ways that produces fewer tensions:  
 
“To me, self-management is a relations between manager and employee, the idea of 
self-management that was presented in the design of PERFORM is great, but it needs 
to be reconsidered because this is more a relationship between manager and 
employee” (Alex, branch manager) 
 
Alex suggests that feedback exists in the relation between manager and employees, 
telling that a coordinating and motivating with feedback involves a social relationship 
between manager and financial advisors. What is implied is the needs to involve the 
branch managers more strongly in the feedback processes, as feedback that coordinate 
and motivate occur from a relationship between manager and employee. 
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8.4.3 Low flexibility to self-manage from the self-manager and feedback meetings 
The self-manager and feedback meetings seek to communicate routines and rules of 
how financial advisors interpret the numbers and how act upon the feedback in 
accordance to these rules and routines.  However, the fixed rules and routines of how 
the financial advisors are supposed to coordinate own feedback distort their self-
management: 
 
”I do use the self-manager, but it is here they fail to sell the idea to us. Because self-
management, that is not about everyone using the system in the same way, because we 
are not the same, so self-management means that it is the system that must be adapted 
to the individual ways of working. Some of us work with a lot of structures and plans 
and others are more flexible and impulsive. And self-management should mean that 
there is room for working in different ways and still deliver results” (Financial 
advisor, Branch X). 
 
The financial advisor emphasize that the actual autonomy in self-management is 
limited by the inflexibility of the rules and routines defined by the self-manager. 
Thus, self-management feedback excluded use of specific knowledge that allows one 
to self-manage based on the feedback. The inflexibility from the rules in the self-
manager hampers the financial advisors to self-manage, as they are prohibited to 
adjust feedback after personal needs such as how to improve performance or plan 
activity. Thus, the details of the design choices exclude possibilities of adjusting 
feedback routines towards relevant areas of feedback. Yet, the chief controller 
explains that the self-manager and the meetings are designed to limited financial 
advisors autonomy in setting the rules of feedback:  
 
“But there are defined boundaries assigned to your job. As a financial advisor, it 
can’t be as easy as just choosing a target of your own preference; we are talking 
about self-management within defined boundaries. There are certain defined 
expectations, and within these expectations you are responsible for the self-evaluation 
of your own performance in accordance with those expectations” (Thomas, chief 
controller Division PerMark) 
 
Self-management is only limited autonomy, as the design of the self-manager and the 
feedback meetings define minimum expectations of how the financial advisors use 
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their “autonomy”. However, as the financial advisor underlined, these “rules” of how 
to self-manage reduce flexibility to adjust feedback after in-time knowledge and 
occurrence. Thus, the irony is that the “private processes” of self-management 
overflow from standardized feedback routines, as the low flexibility to adjust 
feedback after individuals’ work processes and customer portfolio hamper actual self-
management. 
8.5 Re-design of feedback into coaching feedback     
As demonstrated, how the choice of self-management feedback construct 
coordination and motivation, is challenged in the branches, as financial advisors are 
more stressed than motivated by the added responsibility to interpret and act upon the 
feedback, as they are supposed to in self-management feedback. Also, the exclusion 
of manager feedback and recognition seemingly reduce motivation, as part of 
financial advisors motivation is based on manager acknowledgement. Furthermore, 
the self-manager and feedback meeting attempted to coordinate how self-management 
should be performed (i.e. interpret information and act upon it), by defining the rules 
and routines of how to manifest information into actions, overflowed as this hampered 
the financial advisor to self-management with relevant feedback. Thus, tensions arise 
as the financial advisor is hindered in adjusting feedback according to their customer 
portfolio, and specific competences. These overflows lead to modification of how to 
coordinate and motivate financial advisors with feedback, by re-designing feedback to 
be provided by the branch managers (i.e. coaching design of feedback). The following 
describes how the re-design into coaching feedback produce new ways to coordinate 
and motivate financial advisors.  
8.5.1 Coaching management feedback design  
The design choice of coaching feedback, involves that it’s the manager who provide, 
interpret and articulate action plans for the financial advisors, based on the measured 
performance in PERFORM: 
 
“A manager must possess the ability to lead the employees with different instruments. 
In a knowledge organization, employees are in need of the autonomy to structure 
their own work, to focus on their responsibilities; and the manager’s tasks are to 
provide the structures within which the employees can succeed – to construct an 
Chapter 8    165 
 
 165 
arena in which we can perform – this is what you must be able to do as managers” 
(Alistair, Director of customers and Markets). 
 
The re-design of self-management into coaching management move the responsibility 
from the financial advisor to the branch managers: 
 
“It is the manager’s responsibility to develop the financial advisors’ performance. 
This is about how to create more business, right! Coaching-leadership involves to 
facilitate and developing your employee’s performance, by defining the boundaries - 
self-management within a set of defined boundaries” (Alistair, Director of customer 
and Markets). 
 
Alistair indicates a subtle modification in the design, as the responsibility to manage 
feedback is moved from the financial advisors to the branch managers’. Now it is the 
branch managers who has responsibility to facilitate how financial advisors perform 
in their job. Consequently, coaching feedback is an extension of self-management, but 
modify it by re-designing the role of the manager. The managers provide the 
feedback, interpret the feedback and are the one who decide on action plans on the 
basis of the feedback. However, by given the responsibility of feedback to the branch 
managers, the, quality and style of how feedback provided by the branch managers is 
a central topic:   
 
“Well, the more self-management you get in the organization, the more is required of 
the management – and I look forward to this.  I have announced to everyone that we 
must stop pointing the finger at individual financial advisors, because 70% of our 
performance is about the leadership – I am convinced that most of current 
performance is the fruits of the type of management style we got… So we must 
produce a process for our managers, to help them be a manager in the correct way. It 
is not enough that we point to a financial advisor with regards to low quality of 
customer meetings; we must also work on the quality of the manager. This is also a 
key input factor that develops and determine the factors that we are measuring. And 
what we are measuring is the improvement of speed and the quality in activity 
towards the customers” (Alistair, Director of Customer and Markets). 
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What is interesting with the re-design into coaching feedback is how it develops 
PERFORM with routines and rules that seek to coordinate the branch managers’ style 
in providing the feedback and communicating the actions plans, by structuring their 
coaching competences and feedback dialog:   
 
“The biggest challenge we face now, and this is something we are discussing, is how 
to get the middle-management to understand what  ... eh, what it means to be a 
coaching leader, and provide constructive feedback” (Thomas, chief controller in 
Division PerMark). 
 
There is a common appreciation of the type of feedback style that is desired from 
branch managers, i.e. coaching. However, it is perceived to be an issue to coordinate a 
general understanding of what it entails to perform coaching feedback with rules and 
routines, which is confirmed by the variance in feedback style among branch 
managers:  
 
“Well, we are different... very different in our style and what we focus on, but this is 
my management style, and I am focused on emphasizing the positive experiences and 
to develop individuals, and to this end, I think PERFORM is a very interesting tool, 
which is interesting for me as a manager as well.” (Sarah, branch manager) 
 
The branch manager emphasize the variance in how branch managers provide 
feedback, and interpret numbers, as branch managers focus on different types of 
numbers. This in turn, influences how manager feedback coordinates and motivates 
the financial advisors, both in more or less desired ways: 
 
“There is no doubt about it: It is management which constitutes our biggest 
challenges, this is the key to performance. And to this end, we are just now 
introducing a development program for our management. So no doubt about it, this is 
our current challenge” (Alistair, Director of Customer and Markets). 
 
Accordingly, in order for coaching feedback to coordinate and motivate the financial 
advisor towards exploiting their fullest performance potential, PERFORM is 
expanded with design choices on the routines and rules of how managers interpret, 
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communicate and articulate action plans based on feedback. The next describe how 
manager’s feedback style is coordinated towards coaching feedback design.  
8.5.2. Design choices of coaching feedback   
A somewhat surprising result of the re-design of feedback is this involves new design 
choices, which seek to shape the rules and routines of how to provide, interpret and 
act upon the feedback information in new ways. The new ways of constructing 
coordination of financial advisors is interesting, as the design choices attempts to 
shape how manager provide coaching feedback: 
 
“What we are looking into and incorporating into PERFORM, is to make PERFORM 
into a tool that facilitates management” (Alistair, Director of Customer and Markets). 
 
However, in order to coordinate management feedback into coaching feedback, a 
standard of what coaching feedback compromise must be defined and communicated:  
 
“If an employee comes to me and say: I am a bit behind my target, and the reason 
might be this, and I am working on these things now –I, as the manager, need to know 
when to interrupt- when to go in as a coach and offer more guidance in the meetings. 
You do have the pep talk together with you manager, which is designed to tailor 
feedback towards the areas you that you don't perform on (phone calls, meetings). 
Here, the good leader who takes his time, sits down in a dialog and make a 
development plan for you – help you find the cause of why you perform– it can be that 
you have too high work load, or not structured in your work. The manager might also 
suggest that you have two colleagues, who are good at this, go and talk to them, listen 
to what they do –you learn something from them.  Or, the manager could go with you 
on a meeting and be there for you to help you, the manager must be there to help 
development.” (Alistair, Director of Customers and Markets) 
 
The implied character of coaching feedback is described as offer guidance, by 
tailoring feedback towards the individual’s needs. Also, coaching feedback 
compromise the dialog of articulating action plans, that enable the financial advisor to 
perform his or her tasks, either by coordinating development of competences from 
knowledge sharing or restructure work load.  Part of defining coaching management 
lead to the development of the rule of ROE: 
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“We are working with these new notions now: Return on Experience (ROE) or, 
alternatively, Return on Failure (ROF) – and it is all about the creation of learning: 
What did we do? What worked, what didn’t work? What about next time? This is what 
separates quality control from control, because there is no return from control” 
(Michael, Performance management manager) 
 
Thus, the rule of ROE, emphasize that when making sense of the numbers, the 
emphasis should be on how to make the numbers into a dialog that produce learning 
for future performance. Also, coaching feedback is about coordinating and motivating 
quality, and not control: 
 
“Performance development is about experiences, and if there is too much pressure, 
then this will become something negative, and then you will act accordingly. If you 
are able to create positive experiences, you will also act accordingly, so it’s 
important to produce a space of acceptance and trust where it’s allowed to 
experience both successes and failures. Because nobody can always be successful, but 
this is about building positive experiences” (Michael, Performance management 
manager). 
 
The key role of coaching feedback is to interpret and communicate feedback in a way 
that creates positive experiences, which enables development of self-confidence. 
Coaching feedback use both failure and success in current performance in dialogs of 
how this can be used to produce positive experiences that enables financial advisors to 
learn more about what quality and service in customer activity means. Thus, what it 
means to provide coaching feedback in line with ROE is communicated with tools to 
enable managers to develop coaching competences:  
 
“We have courses for and also coaching of all managers in order to develop the 
competences they need in leading their employees: competences in terms of coaching 
teams and individuals. The key point is to develop management with the competences 
to develop our financial advisors’ performance” (Alistair, Director of Customer and 
Markets) 
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The re-design of feedback in PERFORM compromise employee measurement, where 
the financial advisor evaluate the managers on their coaching daily activity the 
coaching diary and feedback on sales achievement in order to tailor the feedback  
8.5.2.1 Coordinating coaching feedback with employee evaluation 
One of the ways in which the routines of coaching- feedback are coordinated in the 
branches is by introducing bottom-up “employee” evaluation of their branch 
managers’ performance of feedback routines (structure) and their competences in 
performing coaching feedback style. The management index is an employee 
evaluation of their most immediate leader in form of an anonymous survey, conducted 
two times a year: 
 
“Once or twice a year, we conduct an evaluation of the branch management in 
PERFORM; and the evaluation is structured after the best-practices of coaching 
feedback. The employees are rating you on dimensions such as how you are prepared 
on feedback meetings as well as on your coaching competences. And then you will be 
placed within a spider’s web which illustrates your challenges and provide you with 
feedback on your management skills” (Thomas, Chief controller in Division 
PerMark). 
 
The management index evaluates the managers’ “coaching competences” by 
measuring if and how managers’ in providing coaching feedback. The evaluations 
communicate feedback routines, such as feedback meetings, but also the content of 
the feedback dialog, such as the competences to provide feedback in line with the rule 
ROE.  
8.5.2.2 Coordinating coaching feedback with the coaching diary  
Similar to the self-manager, a coaching diary communicates the routines and rules of 
coaching feedback. The coaching diary coordinates coaching feedback routines by 
logging managers’ reflections on financial advisors’ performance numbers, how to 
articulate action plans that address areas in need of development. The diary is logged 
both ex-ante and ex-post, of feedback dialogs, such as pep talks, and Monday 
meetings. The diary of coaching feedback is structured towards performance 
development and ROE: 
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“The coaching-management diary, which is the structure we are currently working 
on. When you are coaching an employee, you need to log the conversations and 
reflections, to be able to remember the dialog from last week this week, which is a 
central part in facilitating financial advisors development plan. To combine the 
weekly plans and the weekly team meetings with a coaching quality of reflection: 
what should be changed? And if so, who should change this?” (Molly, Director of 
division PerMark). 
 
The coaching diary structures the routines of how managers are providing coaching 
feedback to the financial advisors. The attempt is to standardize the quality of 
coaching feedback. Furthermore, the coaching diary links multiple sources of 
feedback as well as feedback and feed-forward information in a common forum. This 
provides the manager with an improved overview to articulate appropriate and 
tailored actions plans that coordinate and motivate the financial advisors.  
8.5.2.3 Coaching feedback on performance on sales outcome 
As emphasized one of the overflows that lead to coaching feedback was the lack of 
flexibility to provide tailor feedback in accordance to the financial advisors’ needs 
with self-management. In order to provide tailored feedback to the financial advisors, 
performance data on sales outcome is included in PERFORM: 
 
“The most important part is that I get to see each individual’s results from the 
activity, so I have a tool I can use in order to provide feedback of how to correct or 
adjust current performance. As you experience yourself, my team is like a bouquet of 
flowers, but only different flowers and each flower need different nurturing in order 
to grow. This makes my job very exciting, but also very demanding” (Sarah, branch 
manager) 
 
The branch manager highlights how feedback on sales results is a key management 
tool in order to tailor feedback in accordance to individual’s needs: 
 
“I think it is an ever going-debate, what to visualize and emphasize in feedback, and 
how to provide feedback – do you produce competition or are you building a team – 
but I think that its important with high degree of openness regarding numbers and 
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results and what people achieve.. For example, I read out laud what the customers 
score and write in the customer feedback, and that something that should be 
confidential in PERFORM … … but people do want to know if they are performing in 
the right way, and I also think that people would like to know, when they have worked 
hard on activity, if this does not show in the results, together with solutions and ways 
that they can correct the activity.. So it is not enough to learn the fruits of you labor 
the 31 December…” (Sarah, branch manager)  
 
Thus, part of performing a coaching feedback style is argued to require information of 
sales results of the measured activity, which is enables the managers to make sense of 
the numbers in PERFORM, and to provide more informed action plans of how to 
guide corrective action: 
 
“… for example, I confronted one of my employees, this are your results, what is 
going on? Here knowing the result where helpful because I looked at number of 
customer cases, calculated the average on each customer case… the last 20 have an 
average on 40 000 kr., why don't you just advice the customer to use these expenses 
on a MasterCard? Because there are better ways to use your time, and then we 
started a dialog on this... Then I told her, work on the selection of customers you book 
meetings with, and we meet again next Tuesday at 14, and then she needed to 
contribute with three corrective action she would work with that week, and that we 
would evaluate and discuss the upcoming Tuesday.. How did it work? Ok, let’s try 
something new next week... And now it works very well and she is performing well...” 
(Regional manager; Region X)  
 
The quota exemplify how feedback on both activity level and sales results enabled the 
manager to provide tailored feedback, which identify the corrective action and the 
plan which guide the financial advisor to improve current performance level.  Thus, 
feedback on achieved sales enables coaching feedback as the sales outcome inform 
more about the means-ends relations which improves the interpretation of numbers.  
8.6 Concluding remarks on chapter 8 
This chapter has exemplified various design choices on how to provide feedback to 
employee performance at operational level, which in general has received scant 
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attention in PM literature. This chapter informs my interest in design choices, by 
describing in detail how the design choice of self-management feedback attempt to 
frame how to coordinate and motivate the financial advisors in their daily activities in 
division PerMark. The chapter portray how design of feedback in PERFORM was 
reasoned to happen in a “self-management design”, denoting that it is the financial 
advisors who have the responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided 
information. This details further how the designing PM constructs a distinct meaning 
to coordination and motivation of financial advisors. Feedback does so, by pointing 
out the rules and routines of how to manifest feedback into actions. Thus, chapter 8 
show how design choices of feedback seek to frame coordination of financial advisors 
in additional ways than performance measures and targets, by specifying whom it is 
that provides the information (manager or system) and who it is that do the 
interpretation of the numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that finds out 
how to take action (employee/peers/manager).  
 
Furthermore, self-management gives feedback a distinctive mode, as it's a private 
process of the individual financial advisor. This private process of self-management 
feedback involves design choices regarding the provision of feedback i.e. self-
manager, as well as the feedback processes (Monday morning meeting and pep-talk). 
These design choices show how feedback involves more than socially produced 
routines and rules that shape the schemes that interpret, analyze and communicate the 
evaluated performance. Feedback also involves design of the routines and rules, 
which seek to shape the social schemes of interpretation in ways that coordinate and 
motivate desired behavior outcome. This is exemplified by the design of the self-
manager and the feedback meetings, which seek to frame how financial advisors self-
manage. Self-management feedback is challenged in the branches, as financial 
advisors are stressed and not motivated by the added responsibility to interpret and act 
upon the feedback, as they are supposed to in self-management feedback. Tensions 
also arise as the financial advisor is hindered in adjusting the feedback and 
interpretation of the numbers according to their customer portfolio, and specific 
competences. Thus, the design self-manager and feedback meetings shape the rules 
and routines of self-management, overflows as this hampered the financial advisor to 
self-management with relevant feedback.  
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The modified ideas of how to coordinate and motivate individual performance with 
feedback, result in re-design of how to provide feedback (from self-manager system 
to branch manager), how to interpret feedback (from financial advisor to branch 
manager) and act upon the feedback (dialog between branch manager and financial 
advisor).  The re-design involves coaching feedback mode, which denote a shift in the 
responsibility of providing, interpreting, and articulate actions plans to the manager. 
The interesting twist in coaching feedback is how the construction of coordination 
and motivation of financial advisors is made by design choices regarding how to 
shape the rules and routines of providing coaching feedback. Thus, this specifies 
another way that design of feedback seeks to shape the rules and routines of 
providing, interpreting and acting upon feedback. The rules and routines of coaching 
feedback are amongst others shaped by the coaching diary, coaching education and 
the principle or ROE. All in all, feedback is not only socially produced rules and 
routines, but rather the study of design choices indicates that feedback is socially 
produced routines and rules, that in combination with design choices, systems and 
elements (coaching diary) seek to produce the schemes of provision, analysis and 
action from feedback. 
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Chapter 9: a closer look on design choices in PM 
9.1 Introduction to my discussion  
I was motivated to explore how the design choices made on elements that are part of a 
performance management systems (PMS), function as actors
56
 that propose how to 
define the coordination and motivation of employees’ contribution to value creation. 
In this respect, I conducted a case study that traces how the design choices of 
performance measures, performance targets and feedback contributes in defining the 
boundaries of what coordination and motivation of financial advisors daily activity 
means in practice. Unquestionably, it takes much more than the studied design 
choices on these three elements alone to frame the boundaries of coordination and 
motivation. Still, my analysis shows how the designing PMS proposes specific ideas 
of what coordination and motivation means, by pointing out propositions of how to 
coordinate and motivate the financial advisors. What I also illustrate is that the 
framing produced by the design choices where incomplete. Thus, how the design 
choice contributes in framing coordination and motivation involves studying how 
they are contested and modified as a consequence of the operational responses (i.e. 
overflows). The design choices are challenged as they unfold in practice, which leads 
to new propositions of how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors. This in turn 
alters how they seek to shape the financial advisors behavior. Consequently, the 
design choices contributes in specifying the details of value creation, but this 
contribution to the framing can never be taken into conclusion, as this is composed in 
new ways from interaction with practice.  
 
As follows, it may not be particular surprising that design choices proposes ideas that 
shape the understanding of what it means to say that PM motivate and coordinate 
value creation. However, I provide detailed insight of how design choices produce 
and shape particular ideas of what motivation and coordination entails at operational 
level, by pointing out to the financial advisors how they should to perform their tasks. 
PERFORM was developed with the specific purposes to facilitate financial advisors 
                                                        
56 In chapter 3, design choices can be understood as framing devices, involving non-human actors such 
as performance measures, performance targets, spreadsheets, or customer lists, as well as immaterial 
actors, such as norms, propositions or rules 
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contribution to growth in sales (KPI). I traced three out of numerous PM elements in 
PERFORM over a period of 3 years, in order to provide a detailed account of how the 
design choices made on these elements frame the perception of what it means to 
coordinate and motivate towards increased sales. This proved to entail the 
specification of what activities to perform and how to perform them, in order to 
achieve sales growth. This close look into the design choices discloses how this 
constructs specific meaning to the coordination and motivation of financial advisors.  
 
However, I would like to stress once more, that the design choices alone do not 
determine the coordination and motivation of financial advisors per se. What they do 
is that they provide propositions of how to do so. Yet as these propositions are 
challenged when the design choices unfold in practice, design choices only partake in 
this shaping as their contribution is modified into re-designs
57
 (e.g. compositions of 
themselves) from the challenges (e.g. overflows) in the branches. In chapter 3, I 
elaborate on how design choices can be studied as actors that seek to frame the 
boundaries within which behavior occur, by looking into their propositions of how to 
motivate and coordinate behavior. Propositions are here understood as specifications 
of coordination and motivation, by detailing the “how” and “why” of their specific 
construction. I use Latour (2004) notion of propositions, which reads that 
‘proposition’ conjugates three crucial elements: (a) it denotes obstinacy (position), 
that (b) has no definitive authority (it is a pro-position only) and (c) it may accept 
negotiating itself into a com-position without losing its solidity” (Latour, 2004, P. 
212). In the context of my study, this suggests that the design choices hold 
propositions (a position) of how to coordinate and motivate, but the propositions is 
only a pro-position (anticipated effect), because it has not yet taken into conclusion in 
terms of concrete behavior. Hence, the design choices partake in framing with pro-
positions, which in the interaction with practice may be negotiated into com-positions 
i.e. re-designs. This is reflected in my study of the dynamic relation between framing 
and overflowing.   
 
I traced how the design choices seek to frame with propositions of how to coordinate 
and motivate, and how the propositions are modified over a period of 3 years. It 
                                                        
57 In chapter 3, I elaborate on how design choices seek to frame the boundaries within which behavior 
occur by proposing propositions.  
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proves impossible to coordinate growth in sales by only directing focus at activities as 
this excludes too many dimensions. Consequently, as the design choices unfold in 
practice, the propositions of how to coordinate and motivate are modified (into com-
compositions), due to the overflows produced via the interaction with concrete actions 
in the branches. Thus, my study provides detailed insight of how design choices not 
only contribute in framing motivation and coordination, but also partake in 
constructing incompleteness. The design choices do so, as the proposition of how to 
coordinating and motivate, exclude relevant dimensions of value contribution. This 
provides detailed insight into the complex relationship between design choices and 
incompleteness, as the design choices produce overflows, which in turn shape how 
the design choices seek to frame. The re-designs express how the construction of 
incompleteness when practiced modifies how the design choices seek to coordinate 
and motivate financial advisors. 
 
The first part of the discussion sum up the main points from chapter 6-8, by 
discussing how each of the design choices seek to frame how PERFORM motivate 
and/or coordinate the financial advisors in their daily activities. This includes a closer 
look at the described movements between the design choices, how they overflow in 
the interaction with practice, and how this in turn leads to modified ways to 
understand coordination and motivation via re-designs. This part of the discussion is 
summed up in table 8. The second part involves a detailed discussion of how my 
study contributes to the PM research outlined in chapter 2. Lastly, I comment on how 
my findings can be understood to illustrate the craftsmanship of designing PM.  
9.2 The framing role of the design choices in PERFORM  
Table 8 provides a more detailed account on how each of the design choices: leading 
indicators, threshold and benchmarking targets and self-management feedback seek to 
frame how to motivate and coordinate financial advisors in their daily activities. The 
examination of how the design choices overflow, which results in re-designs of the 
PMS ads to our understanding of how these design choices unfolds in practice. On the 
one hand, making design choices produces incompleteness, but on the other hand, the 
incompleteness produced by the design choices also partake in shaping how design 
choices frame motivation and coordination of employees. Thus, we learn more about 
the dual relationship between design choices and incompleteness. 
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Table 8: Overview of how the three design choices frame coordination and motivation 
 Initial framing Re-framing 
Choice of performance measures 
Coordinati
on  
The choice of key behavioral indicators (KBIs) as 
performance measures reflects a strong belief in 
operational causality. The three KBIs (number of 
customer meetings, number of outgoing phone 
calls, and customer satisfaction) are presumed to be 
leading indicators that lead to growth in sales (the 
lagging indicator). All the financial advisor needs 
to concentrate on are performance along the KBIs 
(the leading indicator) then sales growth will 
follow (the lagging indicator). Value creation is 
like a sequential process  
The sole focus on the KBIs is perceived as incomplete in 
terms of measuring the value creation of the financial 
advisors. The KBIs do not fully capture the complexity of 
value creating as they exclude relevant aspects in order to 
achieve growth in sales. More performance measures are 
introduced: The KBIs are supplemented with lagging 
indicators.  The combination of KBI performance (leading 
indicators) and Sales Performance (lagging indicators) is 
important to express value creation with performance 
measures. The financial advisor cannot only concentrate 
on the KBIs but need to balance their performance on 
activity (KBI) and sales. Value creation is like an iterative 
process.  
Motivation  
 
 
N/A N/A 
Setting multiple performance targets 
Coordinati
on  
The Threshold Target (TT) is pointing out how 
much financial advisors, as a minimum, should 
perform on each of the key activities. The TT 
design defines the minimum required activity level, 
which specifies when there is casual relation 
between performance on key activities and sales 
growth. By communicating a minimum the target 
produce more leeway for the individual employee.  
 
The TTs coordination by directing minimum level of the 
key activities is incomplete due to low flexibility towards 
unforeseen occurrences, variance in customer needs and 
financial advisors specific knowledge. The TT is modified 
into dynamic TT (DTT), which coordinates minimum 
level of key activity with flexible planning. The RPT 
turned out to have a negative effect on cooperation and is 
modified into team relative performance targets (TRPT) 
by the branch managers, to communicate the need for 
cooperation on customer services. The personal sales 
targets (PST) coordinate sales outcome from customer 
activity with difficult to sell products.  
Motivation The TT does not provide enough pressure on the 
individual to perform. The relative performance 
targets (RPT) are added to the TT and propose 
increased effort intensity on the key activities due 
to competition to become the best (TT and RPT in 
combination means multiple targets on each KBI) 
The competition from RPT reduces motivation with low 
self-esteem, which leads to team RPT. The TRPT is 
focused at teams’ success in comp over the other teams. 
The personal sales target (PST) seeks to motivate 
individual effort on sales with commitment from 
personalized set sales targets based on activity level  
Feedback 
Coordinati
on  
The self-management mode of feedback gives the 
financial advisors the responsibility to interpret and 
act upon feedback provided by the IT-system 
(PERFORM).  
Self-management feedback is perceived as incomplete, 
which leads to coaching feedback design. Coaching 
feedback coordinates the financial advisors, by pointing 
out how the managers should interpret, communicate and 
articulate how financial advisors should act upon the 
information.  
Motivation Self-management design gives the financial 
advisors more autonomy, as they are responsible 
for providing their own feedback. This is turn 
motivate performance development from intrinsic 
interest in own performance. 
Coaching feedback motivate performance development 
with manager recognition and self-confidence produced 
by positive experiences (ROE). 
 
Table 8 summarizes how each of the design choices seeks to point out how the 
financial advisors should perform their daily activities. The table also shows the 
momentum of how their attempt to frame is modified in the interaction with the 
operational context. In consequence, how the design choices unfold in the attempt to 
frame is shaped by the contextual response (i.e. overflows), which informs us of how 
incompleteness influences PMs Facilitation of value creation. It is important to 
underline that table 8 provides an overview of how the design choices in my study 
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shapes propositions of how to coordinate and motivate. Table 8 cannot be taken into 
conclusion, as the propositions detailed by the design choices are modified when the 
design choice unfold in practice.  
9.2.1 A closer look at the choice of leading indicators  
While we are familiar with the coordinating and motivating role of performance 
measures, we are less knowledgeable of the detailed ways in which leading indicators 
specify coordination of operational staff. My analysis adds insight into the ideas 
behind design choices of causality and leading indicators at operational level, and 
how these design choices specify how to coordinate the financial advisors in their 
own unique way. It is noteworthy that the KBIs frame coordination based on an 
“illusion” of causality, by pointing out categories of value drivers’ i.e. key activities 
(number of meetings, number of phone calls and happy customers). It is quite 
interesting is how the strong trust in causality shapes the details of designing the KBIs 
which in turn shapes how the KBIs seek to coordinate the financial advisors: The 
KBIs supposedly coordinate how to achieve sales growth, by pointing out what to do, 
how to do it and towards which customers, as performing the outlined activities 
(leading indicators) surely leads to growth in sales (lagging indicators). All the 
financial advisor need to know and focus their resources on in order to achieve sales 
growth, is to perform customer sales meetings, call up customers, and make sure that 
the customer is happy with the service provided. The “illusion” that it is sufficient to 
only coordinate the means (e.g. KBIs) in order to achieve sales growth is influenced 
by knowledge of best practice and the operational map, which illustrate how 
conditions such as task knowledge and causality influences the details of how leading 
indicators seek to specify meaning to coordination. 
 
Nevertheless, it proves too complex to guide financial advisors performance by only 
coordinating their daily activities. Thus, new ideas of how to coordinate financial 
advisors behavior challenge the design of leading indicators as KBIs. The 
propositions of how to coordinate proposed by the KBIs is challenged when the KBIs 
unfold in the branches. The KBIs are perceived to coordinate incompletely, by 
excluding relevant dimensions of how to coordinate financial advisors towards sales 
growth. The KBIs define the boundaries of performance in terms of activity, which 
excludes relevant dimensions of performance on sales growth such as selecting 
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customers and focus on sales outcome when performing the activity. It’s noticeable 
that the incompleteness mirrors the propositions of only coordinating activity 
proposed by the KBIs. Thus, tension arises related to excluding the “lagging 
dimensions” of performance in specifying contribution to value creation. This in turn, 
makes the KBIs incomplete in specifying value-driving activity in itself, exemplified 
by the wrong selection of customers. Thus, this show us that when interacting with 
the operational context, the propositions of how to coordinate proposed by the KBIs, 
is altered by adding lagging indicators in order to coordinate with more dimensions.  
 
The overflows modify the conviction that the financial advisors only need to know 
how to perform the right activity correctly in order to achieve desired sales outcome. 
This shows how leading indicators overflow in coordinating operational employees, 
but also how the overflowing contribute in shaping how leading indicators unfold in 
coordinating contribution to value creation. The re-design from the overflows reflects 
new ideas of how to coordinate the financial advisors, by specifying the dimensions 
of financial advisors performance with activity and sales outcome: the financial 
advisors need to know and focus on both activity and sales outcome, in order to 
achieve sales growth. The lagging indicators alter how the leading indicators seeks to 
specify coordination, by including sales outcome, as part of what the financial 
advisors needs to know and focus on. Chapter 6 illustrates two distinct ways that 
leading indicators seek to contribute in framing coordination of financial advisors. 
First, the design choices reflect an illusion of the leading indicators predictive powers, 
which is modified into more “conditional predictions” as leading indicators 
coordinate operational activity if accompanied with lagging indicators that reminds 
the financial advisors of the desired ends of the activity. 
9.2.1.2 A closer look at the choice of multiple targets on operational measures 
One thing is to outline the dimension of performance another thing is to set the 
desired level of performance as part of defining the boundaries within which financial 
advisors behavior occurs. Chapter 7 addresses the call for more insight into the design 
of performance targets, by illustrating interesting design choices of setting 
performance targets for individual performance: 1) design of multiple targets, 
denoting multiple performance levels on the same performance dimension, 2) the 
design of threshold targets, denoting minimum level of performance on the 
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performance dimensions. My analysis shows how design choices on performance 
targets seek to contribute in the framing of coordination and motivation in ways that 
have received scant attention in research. What is interesting is the combination of 
design choices, as the TT design proposes to coordinate, by defining individuals’ 
minimum level of activity, and the RPT proposes how to motivate, by creating 
competition to perform highest possible level of activity. Thus, together the design 
choices seek to frame a “performance range” that specify upper and lower levels 
within which financial advisor level of activity should occur 
 
Designing targets on operational activity in Division PerMark resulted in a somewhat 
surprising design choice(s) as multiple targets where designed, which denotes 
combining different performance targets that define different target levels on the same 
performance dimension. The choice to design multiple targets on the KBIs is due to 
the difficulties of specifying coordination and motivation with a single target level on 
activity, due to the complex daily operations in the branches. However, one of the 
targets denotes an unusual designs choice in itself: the threshold targets (TT). The TT 
proposes to coordinate, by communicate the minimum required level of activity in 
performing customer meetings and phone-calls, in for these performance dimension to 
be means that leads to desired ends. What is demonstrated is how the TT seek to 
specify operational causality between measured activity and desired sales results, as 
the TT specify how much to perform of activity in order to make it predictive of 
desired results. Thus, coordinating activity does not only involve that the financial 
advisors knows and focus on the dimensions: customer meetings and telephone 
contact (which the KBIs provide), but also how many meetings and phone calls they 
need to perform in order to achieve sales growth. Thus, TT proposes additional 
specification of how to coordinate what desirable behavior is.  
 
Also, the idea behind the design choice of the TT, instead of setting expected or 
stretch targets levels of activity, reflect the complexity of defining level of activity, 
due to complexity in balancing prioritization between multiple activities. Yet, 
designing target of the minimum level of activity on the KBIs specifies coordination, 
as the minimum level ensures that the key activities are granted a minimum required 
priority in the operational day to day. The other performance targets involve design of 
benchmarking (RPT) on the measured activities: number of customer meetings and 
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number of phone calls. The RPT seek to frame motivation to perform higher level of 
activity, from creating competition to become the best. Also, the RPT complement the 
TT, as the TT does not provide enough pressure on the financial advisors to develop 
performance level above the threshold level. Thus, designing targets is not just a 
further specification of what to do (coordination), as to see a specific target (number) 
may also motivate higher effort intensity compared with just knowing about the 
performance dimension. 
 
The specific designs of multiple performance targets are challenged as they unfold in 
practice, as they produce tension in the daily operations in the branches. Each of the 
two targets produces incomplete coordination and motivation of financial advisors 
performance level, as specifying level of activity excludes other relevant dimension 
for high performance in an operational context. The TT overflows from the tensions 
produced by low flexibility towards unforeseen occurrences, variance in customer 
needs and financial advisors specific knowledge. Thus, the TT constructs incomplete 
coordination of higher level of key activities due to the variance in real-time planning, 
weekly occurrences and customer needs.  Furthermore, rather than inspire to higher 
level of activity, the RPT reduces motivation to perform on key activities, as the 
ranking produce low confidence. Also, the RPT is incomplete in motivating higher 
level of performance, as the targets excludes dimensions such as cooperation in 
providing customer service and knowledge sharing among peers. The response in the 
branches makes the TTs and RPTs incomplete in framing high level of performance, 
exemplified by the cream skimming of customers and distorted planning of activity.  
 
The overflows modify the design choices of the performance targets, by shaping the 
propositions of how to frame coordination and motivation. The design of TT is 
modified into a dynamic TT (DTT), which coordinate weekly performance level by 
setting weekly threshold level of personal activity, adjusted for emerging occurrences, 
changing work processes and in-time knowledge of customer needs. The RPT is re-
designed into team-based target (TRPT). The TRPT motivate higher level of 
performance from team-based performance, knowledge sharing and cooperation 
within the teams to provide higher quality in customer activity. In addition, the TT 
and RPT proved incomplete in specifying expected level of sales outcome based on 
activity, which lead to designing targets on personal sales potential (PST). The PST 
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seeks to coordinate sales growth in an interesting way, as the PST coordinates 
attention towards the difficult to sell product groups: number of credit cards, kr. of 
savings and insurance. Thus, the PST carries distinctive propositions of how to 
coordinate and motivate financial advisors towards sales growth, by counter-
balancing the current under-performance on sales of certain product groups. Chapter 7 
provides a detailed account of how incompleteness in turn shapes proposition of how 
to motivate and coordinate financial advisors behavior.  
9.2.1.3. A closer look at the choice of self-management feedback design 
Yet another way to specify how to coordinate and motivate individuals’ behavior is to 
make design choices regarding how to provide feedback. Feedback informs how 
financial advisors succeed in contributing to value creation for Division PerMark. 
Chapter 8 portray how the feedback in PERFORM is design to happen in a “self-
management mode” denoting that it is the financial advisors who have the 
responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided information. The design of self-
management gives feedback a distinctive coordinating and motivating role, as it is 
private processes between the individual and the self-manager (system). This 
illustrates to us how design choices of feedback seek to frame coordination and 
motivation in own distinct ways, which add new ways to specify how to coordinate or 
motivate the financial advisors. Feedback does so, by specifying whom it is that 
provides the information (manager or IT system) and who it is that do the 
interpretation of the numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that finds out 
how to take action (employee/peers/manager). Feedback also seeks to coordinate 
financial advisors behavior, by pointing out the rules and routines of how to manifest 
information into actions. This adds insight into how design choices constructs a 
distinct meaning to coordination and motivate of financial advisors performance, as 
the design choices also entails additional choices that define the rules and routines of 
how to manifest information into actions.  
 
In addition, the design choices of feedback coordinate and motivate financial 
advisors, by pointing out the expectations, rules and routines of how to interpret 
information, how to communicate information and how to act upon the information in 
terms of adjusted operational activities. What is interesting is how self-management 
involves additional design choices regarding the provision of feedback i.e. self-
184    Chapter 9 
 
 184 
manager, as well as how to act upon the information in feedback meetings (Monday 
morning meeting and pep-talk). These added design choices contributes with detailed 
account of how feedback are socially produced routines and rules that shape the 
schemes that interpret, analyze and communicate the evaluated performance in the 
PM system. But it also adds how these socially produced routines and rules are 
shaped by design choices, exemplified by the design of the self-manager and the 
feedback meetings. Also, the design choice of self-management seeks to specify 
financial advisors motivation, as interest to provide high performance from intrinsic 
arousal from ownership of own performance and autonomy. Self-management 
feedback is challenged in the branches, as financial advisors are not motivated by the 
added responsibility to interpret and act upon the feedback, as they are supposed to in 
self-management feedback. The additional design choices on the self-manager and 
feedback meeting structures attempted to specify coordination and motivation of how 
self-management should be performed (i.e. interpret information and act upon it), by 
defining the rules and routines of how to manifest information into actions. Tensions 
arise as the financial advisor is hindered in adjusting the feedback and interpretation 
in accordance to their customer portfolio, and specific competences.  
 
The overflows modify the propositions of how to coordinate and motivate financial 
advisors behavior with feedback, expressed by re-design of how to provide feedback 
(from self-manager system to branch manager), how to interpret feedback (from 
financial advisor to branch manager) and act upon the feedback (dialog between 
branch manager and financial advisor).  The coaching feedback design denotes a shift 
of who has the responsibility of providing, interpreting, and articulate actions plans. 
However, the interesting twist in the re-design to coaching feedback is how the re-
design modify the design choices regarding the rules and routines of how to provide, 
analyze and act upon information. This show yet another way that designs choices on 
feedback seek to frame coordination and motivation in unique ways, by shaping the 
rules and routines of providing, interpreting and acting upon feedback. Here, the 
attempt is to coordinate and motivate financial advisors behavior is to coordinate how 
the branch managers provide feedback. The design choices seek to coordinate 
managers’ feedback style as coaching by designing rules and routines of coaching 
feedback schemes with coaching diary, coaching education and the principle or ROE.  
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9.2.1.4. The contribution of a close study of design choices  
My motivation has been to make a detailed study of design choices in practice, in 
order to take a closer look on how design choices partake in shaping the directions of 
how to coordinate and motivate individual performance at operational level. Often, 
the concern is how the complex context of organizations and the people in them 
partake in shaping this. Acknowledging this as part of the network that frame, I find 
that we can learn about PM as a practice, by developing an appreciation of the role of 
design choices in pointing out how to coordinate and motivate. I demonstrate this by 
showing how leading indicators, threshold targets or self-management feedback shape 
how financial advisors are coordinated towards sales growth. It takes much more than 
design choices alone to frame how to coordinate and motivate financial advisors, but 
my analysis show how a closer look on design choices inform us of their contribution 
in specifying “how” and “why” to coordinate and motivate in specific ways. 
 
Secondly, my detailed study of design choices also contributes by demonstrating how 
the meaning of coordination and motivation is not given a priori, but is produced from 
being framed.  Again, I stress that design choices are only partaking with propositions 
of how to frame the coordination and motivation of financial advisors. My 
contribution is therefore not to take into conclusion how design choices coordinated 
and motivated the financial advisors in performing their daily activities, as this 
produced by whole network of actors and framing devices. But my analysis shows 
how the three design choices point the construction of coordination and motivation in 
specific directions. Certainly, motivation and coordination can be specified in 
multiple ways, and my study shows some of the way that their meaning is framed, 
which partly is specified by the design choices.  
 
Why the framing of coordination and motivation is impossible to be taken into 
conclusion is illustrated from my analysis of how the design choices overflow, which 
inform us of how the limitations in framing coordination and motivation of employees 
when designing PM. Callon (1998) stresses that all framing overflows, wherefore all 
attempts to frame is unavoidable incomplete. It follows as no surprise that design 
choices provide incomplete representations of the performance they seek to shape 
(Jordan & Messner, 2011; Lillis, 2002; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). I believe that 
my empirical analysis contribute with detailed insight into how incompleteness is 
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produced by the details of the design choices. Also, I add how the production of 
incompleteness partakes in re-framing how to coordinate and motivate financial 
advisors. In consequence, I show in my study how the incomplete framing by design 
choices expresses alternative ways to frame the employee behavior towards value 
creation. Thus, my study adds the insight that incompleteness is not necessarily a 
problem in designing PM; as it also denotes opportunities of re-design.   
9.3. The contribution of my study to PM literature  
The next part will outline how my empirical chapter 6-8 (summarized in table 7) 
contributes to PM research. I do so, by structuring my contribution on the three design 
choices I studied.  
9.3.1 The design of leading indicators and causality at operational level 
Chapter 6 provides a detailed account from practice, of how performance measures 
might be designed to coordinate employees’ value contribution at operational level. 
The overall contribution is the supplementary knowledge of the practices of designing 
leading indicators and causality at operational level  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Lillis, 
2002; Otley, 1999; Stringer, 2007). While we are familiar with some of the ways in 
which leading indicators play a role in strategic maps and business models  
(Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 2008; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Malina et al., 
2007; Merchant et al., 2011; Norreklit, 2000; Nørreklit, 2003), little has been said 
about the detailed design choices of leading indicators, and how this specify the 
coordination of operational behavior (e.g. operational maps).  
 
The distinctive design of KBIs does so, in by pointing out what financial advisors 
should do in order to achieve sales growth. I provide a detailed account of how the 
illusion of operational causality leads to design of leading indicators that coordinate 
individual contribution by specifying how to perform their job. The KBIs provide an 
interesting example of leading indicators, as the KBIs demonstrates how a true 
conviction in the predictive powers of leading indicators shape coordination of 
operational employees to only point out the means i.e. key activities. This exemplifies 
the design choices when the narrative of leading indicators to an extreme: The 
financial advisor only needs to know how to perform specific activities (i.e. customer 
meetings, call up customers, and make sure that the customer is happy), because by 
doing so, growth in sales will surely follow. In contrast, the re-design with added 
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lagging indicators, exemplify an alternative way that leading indicators coordinate 
operational employees. All in all, my study illustrates in detail the complexity of 
designing leading indicators with predictive powers (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), at least 
in the complexity at operational level.   
 
In extension, my study also contributes to the current concern with how organizations 
design causality  (Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 2008; Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Malina et al., 2007; Merchant et al., 2011; Norreklit, 2000; Nørreklit, 2003). 
Chapter 6 informs this inquiry in many ways by exemplifying the design of 
operational causality (i.e. operational map) in practice. Also, I show in detail how the 
design of operational causality seeks to represent the KPIs (i.e. strategy map)  (Kaplan 
& Norton, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 2013; Lillis, 2002). First, my study shows a dual 
relationship between leading indicators and operational map (i.e. operational 
causality). On the one hand, the outlined operational map between activities and 
desired sales outcome inspired the design of the KBIs. It is the operational map that 
gives the design of the KBIs the predictive power, which shapes how, the influence 
the coordination of daily operations: just focus on these three activities, performed in 
this particular way towards these types of customers and you will generate sales 
growth. On the other hand, via the details of designing the KBIs the means that lead 
to the ends are further specified with what to do in terms of specific activities. 
Furthermore, what is also noteworthy is how the conviction of operational causality is 
shaped by the KBIs, but also task knowledge, which together seek to specify the 
conditions under which causality between activities and desired ends holds (e.g. 
pointing out what to do and how to do it) 
 
This is also linked to another contribution to the design of leading indicators and 
causality for coordinating operational employees. The predictive ability of the KBIs is 
shaped by task knowledge. The task knowledge of how to perform the measured 
activities and towards which customers, provides additional conditions to the 
operational causality. It does so, by specifying how to perform the activities measured 
by the KBIs, in order for these activities to be predictive of desired sales outcome. A 
key insight, somewhat overlooked in prior discussion of how leading indicators 
coordinate operational employees, is that the way that leading indicators coordinate 
involves interaction with additional elements. The KBIs coordinated financial 
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advisors behavior together with the best practice descriptions, customer lists and 
CRM system. In order to guide what to dot, but also how to do it, and towards which 
customers, the KBIs functioned in a network of additional elements.  This in turn, 
contributes to the inquiry of how causality is designed for operational level  (Lillis, 
2002). As shown, the design of KBIs involved further specification of the KPI sales 
and market growth, by identifying what activities to perform, and how to perform 
these activities, in order to predict achievement of the KPI. It is highlighted that 
designing operational measures that reflects KPIs often leads to incompleteness, due 
to the complexity at operational level (Lillis, 2002). My study informs us of the 
detailed design of operational measures i.e. KBIs, but also how designing operational 
measures to reflect the KPIs involved additional elements in order to coordinate 
means-ends relations. Chapter 6 adds insight of design choices frames how leading 
indicators seek to coordinate casual relations between strategic and operational level.  
 
Lastly, there has been a general concern with incomplete representation of causality in 
contemporary literature, either in terms of their informative value (Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Luft, 2009; Norreklit, 2000) or due to the complexity of designing operational 
causality (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Lillis, 2002). My study contributes by 
demonstrating the limitations of designing operational causality, due to the on-going 
complexity of unforeseen occurrences, and from variances in skills, demands and 
knowledge. Thus, the design of operational maps is by nature limited, wherefore 
designing leading indicators to point towards key means that predict desired ends, in 
the operational context is limited. However, Chapter 6 also shows that the 
unavoidable incompleteness of how leading indicators coordinate causality generates 
new knowledge of conditions of the operational means-ends relations. The KBIs was 
incomplete in communicating sales growth, which lead to new appreciation of added 
conditions of the operational map (direct attention on sales, guide specific knowledge, 
flexibility towards customer needs). Thus future research might look into the use of 
leading indicators to “test” for operational causality as ways for organizations to learn 
about the nature of their operations.  
9.3.2 The design of performance targets at operational level 
With regards to design of performance targets for operational employees, my studies 
overall contribution is to illustrate how two relatively unexplored design choices 
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threshold targets and multiple target design unfolds in practice. The uniqueness of 
these designs amplifies how design of performance targets partakes in framing how to 
coordinate operational employees’ behavior. Also, I believe I contribute by providing 
a detailed illustration of interesting ways to set performance targets in order to specify 
how to motivate and coordinate individual performance at operational level. 
Undeniably, most literature on design of performance targets has studied more 
aggregated target designs, such as budget targets. Furthermore, much research is 
devoted to how performance targets are set to motivate individual performance by 
evaluating or rewarding performance (Dekker et al., 2012; Indjejikian et al., 2014; 
Jensen, 2003; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989; Webb et al., 2013; Webb, 2004). Yet, 
research on how the design of performance targets specifies how employees should 
perform their activities is fairly scarce. For example, I find that much literature 
concerned with design of PM at operational level implicitly or explicitly concerned 
with design of performance measurement systems (PMS) or Management Control 
systems (M.C.s) (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jordan & 
Messner, 2011; Lillis, 2002; Potter & Banker, 1993; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). My 
study contributes to this stream of research, not only by demonstrating the role of 
performance measures, but also by showing the somewhat overlooked importance to 
study design choices of performance targets. My study show how the design of targets 
point out how to perform operational activity, which I believe contributes with insight 
into the working of PM systems in practice.  
 
My study contributes with insight of how design choices of performance targets 
coordinate employee performance in their own way. I do so by my detailed accounts 
of how the setting of Threshold targets (TT) unfolds in practice, which to my 
knowledge is a design choice, which has received scant attention in research. First, 
my study of the design of TT contributes to current knowledge by describing how 
performance targets might be designed to specify the coordination of operational 
performance. It might not be surprising that performance targets might coordinate 
planning, resource allocation, or to incorporate externalities  (Hansen, 2010; Jensen, 
2003; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). Nevertheless detailed descriptions of how targets 
seek to specify how to coordinate individual behavior at operational level and how 
they are designed to do so is scarce. The TT is interesting in this regard, as the TT 
specify how to coordinate employees’ performance of key activity by pointing 
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out how much financial advisors, as a minimum, should perform on each of the key 
activities. The TT is perceived as a more adequate target level in operations due the 
complexity of defining an expected level of performance in weekly activity, it is 
decide to design a minimum benchmark, that better guide weekly activity less.  
 
The proposition of designing a minimum level of activity on number of customer 
meetings and number of outgoing phone calls is that the minimum level forces 
financial advisors to prioritize enough energy to perform the key activities and to plan 
their weekly resource capacity in order to meet the set TT. The interesting details of 
the design of the TT are to suggest that higher level of activity can be coordinated. 
The minimum level of activity guides prioritization and planning of performing the 
activities. This is in extension suggested to reducing the variance in performance level 
across financial advisors, making the TT into “leading target” that guides routines that 
enable speed in best practice customer services. Furthermore, my study also adds to 
the literature concerned with developing causality (Huelsbeck et al., 2011; Ittner & 
Larcker, 2008; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Malina et al., 2007; Merchant et al., 2011; 
Norreklit, 2000; Nørreklit, 2003; Smoot, Ittner, & Larcker, 2004) Another interesting 
finding when studying the TT was how the target design was used to specify 
operational causality. By defining the minimum required level of performing key 
activities, the TT specifies additional conditions under which the casual relation 
between key activities and sales growth holds. The TT communicates the minimum 
level of expected performance that financial advisors must perform weekly in order 
for the key activities to result in increased sales.  
.  
In extension of this, yet another contribution to the design of operational PM is the 
design choice of multiple targets. Given the volume of research on design of multiple 
performance measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Lipe & 
Salterio, 2000; Malina & Selto, 2001; Malina & Selto, 2004), there exists surprisingly 
little research on the details of designing multiple target levels on the same 
performance dimensions. My study adds insight into this somewhat unexplored target 
design, by showing how the complexity of the operational setting leads to the setting 
multiple target levels on the same KBIs. Multiple targets are designed in order to 
specify both the coordination and motivation of employees, and function 
simultaneously even if they coordinate and motivate financial advisors in their own 
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way. The fact that the financial advisors should navigate towards two or more targets 
on the same performance dimension shapes the coordination and motivation of 
operational behavior. The TT communicates the minimum level and the RPT 
communicate the maximum level of performance, and together the two targets define 
a performance range within which all financial advisors should perform. My study of 
design choices contributes with some of the multiple possibilities to design targets at 
operational performance. All in all, my study suggests that future research on design 
of operational PMS should be more attentive to design of target setting. 
9.3.3 The design of feedback for employees at operational level 
My overall contribution to PM research concerned with design of feedback is more 
insight to how feedback is designed to facilitate operational performance as well as 
how feedback designs unfold in practice (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et al., 2010; 
Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). All in all, chapter 8 also shows how the design choices of 
feedback play a significant role in shaping how PM unfold in practice, by specifying 
how to coordinate and motivate operational staff in new ways. Thus, my findings 
speak to literature on feedback (Grafton et al., 2010; Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Otley, 
1999; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011), as well as the general literature concerned with PM 
in practice  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 2012; Stringer, 2007). A key focus in the 
literature has been how various design choices of feedback information might 
facilitate different types of managerial decision-making  (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; 
Grafton et al., 2010; Luft, 2009; Otley, 1999). Chapter 8 contributes to this, by 
adding insight of how feedback is designed to facilitate decision-making of 
operational employees (Financial advisors) and later the branch managers.  
 
In my case, this is exemplified by “self-management design”, on feedback, denoting 
that it is the financial advisors who have the responsibility to interpret and act upon 
the provided information. Chapter 8 shows how self-management feedback frame 
coordination of financial advisors, by specifying whom it is that provides the 
information (manager or system) and who it is that do the interpretation of the 
numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that find out how to take action 
(employee/peers/manager). Chapter 8 therefore add insight in how feedback specify 
coordination, by additionally specifying whom it is that provides the information (the 
system) and who it is that do the interpretation of the numbers (the financial advisors 
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him/her-self) and who it is that finds out how to take action (also the financial 
advisors him or herself). Thus, we know some of the many design choices involving 
the structure the interpretation of feedback (formal/informal) and type of feedback 
dialog (Feed-back or feed-forward). Chapter 8 contributes to PM literature by 
exemplifying additional design choices regarding how to provide feedback  (Ferreira 
& Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011), such as with whom to place 
the responsibility to interpret and act upon the information. In other words, in chapter 
8 we learn more about how feedback involves specification of “action plans”, 
denoting how to respond and act upon the communicated information. 
 
Furthermore, in chapter 2, feedback was defined as socially produced routines and 
rules that shape the schemes that interpret analyze and communicate the evaluated 
performance in the PM system (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). Self-management design 
involved additional design choices regarding how to provide feedback i.e. self-
manager (It system), as well as design choices regarding “socially produced rules and 
routines” of how to act upon the information in feedback meetings (Monday morning 
meeting and pep-talk). These added design choices contributes with detailed account 
of how feedback involves socially produced routines and rules that shape the schemes 
that interpret, analyze and communicate the evaluated performance. However, my 
study also adds that the socially produced routines and rules is shaped by design 
choices on framing devices, such as design of IT systems (self-manager) and other 
elements (coaching diary) that seeks to shape how these rules and routines coordinate 
and motivate specific ways. This is exemplified by the detailed design of self-
manager and the feedback meetings, and later the coaching diary, ROE, which 
involve design choices that seek to shape the socially produced schemes of 
interpretation and communication of feedback. Thus, my study clarifies how feedback 
involves design choices regarding social rules and routines of interpreting, 
communicating and acting upon the feedback information. This exemplifies the 
complexity of distinguishing between formal and informal (Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011) 
as well as feedback and feed-forward (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et al., 
2010)types of feedback in practice, as these occur ad-hoc and simultaneously. 
All in all, chapter 8 adds interesting insight into the scarce knowledge of feedback by 
providing a detailed account of how feedback frame coordination of operational 
employees by specifying whom it is that provides the information (the system) and 
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who it is that do the interpretation of the numbers (the financial advisors him/her-self) 
and who it is that finds out how to take action (also the financial advisors him or 
herself). Also, feedback add specific ways to coordinate and motivate individuals, 
with design choices that seek to shape the socially produced rules and routines, such 
as detailing how to provide, interpret, and act upon feedback. Thus, my study of 
design choices indicates that feedback is socially produced routines and rules, that in 
combination with design choices on systems (Self-manager) and elements (coaching 
diary) seek to produce the schemes of provision, analysis and action from feedback. 
This demonstrates the significance, but also the complexity to design feedback as it 
involves coordinating social interaction, which to my knowledge, underplayed criteria 
within knowledge of feedback design.  
 
My contribution to PM literature is summarized in table 9. 
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Table 9: Overview of how my study contribute to current PM literature 
Design 
choice  
Identified research gaps in 
chapter 2  
Identified contribution in this study 
Choice of 
performan
ce 
measure 
There is a multifaceted call to learn 
more how organizations design the 
operational means-ends relations 
with performance measures (Ittner, 
Larcker, & Rajan, 1997; Ittner & 
Larcker, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Lillis, 2002; Malina & Selto, 
2004; Malina et al., 2007; Norreklit, 
2000; Nørreklit, 2003) 
How do specific design choices on 
leading indicators coordinate 
activity planning, learning and 
knowledge sharing by measuring 
operational activities?  
1. Shaping operational causality: The operational map shapes the 
design of the Key Behavioral Indicators. The three KBIs (number of 
customer meetings, number of outgoing phone calls, and customer 
satisfaction) are presumed to lead to growth in sales (the lagging 
indicator). Thus, the KBIs specify operational causality, by coordinating 
that all the financial advisors needs to concentrate on is their performance 
along the KBIs, as this leads to sales growth. The choice of KBIs as 
performance measures reflects a strong belief in operational causality, 
which leads to KBIs that coordinate by specifying employees, should 
perform their tasks, as value creation is viewed as a sequential process. 
2 Support elements for coordinating with leading indicators: a key 
insight is how the leading indicators coordinate financial advisors 
performance towards key activities together with additional elements, 
such as best practice descriptions, customer lists and CRM system that 
point out how employees should perform the key activities in order to 
achieve desired ends.  
3. The illusion of leading indicators: My study provide detailed 
specification of how leading indicators seek to coordinate operational 
employees by pointing out what to do and how to do it, (e.g. the key 
activities: number customer meetings, number of phone calls and 
customer satisfaction). This also shows us the limitations in pointing 
towards key activities that predict desired ends (e.g. operational map). In 
the complexity of operational context designing operational maps proves 
to be more an illusion, as by pointing out what to do, one also distorts 
value creation by pointing out what not to do. Thus, designing causality at 
operational level might be too contingent to guide value creation. 
Target 
setting  
There is a general call for more 
insight in the multiple ways in 
which targets are designed. (Dekker 
et al., 2012; Hansen, 2010; 
Merchant & Manzoni, 1989; 
Merchant, Van der Stede, & Zheng, 
2003; Otley, 1999; Otley, 2012). In 
particular, one of the areas with 
potential to improve current 
knowledge is with regards to how 
targets are set to coordinate or 
motivate operational employees in 
their task performance.  
 
1. Specifying coordination individual performance: The study 
provides detailed insight into how the design of performance targets 
shape coordination of operational performance. The design of 
performance targets add specification of how to coordinate financial 
advisors performance by specify prioritization, planning and allocation of 
activities, making targets a key actor in coordinating how to perform your 
tasks for employees at operational level 
2. Threshold target to specify causality: The TT, specify how much, as 
a minimum, employees must perform of key activity in order for this to 
lead to desired results. Thus, setting minimum level of activity specify 
new conditions of when measured activity predicts sales growth 
(operational causality).  Also, the setting of a minimum level is suggested 
as more adequate target level for coordinating operational employees at 
operational level. The TT produces more leeway for the individual 
employee to make sufficient planning and prioritization among tasks.  
3. Multiple targets for individual performance: The complexity of 
framing the coordination and motivation of individual performance 
activity level lead to multiple targets design (in my case two targets per 
performance measure rather than one that is often the case). This involves 
multiple targets on the same performance dimension that simultaneously 
but independently specifies how to motivate and coordinate financial 
advisors. Also, multiple targets also specify operational causality, as 
targets set on both the activity (e.g. leading) and the sales results of that 
activity (e.g. lagging). This is exemplified in the re-framing into dynamic 
threshold targets, team benchmarking and personal sales targets.  
Feedback  There is in general scarce 
knowledge of how organizations 
design the processes of feedback,  
(Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grafton et 
al., 2010; Pitkänen & Lukka, 2011). 
In particular with regards to 
facilitating operational staff in 
decision-making and commitment 
to performance level 
This suggests a need to add to 
current lack of knowledge of the 
multiplicity of feedback design 
choices and how different designs 
specify the meaning of coordination 
and motivation of value creation.  
1. The design of self-management feedback: Feedback can be designed 
in a self-management mode (supporting self-management thinking in the 
case company). In this mode feedback becomes a private process of 
interpreting and acting upon the information, by decentralizing the 
responsibility to do so to the employees (self-management). My study 
inform of some of the conditions under which it’s possible to design 
feedback in this way, as this requires competences, interest and sufficient 
trust in the employees abilities to act upon feedback themselves  
2. Feedback shapes behavior with social rules and routines: Feedback 
coordinates and motivates employees by pointing the social or private 
schemes of interpretation in specific directions. Feedback is more than 
social produced rules and routine, as these are shaped by design choices 
on routines, rules and elements such as IT systems or coaching diary 
3. Feedback specifies coordination: Feedback specifies coordination in 
added ways than performance measures and targets. Feedback does so, by 
coordinating whom it is that provides the information (manager or 
system), which it is that do the interpretation of the numbers 
(employee/peers/manager) and who it is that finds out how to take action 
(employee/peers/manager). Two exemplifications of this are provided by 
self-management mode and later coaching feedback mode.  
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All things considered, my study contributes with its detailed account how specific 
design choices on performance measures, performance targets and feedback have an 
impact on the coordination and motivation of operational employees’ behavior. 
Certainly, it’s not an eye-opener that design choices reflect ideas of coordination and 
motivation, but the conflicting findings of how they do so begs for more exploration 
of design choices in practice (Ittner & Larcker, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Otley, 
2012; Stringer, 2007). I do so, by showing how design choices seek to specify how to 
coordinate and motivate operational employees, by pointing out how employees 
should perform their tasks operational level.  
 
I studied this from a different perspective than the general focus on how the complex 
context of organizations and the people in them shape how PM coordinate and 
motivates behavior in practice. Also, my close look on the role of design choices, not 
just on performance measures, but also performance targets and feedback, informs of 
how design choices are designed to point out how operational employees should 
perform their job. I also clarify how they are limited in doing so. My study 
demonstrate the complexity of designing PM that coordinate operational level by 
specifying what to do and how to do it; as the level of detail simultaneously provide 
incomplete coordination of value creation. This insight is informative for the debates 
of how, and if so, to what extent leading indicators and casualty might coordinate 
operational employees  (Ittner et al., 1997; Ittner & Larcker, 2003; Ittner & Larcker, 
1998; Ittner et al., 2003; Lillis, 2002; Malina & Selto, 2004; Malina et al., 2007; 
Norreklit, 2000) 
 
Accordingly, my study also informs the general literature concerned with how to 
design PM for operational employees (Banker et al, 1993; Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; 
Lillis, 2002) and with the PM in practice (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Jordan & 
Messner, 2011; Otley, 2012; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). The level of detail of the 
design choices I study provides an interesting perspective of how to design 
operational causality of individual at operational level. An interesting insight from my 
study is how design choices on leading indicators might be made in order to point out 
what to do in at operational level in order to contribute to achievement of the strategic 
KPIs  (Lillis, 2002). This also clarifies how design of leading indicators seeks to 
coordinate employees’ contribution, by guide them in how to handle the multiple 
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goals at operational level  (Lillis, 2002). Thirdly, as my study demonstrates the 
limitations of leading indicators in doing so, we learn more of the relation between 
incompleteness and design choices. I also shed light on the dual role making leading 
indicators that point out how to perform operational activities. I show how design of 
leading indicators seeks produce order by specifying what to do, but also how 
simultaneously produces disorder by specifying what not to do. I clarify how leading 
indicators who are designed to aid operational employees, also produces tension, by 
constructing trade-offs in-between multiple goals at operational level. Thus, my study 
provides insight into the practical complexity of making design choices for 
individuals at operational level.  
9.4 The craftsmanship of designing PM  
I have studied PM in practice; with a particular focus on how the details of the design 
choices involve propositions of how to shape coordination and motivation of 
operational employees. This also involved studying how the design choices unfold 
(i.e. overflows) in practice. I have done so, in order provide a close look on the role of 
design choices in pointing towards specific ways to coordinate and motivate 
individual performance at operational level. My performative perspective denotes to 
study how the meaning of coordination and motivation is produced form the 
processes of framing, as their meaning is not given a priori. Of course, it takes much 
more than design choices frame specific meaning to coordination and motivation of 
employees. However, my analysis shows how design choices frame some directions 
of how to coordinate (specify how employees should perform their tasks) and 
motivate how to perform accordingly. My motivation has been to take “design 
choices” seriously, by studying them as actors that partake in setting the directions of 
how coordination and motivation of value contribution is specified. My contribution 
is therefore not to take into conclusion how financial advisors where coordinated and 
motivated in performing their daily activities, as this is framed by whole network of 
actors and framing devices. 
 
I demonstrate how the design choices that I have studied partake in framing, by 
specifying some aspect of how to coordination and motivation of the employee. 
However, the value of studying design choices as actors that seek to frame, and in 
doing so, overflows, is that we also learn more about the limitations of design choices 
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in setting the direction of how to coordinate and motivate. Designing PM is a 
craftsmanship because it not only involves expertise of knowing the multiple 
possibilities in designing PM in order to shape the meaning of motivation and 
coordination, but also knowledge of the conditional nature of the design choices, and 
thus, learn how to manage their incomplete framing. Callon (1998) stresses that all 
attempts to frame produces overflows. It is not surprising that PM is incomplete in 
coordinating and motivating desired performance, as it is impossible to include all 
relevant dimensions within the framing. However, what my empirical analysis adds is 
detailed accounts of how the character of the design choices constructs distinctive 
types of incompleteness, which in turn produce new meaning to coordination and 
motivation.  
 
Accordingly; the analysis of the overflows demonstrates the limitations of design 
choices in defining the coordinating and motivating roles of PM, as their framing 
produce tension from incompleteness. The insight to the limitations of design choices 
in constructing motivation and coordination is important in order to understand the 
true craftsmanship of designing PM in practice. Here, the operational context 
challenges the specific meaning to coordination and motivation framed by the design 
choices. Thus, this enables an illustration of how design choices not only perform, but 
also are performed by its context. The branches challenge the framing of the design 
choices, with alternate meanings to coordination and motivation that re-frame the 
perception of what to coordinate and motivate. Thus, design choices are performative, 
denoting that by specifying the boundaries of value creation, design choices 
simultaneously produce ambiguity and tension. This was illustrated in the three 
analytical chapters, which show how the initial design choices overflow into new 
understanding of the boundaries of coordination and motivation, leading to re-design 
of performance measurement, target setting and provision of feedback 
 
The dynamic tension between framing and overflowing illustrate the craftsmanship of 
designing PM, as the analytical concepts illustrate the duality in how design choices 
frame specific meaning to the coordinating and motivating role of PM. On the one 
hand, the design choices seek to shape a specific meaning to coordination and 
motivation of value creation. Yet, on the other hand, design choices are fragile, as the 
interaction with the context re-constructs the specification of coordinating and 
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motivating value creation, expressed in re-design of the design choices. This 
corresponds to Callon (1998) notion, where all framing leads to overflowing, but as 
Callon (1998) also add, this process is ongoing. Thus, the analysis might even be read 
as a contribution that underlines in more detail how design choices are on-going 
process of craftsmanship.  In the tool box for the craftsman should be detailed insight 
to the design choices available and how they shape the framing of coordination and 
motivation. I tried to provide some more insight into the complexity of what 
designing PM constitutes, and how design choices can be understood as tools that 
facilitate the craftsmanship of PM.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion  
 
The motivation of this study was to explore how the design choices made when 
developing Performance Management (hereafter PM), produces proposals of how to 
coordinate and motivate operational employees in performing their tasks as well as to 
which extent they are successful in doing so. I was therefore inspired to study how 
design choices shape the ideas of what it entails to coordinate and motivate employees 
in practice, when I went out to study the design of the operational Performance 
Management System PERFORM. PM is often postulated as a management resource 
in organizing employee contribution to value creation. Here, it is often advocated that 
carefully designed PM supports organizational value creation, by facilitating the 
coordination (e.g. the right people do tasks efficiently in the right way and at the right 
time and place) and motivation (e.g. interest alignment) of employee’s contribution. 
Following this line of reasoning, I have studied how the making of design choices in a 
operational PMS partakes in specifying how to motivate and coordinate employees. 
Despite the significant attention towards the design PMS and its elements (i.e. 
performance measures, performance targets etc.) in the literature, the way in which 
design choices proposes what it means to coordinate and motivate employees in 
practice is less clear. Thus, I have studied how the design choices construct detailed 
propositions of how to coordinate and/or motivate employees in their daily 
operations. I find that studying the role of design choices adds insights to how PM 
unfolds in practice.  
 
My interest in the detailed working of design choices resulted in a case-based study 
where I traced the development of the design of three selected elements in a new 
operational Performance Management System (PERFORM hereafter). I do so in order 
to explore how these design choices propose ideas of how to coordinate and motivate 
employees’ value creation in daily operations. I explore the design choices made with 
regard to leading indicators (e.g. performance measures), performance targets and 
feedback over a period of three years (2012-2014). I chose to illustrate these three 
elements as my comprehensive data collection made it beneficial to select some of the 
most illustrative examples from my case study. The focus was to investigate how the 
design choices play a significant role in assigning specific properties to what 
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motivation and coordination of operational employees entails in practice. For 
example, the study illustrate how the design of leading indicators as key behavioral 
indicators (KBIs hereafter) suggest the idea that coordination of employees 
contribution means to point out what they should do when performing key activities.  
Detailed accounts such as this, provides rich examples of how design choices 
construct meaning to the coordination and/or motivation of employees in their daily 
operations. This is of course not the only way that the meaning to coordination and 
motivation is produced, but the design choices prove to be a significant part of their 
making.  
 
In chapter 2, I provide a selected overview of current understanding of PM in the 
literature, with a tailored focus on the studied elements of PM: performance measures, 
performance targets and feedback. This overview of current knowledge is noteworthy 
as this identifies how my study contributes with additional insight to current 
understanding of the design of PM. For example, I find that most studies concerned 
with design of PM often focus on PMS as a whole, and thus, become quite vague in 
describing the role of design choices in shaping the working of PM in practice. This 
in turn implies the need of more insight of how design choices propose what it entails 
to coordinate and motivate employees’ value contribution. For example, while rich 
discussion of the value of leading indicators exists, few provide detailed descriptions 
of how organizations actually design-leading indicators to lets say, point out which 
tasks to perform. Thus, current knowledge of how design choices define the 
boundaries of what it means to coordinate and motivate employees in practice is 
scarce.  My study also adds insight into other interesting design choices in regards to 
developing an operational PMS, such as setting threshold targets for minimum level 
of performance. The rich description of these design choices contributes as this has 
received scant attention in prior literature. All in all, it might not be surprising that the 
design choices made on performance targets and feedback contribute in shaping how 
PMS seek to coordinate and motivate operational employees, but there is a need of 
more knowledge of how they do so. 
 
In chapter 3, I explain how I apply a performative perspective. I draw upon Callon's 
(1998) idea of framing, which here is understood as to study how the design choices 
produces the boundaries that constructs the meaning of coordination and motivation 
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in practice. Therefore, design choices are studied as actors that frame, denoting that 
design choices produce boundaries of action by suggesting what it is that employees 
should do, in order act within the boundaries of motivation and coordination of value 
creation. For example, the design of KBIs (e.g. leading indicators) pointed out the key 
activities (e.g. having customer meetings and making customer phone calls) or design 
of threshold targets pointed out how much to do of specified activities (e.g., making 5 
meetings a week or making 10 phone calls a week). More precisely, I study and show 
how framing is the making of boundaries that seek to regulate and shape action. I 
argue and illustrate that part of what frames action, is the way in which design choices 
propose ideas of what motivated and coordinated action entails. Thus, I have studied 
how these ideas seek to produce boundaries of action, but also how the making of 
such boundaries makes the design choices performative as they are contested in 
practice. The contesting of the suggested way to coordinate and motivate employees’ 
contribution is important as this leads to reframing how design choices construct the 
meaning of coordination and motivation (e.g. performativity).  
 
Consequently, I have studied how the meaning of coordination and motivation is 
constructed when making and contesting design choices. This implies that what it 
means to motivate and coordinate cannot exist a priori, but its meaning is constructed. 
My ambition was to demonstrate how design choices play a significant role in doing 
so. Of course, it requires more than making design choices to construct (e.g. frame) 
the boundaries that shape how to coordinate and motivate employee contribution. 
Still, my analysis shows how design choices partake significantly in this boundary 
making, by proposing detailed ideas of what coordination and motivation entails in 
practice. I illustrate how framing is inescapably linked to overflowing, by first 
describe how the design choices propose ideas of coordination and motivation, and 
then, show how the ideas are challenged and modified (i.e. overflows) in the 
interaction with the branches. All in all, I find Callon's (1998) concepts resourceful in 
providing a detailed account of how the design choices define a specific meaning to 
what coordination and motivation of operational employees could entail. Also, this 
perspective enables a more detailed study of how design choices both specify the 
boundaries of desired action as well as how they are contested in the attempt to do so. 
This illustrates the performativity of design choices, as the proposed construction is 
modified via the interaction with the organizational practices.   
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The primary focus of my thesis was to address the stated research question: How does 
the design choices related to performance measures (i.e. leading indicators), 
performance targets and feedback contribute to the performance management systems 
framing of the coordination and motivation of operational staff (i.e. financial 
advisors) and how does the operational level response to the design choice potentially 
modify the way in which the design choices do so? Guided by this research inquiry, 
my primary focus in the empirical analysis was to provide a detailed account of how 
the design choice of performance measures, with corresponding choices of 
performance targets and provide feedback, contributed in framing specific meanings 
to what it entails to coordinate and motivate financial advisors in Division PerMark.  
 
Chapter 6 informs my research question by providing a rich account of how the 
choice to design leading indicators (e.g. performance measures on the key activities) 
produces specific ideas of how to coordinate the financial advisors in their daily tasks 
in division PerMark. Chapter 6 shows how the design of leading indicators (hereafter 
Key Behavioral Indicators (KBIs)) promotes ideas of only focus on key activities 
(customer meetings, outgoing phone-calls and producing customer satisfaction), as 
these activities supposedly predict achievement of sales growth (e.g., value creation). 
The specific design of the KBIs shapes coordination of financial advisors in distinct 
ways, by specifying what the advisors should do to perform well for Division 
PerMark. The KBIs propose that coordinating employees means to promote the strong 
belief in the operational causality between activity and sales results. Thus, to 
coordinate is to point out how to perform key activities in a correct way (e.g. best 
practices on customer meetings, making phone-calls and customer satisfaction). 
Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that the KBI cannot frame meaning to 
coordination of operational activities alone, as the chapter show how the KBIs 
function together with additional elements in order to frame what it means to 
coordinate financial advisors in accordance to value creation. However, the framing 
of coordination proposed by the KBIs is contested, as it proves impossible to 
coordinate financial advisors as suggested by the KBIs (e.g. specifying what activities 
to perform and how to perform them). Accordingly, the KBIs are performative via the 
interaction with the operational context where new meaning of coordination is 
produced by the KBIs together with new lagging indicators. 
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One thing is to define the dimensions of performance; another way to specify how to 
coordinate and motivate employee’s contribution to value creation is to define the 
desired level of performance. Chapter 7 enlightens my research inquiry, by portraying 
how the design choice of performance targets also contributes in specifying the 
coordination and motivation of financial advisors. First, chapter 7 illustrates how 
threshold targets (TT) frame coordination of financial advisors performance; by 
communicate required minimum level of activity on the measured activities. The TT 
specifies new conditions of when performing the key activities leads to desired sales 
results, as the TT specifies how much one need perform of the activities, as a 
minimum, in order to contribute with improved sales from activity. The role TT at the 
operational level has not received much attention. Designing TT rather than, for 
example a target representing the expected average level or the top level of 
performance reduces the performance pressure on the key performance dimensions. 
For example, the suggested idea by the TT is that the minimum level provides space 
to learn how to prioritize between activities and planning of weekly activity level. 
Another interesting design choice was to set multiple targets to each performance 
measure. The multiple targets require the employees to navigate towards two or more 
targets on the same performance dimension. The choice of multiple targets reflects the 
complexity of setting target level on operational activities, wherefore multiple targets 
are perceived as necessary in order to specify coordination and motivation of 
employees. Similarly, the branches challenges how these design choices, as setting 
targets on activity level is unreasonable due to uncertainties in operational day-to-day.  
 
Yet another way to frame the coordination and motivation of employees’ performance 
is by making design choices regarding how to provide feedback to operational 
employees. Chapter 8 show how the design choices regarding feedback frame 
coordination of financial advisors in additional ways, by specifying whom it is that 
provides the information (manager or system), who it is that do the interpretation of 
the numbers (employee/peers/manager) and who it is that find out how to take action 
(employee/peers/manager). Chapter 8 displays how design of feedback in PERFORM 
was supposed to happen in a “self-management mode” denoting that it is the financial 
advisors who have the responsibility to interpret and act upon the provided 
information. Chapter 8 adds insights into how design of PMS might construct a 
distinct the coordination and motivation of financial advisors in new ways, as the 
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design of feedback influence the making of social rules and routines of interpreting 
information. The design of feedback is challenged in the branches, as financial 
advisors are not motivated by the responsibility to interpret and act upon the feedback 
by themselves, as they are supposed to in self-management feedback. Thus, the re-
design of feedback leads to coaching feedback. The coaching feedback design 
specifies new meaning to coordination, by specifying how the branch managers 
should interpret and communicate feedback in lined with coaching feedback.  
 
All in all, the three empirical chapters address my research question by showing how 
various design choices made on each of the PM elements contributes in their own 
specific ways in specifying the meaning of coordination and motivation. My analysis 
also indicates how re-design emerges from the branches contesting of the design 
choices proposed way to perceive coordination and motivation. These modifications 
to the design choices reflect alternative ways to construct the meaning of coordination 
and motivation. Consequently, I show how the studied design choices perform a 
critical role in shaping what motivation and coordination of value creation entails, but 
also how the constructed meaning is conditioned on the interaction with the context. 
Thus, this implies that any framing of what it entails to motivate and coordinate is 
always subject to new contesting and potential modifications, as any construction 
made from the design choices framing is contested when practiced.  
 
Arguably, is not surprising that it take much more than design choices to shape ideas 
of how to coordinate and motive employee contribution. Yet my study provides a 
detailed account of how design choices are contributors in doing so. However, by 
studying design choices as actors that frame and thus, overflow, we learn more about 
the limitations of making design choices in PMS with the intention to specify and 
regulate how to coordinate and motivate employees’ value contribution. This is 
exemplified by the demonstration of the role of design choices in shaping how PMS 
are incomplete in coordinating and motivating employees contribution. I also show 
how the incompleteness produced by design choices in turn influence the processes of 
constructing alternative ideas of how to coordinate and motivate value contribution. 
Consequently, we learn more of how design of PMS is conditional in nature. The 
conditionality of designing PM is an on-going process of emerging conditions that 
transform as the design choices framing are modified. Arguably, PERFORM could 
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have unfolded in many alternative ways, depending on how the interaction with 
practice influence the framing produced by the design choices. Thus, alternative 
meanings to coordination and motivation could just as well emerge. Consequently, 
making design choices to define the meaning of coordination and motivation involves 
on-going processes of negotiating new boundaries, which simultaneously creates 
alternative ideas that seek to be included. This is showed by the analysis of the 
overflows, which display how new conditions emerge to shape the ideas of motivation 
and coordination in alternative ways. Thus, my detailed study of the role of design 
choices informs us with rich details of how operational practices impacts how design 
choices shapes the functionality of PM.  
 
All things considered, my project contributes to research concerned with the design of 
PM in practice as well as the design of PM at operational level. Returning to my 
starting point, my ambition was to take a closer look on how design choices are 
central tools in the craftsmanship of designing PM.  I find that design choices are key 
tools, as they craft specific ideas of how to intervene employees in ways that 
coordinate and motivate value creation. I believe I illustrate the importance of not 
“black boxing” the role of design choices in shaping PM, as they are key contributors 
to how PM unfolds in practice. Thus, the craftsmanship of PM involves the 
understanding the conditional nature of designing PM, to which my thesis has 
contributes with some new insight. This is illustrated by showing the on-going process 
of re-designing the elements of PERFORM, which expresses alternative ways to 
frame the meaning of coordination and motivation. My study is insightful for research 
concerned with the craftsmanship of designing PM, as the toolbox for the craftsman 
should reflect detailed insight to the multiple design choices available. Also, because 
PM design is a craftsmanship, this denotes the appreciation that any design choice is a 
conditional in shaping the coordination and motivation of desired behavior. Thus, the 
craftsmanship of PM involves the understanding of the conditional nature of 
designing PM, to which my thesis has contributes with some new insight. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Overview of Interviews made during the project  
 
Table 10: An overview of phone interviews 
Phone interviews  
Function Location   Duration 
Chief Controller in 
Division PerMark 
Divisional management  1 H 
Director of Customer and 
Markets , Bank Nordic 
Divisional management 1 H 
Performance 
management  manager 
Divisional management 1 H 
Regional manager, region 
2 
Branch Y 1 H 
Branch manager  Branch , Alex 1 H 
Branch manager Branch , Kathy  1 H 
Financial advisor  Branch X 1 H 
 
Table 11: An overview of interviews 
Central management 
Function Duration (hours) Number of 
interviews 
Divisional director 1.5 1 
Head of risk management 1.5 1 
Director of Customer and 
Markets  
2. 1.5; 1.5; 1.5 4 
Chief controller in Division 
PerMark 
1.5; 1. 1.5; 1.5 4 
Internal consultant (Division 
PerMark/Bank Nordic) 
1.5; 1 2 
HR- Director Bank Nordic   1.  1 
Branch Y 
Regional manager 1.5 1 
Branch manager 1.5; 1.5; 2; 2; 2 5 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
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Financial advisor   1.5; 1 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Branch Z 
Regional manager 1.  1 
Branch manager 1.5; 1.5; 0.5 3 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5 1 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1.5 2 
Financial advisor   1.5 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5 1 
Financial advisor   1.  1 
Financial advisor   1.5 1 
Branch X 
Branch manager 1.5; 1.5; 2 3 
Financial advisor   1.5; 1.5 2 
Financial advisor   1.5 1 
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